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Abstract 
This dissertation investigates China’s recent shift in its climate change policy with 
a refined discourse approach. Methodologically, by adopting a neo-Gramscian notion of 
hegemony, a generative definition of discourse and an ontological pluralist position, the 
study constructs a theoretical framework named “discursive hegemony” that identifies the 
“social forces” for enabling social change and focuses on the role of discursive 
mechanisms via which the forces operate and produce effects.  
The key empirical finding of this study was that it was a co-evolution of 
conditions that shaped the outcome as China’s climate policy shift. In examining the 
case, a before-after within-case comparison was designed to analyze the variations in the 
material, institutional, and ideational conditions, with methods including interviews, 
conventional narrative/text analysis and descriptive statistics. Specifically, changes in 
energy use, the structure of decision-making body, and the narratives about sustainable 
development reflected how the above three types of social force processed in China in the 
first few years of the 21st century, causing the economic development agenda to absorb 
the climate issue, and turning the policy frame for the latter from mainly a diplomatic 
matter to a potential opportunity for better-quality growth. With the discursive operation 
of the “Science-based development”, China’s energy policy has been a good example of 
the Chinese understanding of sustainability characterized by economic primacy, 
ecological viability and social green-engineering. This way of discursive evolution, 
  iii 
however, is a double-edged sword that has pushed forward some fast, top-down 
mitigation measures on the one hand, but has also created and will likely continue 
creating social and ecological havoc on the other hand.   
The study makes two major contributions. First and on the empirical level, 
because China is an international actor that was not expected to cooperate on the climate 
issue according to major IR theories, this study would add one critical case to the studies 
on global (environmental) governance and the ideational approach in the IR discipline. 
Second and on the theory-building level, the model of discursive hegemony can be a 
causally deeper mode of explanation because it traces the process of co-evolution of 
social forces. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
Globalization, Global Governance and the Rise of China 
Climate change is one of the most daunting challenges facing the world politics 
today. The majority of climate scientists today agreed that there is a more than 95-% 
probability1 that human influence has been the dominant cause of the observed warming 
since the mid-20th century. They are more certain of the human influence in warming of 
the atmosphere and the ocean, in changes in the global water cycle, in reductions in snow 
and ice, in global mean sea level rise, and in changes in some climate extremes, as the 
scientific evidence has grown since 2007 according the Summary for Policymaker Report 
of the Fifth Assessment Report published in September 2013 by the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013, p. 12). These changes in the earth system can 
cause, and in many places are causing, severe social and political consequences. The rise 
of ocean-levels are threatening coastal communities; shortened water supplies and heat 
waves make the world’s food supply at considerable risk; and the risk of death or injury 
on a widespread scale, the probable damage to public health, and the displacement of 
people and potential mass migrations engendered by the changes of the natural patterns 
                                                
1. The term used in the report was “extremely likely” which was defined as a probability above 
95%. The IPCC has used the following terms to indicate the assessed likelihood of an outcome or 
a result: virtually certain 99–100% probability, extremely likely: 95–100%, very likely 90–100%, 
likely 66–100%, about as likely as not 33–66%, more likely than not 50–100%, unlikely 0–33%, 
very unlikely 0–10%, extremely unlikely 0–5%, exceptionally unlikely 0–1%. (IPCC, 2013, p. 2) 
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may increase the possibility of violent conflict over land or other resources by 
exacerbating well-established drivers of these conflicts such as poverty and economic 
shocks (IPCC, 2014a).  
Despite the recognition of the problem, how humanity should do to curb it 
remains highly controversial. Fragmented policy communities within the United States 
and all over the world can find numerous cleavages from the method of calculating the 
costs and benefits in money terms, to the philosophical grounds of responsibility and 
equity. At the international level, given the perceived urgency for collective action and 
yet the uncertainties in the assessment of risks, climate change seems to have been turned 
into an ideological strife among different state or non-state actors particularly at the 
annual climate negotiations hosted by the United Nations. The global economic recession 
has added stalemate up to the fragmentation of the global climate politics, demonstrated 
by the difficult compromise made to extend the Kyoto Protocol in 2012, whereas the 
successor of the Protocol should have been produced at the Copenhagen conference three 
years earlier.     
Responding to climate change is therefore a pressing issue for global governance 
empirically and theoretically. Empirically, the traditional approach to managing cross-
border issues by establishing international regimes and institutions appears to have 
encountered great difficulty on an issue without strong political consensus such as 
climate change. Theoretically, the conventional regime or institutionalist model of global 
governance that is mapped on a (neo)liberal-democratic conception of world order 
inescapably sees contradictions emerging from an also conceptually deeply globalized 
world. As more linkages between different issues are articulated (e.g. climate change and 
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cross-border conflicts), more type of non-state actors are identified, and more citizen 
individuals across the globe are more willing to collaborate to combat climate change 
than national governmental officials, the representation and accountability of national 
governments in global governance become questionable, shaking the democratic 
foundation of the socially constructed institutions.      
These concerns induced by the problem of climate change would propel IR 
scholars to seek alternative ways to addressing it at the national and even subnational 
levels. Along with global governance, another major theme that has occupied IR 
discussions in the twenty-first century is the rise of the China.2 For years between 2000 
and 2013, the world has seen an astonishing progress economically and militarily: the 
annual GDP growth rate was 9.8% on average (World Bank, 2015) and its military 
expenditure has quintupled (SIPRI, 2014). It has overtaken Japan and Russia to become 
the world’s second largest economy and military power since 2010 and 1998 
respectively.  
In the meantime, the material well-being in China was largely improved. From 
1990 to 2013, the GNI per capita based on purchasing power parity increased almost 12 
times from 1010 U.S. dollars to 11850 U.S. Dollars, extreme poverty (living under 1.25 
dollar/day) was reduced from 60% to 6% (as of 2011) of the population (World Bank, 
2015), and the HDI hiked from 0.49 to 0.72 (UNDP, 2014). However, environmental 
quality in China has deteriorated so much as having been regarded destructive to its 
economic fruits.  
                                                
2 The subject of China in this research refers to the mainland of the People’s Republic of China. 
The Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau are not included. 
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Moreover, when it comes to the issue of global climate change, China can rarely 
avoid responsibility and criticism because of its largest greenhouse gases emissions 
among all nations in the world.  
An Empirical Puzzle 
This project was initiated by the state behavior of the People’s Republic of China 
in June 2007. The Chinese government issued two policy initiatives— “The National 
Climate Change Program” and “The Scientific and Technological Actions on Climate 
Change”—to address the global problem of climate change at the highest level of its 
statecraft. Six months later, the Chinese participation in the 13th Conference of Parties to 
the UNFCCC at Bali, Indonesia, was reported as unprecedentedly engaged in the making 
of the Bali Roadmap. Followed by a series of policy developments on climate change, 
2007 has been considered the beginning of China’s switch to a pro-climate agenda 
(Liang, 2010).    
How can one understand this policy and attitudinal change of China? What would 
this change mean to the future of the global climate governance? These were two initial 
questions that set forth this thesis. A discursive perspective, broadly defined, is used in 
this research to explore the evolution of China’s climate policy that is tied with its 
development policy. The switch of views on climate issues reflects the transformation of 
the views on development of the policy elites under the condition of a co-evolving 
factors. Treating these factors with a sociological lens as informed in the theory “social 
facts” by Émile Durkheim, the research acquires a broader theoretical scope to possibly 
account for an empirical phenomenon that has been co-produced by the various factors. A 
discourse approach is employed to accommodate the complex effects with an approach 
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aims to identify social relationships involving non-material or non-physical elements, 
such as the, in a contextualized understanding of reality. 
Research Design 
Research Questions 
 This research focuses on the impact from the international community in terms of 
the ideational power of sustainable development on China’s domestic political processes 
and in turn its state practices. A discourse-analysis approach is employed to investigate 
the evolution of China’s climate diplomacy and its domestic politics regarding the energy 
policy.  
As the climate issue is essentially a development issue for China, special attention 
should be given to China’s development thinking and practices. Therefore, two research 
questions are posed for my study:  
1. What are the relationships between the views on development and the 
climate policies of China?  
2. Under what conditions and with what interpretive mechanisms, do the views 
on development affect China’s climate policies?  
In search for explanations for these two questions, this research has been directed 
to a reflection on the conception of power in the global environmental governance. 
Therefore, an additional research question is: 
3. How can power in governance be understood by studying this case about 
China? 
6 
 I propose a constructivist-informed approach to study this problem by exploring 
the discursive space of China’s climate change politics. More specifically, this study aims 
to investigate China’s internal and international reactions to its perceived climate change 
concerns on the rise with a discourse-analysis approach. The target discourse here refers 
to the (re)presentation of “sustainable development.” Two questions are asked through 
the analysis of the text data: “What does sustainable development mean in China?” and 
“In what ways the discourse(s) of sustainable development has involved in the framing 
and shaping of the Chinese domestic and foreign policy regarding climate change?” 
Purpose 
“This project examines how the global idea of sustainable development have been 
understood, used, presented, circulated, and reproduced, in a knowledge/power dynamic 
relation where concrete effects or political consequences are directed to happen in the 
timespan between 1992 and 2012. This project intends to achieve three goals. Firstly and 
at the empirical level, I would like to examine whether and to what extend the discourse 
of sustainable development is operating in China’s climate change politics. Secondly and 
at the theory-building level, I wish to add one critical case to the studies on the cross-
level approach to (environmental) foreign policy and the ideational approach in IR 
discipline. Thirdly and at the theoretical level, I wish to contribute to furthering the 
application of the discourse-analysis methodology and its underlying epistemological 
foundations, which emphasize the constructivist dimension of social facts, mutual 
constitution between the agent and the structure, and a constitutive type of power.  
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Theory and Design 
 As the empirical part of this project is to examine the relationships between the 
interpretations of development and China’s climate change policies, a theoretical model 
to bridge narratives and practices is needed. While details about the theoretical 
foundations and the theory-building of this research will be demonstrated in Chapter 3, 
the core idea is to acknowledge the critical realist position that multiple ontologies exist 
in contextualized social interactions (Archer, 1995; Khan & Patomäki, 2013; Archer, 
Bhaskar, Collier, Lawson, & Norrie, 1998; Wendt, 1999), and to systemize the approach 
of discourse analysis for studying those interactions and the effects they produce based 
on this epistemological position. For doing this, the concept of “discourse” needs to be 
expanded and specified in the forms of concept, narrative, and practice.   
Based on a Foucaultian understanding, Hajer and Versteeg define discourse as “an 
ensemble of ideas, concepts and categories through which meaning is given to social and 
physical phenomena, and which is produced and reproduced through an identifiable set of 
practices” (2005, p.175). This meaning-giving quality dictates that discourse must be 
context-laden. Gee (2010) provides the essence of discourse analysis as a methodology as 
“the study of language-in-use. Better put, it is the study of language at use in the world, 
not just to say things, but to do things” (p. ix). My study adopts this understanding of 
discourse, referring to things beyond “text” and will look into the context of the text. 
After all, discourse can be also regarded as “the social activity of making meanings with 
language and other symbolic systems in some particular kind of situation or setting” 
(Wodak, 2008, p. 6). Therefore, while the core unit of analysis is the “thinking blocs” as 
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ideas, concepts, and categories, practices in both articulatory and behavioral terms should 
be also under scrutiny.  
Discourses in the forms of concepts, narratives, and practices, are generally 
theorized as the “non-material” or “ideational” kind of unit of analysis in the 
conventional material-ideational divide in the philosophy of social sciences (Wendt, 
1999, Chapter 2). Drawing on the critical realist epistemological claims, which are 
heavily informed by the Frankfurt School and Gramscian theorists, I attribute three 
dimensions of inquiry to the puzzle of China’s shift towards an engaged climate effort. 
They are the material, institutional and ideational dimensions that are mapped on the 
ontologies of material, institutional and ideational forces.   
With a behavioral “shift” as the central puzzle, this is inherently a qualitative, 
case-study project employing a before-after within-case design (George & Bennett, 
2005). For case study is “a strategy of inquiry in which the researcher explores in depth a 
program, event, activity, process or one or more individuals (Creswell, 2008, p. 13),” the 
method of process-tracing is employed. Furthermore, this particular case of China on the 
international climate politics may serve as a “critical case” in the current environmental 
studies literature—could a country with still relatively low per-capita income levels and 
restrictions on domestic political participation decide to seriously engage itself with 
mitigating the climate (Ross, 1999, p. 297)? If so, the conditions under which this could 
happen and the mechanisms that could facilitate this to happen can be valuable topics of 
further study.      
Why study China using discourse analysis? Studying the narratives presented in 
China is crucial to understand Chinese society and politics because, firstly, Chinese is an 
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authoritarian regime. Speeches of the leadership are the final authority. The congruence 
between the official narratives and actual policy-design is the source of ruling legitimacy. 
Secondly, in historical traditions Chinese politics is very much defined by “words.” So 
politicians in China, compounded by the effect of the authoritarian institution, are 
extremely cautious about what they say. The lessons from the Cultural Revolution may 
also deepen the silencing effect. One may know what the highest political considerations 
really are by what the top leadership says, but can generally know what they are 
absolutely NOT.  Thirdly, the operation of censorship. This is not only a polity with 
external restrictions imposed by the suppressive state, but also a society with self-
disciplining collective awareness if not behavior. Studying the Chinese politics by 
looking at narratives and practices from a discourse perspective focuses on identifying 
the conformity and breaking-off between the two; as well as what is being said and what 
is not, why it is not, and how the saying or not-saying was done.  
Data and Method 
Data for this project consist of three categories: text data from Chinese 
publications including official statements, academic journal articles and newspaper 
articles; interactional data from formal interviews and causal conversations with Chinese 
researchers in IR from Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Peiking University, and 
Shanghai Institutes for International Studies; and an event dataset that I constructed based 
on the chronological reports by the Earth Negotiations Bulletin3. Data on the material 
                                                
3 Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) is an online reporting service owned and run by the 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). It has constantly reported all UN 
international environmental negotiations since 1992.  
10 
accounts of the Chinese developmental and environmental situations are obtained from 
various sources including the World Bank, UNDP, IEA, and the annual Statistical 
Yearbook published by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.  
Most of the text and all the interview data were gathered during my research trips 
to Beijing and Shanghai during September 2012 and January 2013, where I was affiliated 
as visiting fellow with Tsinghua University and Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. 
Due to constraints on budget and social networks, I could not the interview as many 
professionals as I initially planned, nor could the planned fieldtrips to rather rural areas in 
Jiangsu Province and Inner Mongolia be carried out for a deeper comparative view on the 
central/local divergence on energy and environmental policy implementation.  
For the text data, I collected major Chinese top-official statements between 1987 
and 2012 on development and climate issues, including the Five-Year Plans, President’s 
keynote speeches at the National Party Congress, and white papers on sustainable 
development, climate change, and energy reform. Besides, 2,056 abstracts of Chinese 
journal articles were collected based on their subject being “climate change (qihou 
bianhua)” or “global warming (quanqiu biannuan)” over the same period. These 
documents were expected to reveal the “concepts” in the policy elites’ ways of thinking 
about climate change as their prose was more condensed, and the target audience was 
experts, higher-ranked officials, industry and business leaders, and sometimes foreign 
governments.    
I also collected 1,069 news articles from the Chinese version of the People’s 
Daily, the newspaper owned by the Communist Chinese party-state and believed to 
provide direct information on the policies and viewpoints of the government, from 1989 
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to 2012. They were selected by the mentions of keywords including “global warming,” 
“climate change,” “climate negotiations (qihou tanpan)” and “scientific development 
(kexue fazhen).” These data are used primarily to trace the evolution of “narratives” in the 
policy elites’ ways of communicating about climate change. The target audience of this 
newspaper has been local officials (village or township level), school teachers, and 
presumably the general public that has completed the compulsory education.  
Coding strategies  
These text data were coded and processed with the assistance of ATLAS.ti, a 
qualitative data analysis software developed by a German company named Scientific 
Software Development. The coding strategies originated from the following questions 
(Table 1-1), adapted from Gee (2010)’s “toolkit,” and these questions served me as a 
reminder that the pursuit is to grasp the concepts and narrative frames of the concepts 
over time.   
Table 1-1 Operationalization of Research Questions 
What does sustainable development mean in China?  
- When the term “sustainable development” appears, what are the most 
common topics for the discussions involved? 
- When the term “sustainable development” appears, what are other concepts 
often referred as related concepts? 
- When the term does not appear, is there other compatible idea(s) 
concerning sustainable development originating from the Chinese 
discursive context? 
In what ways the discourse(s) of sustainable development has involved in the 
framing and shaping of the Chinese domestic and foreign policy regarding climate 
change?  
- When the term “sustainable development” is referred to as an action or an 
action-oriented goal, what are the concrete actions suggested in a given 
context? 
- When the term “sustainable development” is an action-directing phrase, 
12 
what are the reasons offered in the given context for its (past or future) 
success or failure, if any? 
- What kinds of institutions have been and to be established for encountering 
climate change? At what levels of the administration? How do they 
evaluate themselves for their performance with or without using the 
rhetoric of sustainable development? 
  
Main Arguments and Chapter Organization 
Two arguments arise from the empirical investigation through the process-tracing 
of events and texts. One is that the “shift” of Chinese climate policy can be dated back as 
early as late 2003, instead of 2007 as assumed by some authors who have written on this 
subject (Heggelund, 2007; Marks, 2010; Ma, 2010). The other is that China has produced 
a set of development narratives which absorbed the global discourse of “sustainable 
development,” and were mixed with the emphases on “harmony” and “science” as two 
indigenous mainstream narratives. The “Science-based Development” is the name 
generalizing this set of narratives. It has penetrated China’s climate policy texts and 
practices, and its proliferation basically synchronized with the degrees of progressiveness 
of the actual announced policies on climate-related issues since 2003.  
Ecological modernization and distributive justice are two major elements in the 
mainstream international discourses exemplified by a series of authoritative documents. 
In the Chinese discursive space, these two elements also appear within the rhetoric of 
“Scientific Development” and “Harmonious Society” when it is used in discussions 
regarding climate change and sustainable development. Furthermore, the politics and/or 
political decisions regarding specific climate problem seems to be conditioned by the 
relative weighing of these two elements in the discursive space—when the ecological 
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modernization factor is stronger in the heads of Chinese policy participants, the resulted 
policies/state actions tend to be more problem-oriented, focusing on management and 
institutionalization; when the distributive justice factor is stronger, policies/state actions 
tend to be more identity-oriented, focusing on conflicts (in the Marxian sense) and 
structural changes. Plausible examples are China’s most recent legal enactments on 
renewable energy for the former, and its firm stance before 2007 on the “non-promise” to 
emissions cuts by the developing countries unless the developed ones accomplish their 
reductions responsibilities first, for the latter.  
Following the present chapter, which gives an overview of the project, Chapter 2 
offers the background of the issue in terms of the international politicization of climate 
change and China’s early participation, and a review of existing works that have 
addressed the same puzzle of China’s policy shift in the 2000s. One common flaw they 
share is that they assume only one kind of ontology, be it material (e.g. energy thirst) or 
non-material (e.g. spread of knowledge within scientific communities), thus excluding 
the emergence of alternative hypothesis and the possibility of multi-causality or system 
effects.  
Chapter 3 demonstrates my building of a theoretical model that synthesizes a 
critical realist epistemology and a more flexible discourse-analysis methodology. I rely 
on theoretical resources from the writings of Antonio Gramsci and Michel Foucault to 
induce a theory and method called “discursive hegemony”. I wish to frames China’s 
behavioral shift as international “socialization” in terms of doing actions that would be 
approved within the dominant discourse in the society to which the actor perceives itself 
to belong. This formulation of socialization can mean deepening active participation in a 
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global matter, though it does not necessarily connote better compliance or cooperation. 
Studies on socialization in IR usually refer it to the internalization of global norms into 
domestic political or social environments, so they track how particular ideas became 
accepted and implemented domestically through international organizations (Katzenstein 
1996; Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). I generally agree with their methods, but I think the 
adaptation and reproduction of initially foreign ideas deserve greater attention, as 
successful domestication or “localization” can produce further interesting outcomes. And 
a discursive hegemony framework can be helpful in capturing and illustrating this aspect 
of international-domestic linkages. 
Chapter 4 goes into substantive contents of the problem in the material,  
institutional, and ideational accounts. It examines China’s developmental and 
environmental situations from the perspectives of energy needs, environmental 
degradation, climate decision-making institutions dimension, and ecologically-informing 
intellectual traditions. All the analyses aim to understand the actual and epistemological 
spaces in which China learned about the neoliberal international political economic order 
and the concept of sustainable development through its opening to the Western world 
staring from the beginning of 1980s throughout the 1990s. Intergovernmental 
negotiations on ozone depletion and climate change and professional exchanges between 
Chinese scientists and the Western oceanographers, climatologists, atmospheric 
physicists, etc., are the main catalyst of providing material and ideational references for 
China’s configuration of its legal-institutional system on the environment and resources, 
when most of China’s resource and pollution governing institutions was established in the 
1980s and 1990s [see Appendix F].  
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Chapter 6 unpacks the Chinese “Science-based Development” first publicized in 
2003, which serves as both an immediate ideational force in Chinese climate politics and 
illustrates the operation of discursive hegemony. The chapter traces the rhetorical roots in 
the imported concept of sustainable development and the tactical uses in policy contexts. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion summarizing the findings, contributions and limitations of the 
study. It also discusses how an ideational and reproductive power (eg. Barnett & Duvall 
(2005)) can find an application in this case of Chinese climate policy embedded in its 
development discourse mainly evolving from the ecologically-weak concept of 
sustainable development.  
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Chapter Two: Background of the Problem and Literature Review 
Climate Change in China  
Climate warming is happening globally as well as in China. The patterns of 
warming in China have been consistent with the global trends. In the past 100 years, the 
mean surface temperature in China has increased by 0.98 °C, with a warming rate of 
nearly 0.1°C per decade, which is slightly above the global average in the same period. In 
the 1920s-40s and 1985 onwards, most of the mainland saw an increase in annual mean 
surface temperature. In the northwestern region, northern Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau and 
most Inner Mongolia, the increase was especially evident (GoPRC, 2012, pp. 11–12). 
According to China’s Third Assessment Report (CAR-3)4 published in December 2014, 
the most recent scientific conclusion of the native researchers is that the country is likely 
to see an increase in temperatures by 1.3 to 5°C by the year of 2100 (where as the global 
                                                
4 The Chinese “National Assessment Report on Climate Change” is a national-level research 
project launched in 2002. The initial writing team was undertaken by the Vice Minister of 
Science and Technology (Li Xueyong), Head of the China Meteorological Administration (Qin 
Dahe), and Associate Dean of Chinese Science Academy (Chen Yiyu), who were not only 
responsible for organizing scientists from their respective home organization but also 
participating in the editing of the report (Ruan & China New Service, 2002). Since the Chinese 
Panel on Climate Change (CPCC) was established as the official advisory body to the climate 
change issue, the task of producing this most authoritative scientific report has been given to the 
CPCC. The CAR and CPCC are modeled on the Assessment Report and the institutional design 
of the IPCC.    
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average estimated to be 1 to 3.7°C), raising the sea levels for costal provinces by an 
average of 50 centimeters (Wang, 2014).    
The seasonal pattern of precipitation has altered, while the annual precipitation 
has roughly remained. Summer precipitation has notably increased since the 1990s, while 
that of spring and autumn decreased. The changes in precipitation were characterized by 
large regional differences, and seasonal precipitation also showed clear geographical 
variations. Under the high GHG emission scenario, however, it is estimated that the 
annual precipitation nationwide will increase by 2% to 4% by 2040.  
China’s landmass and large population determines the nature of its vulnerability 
to climate change. The mainland China contains multiple ecological and climatic 
subsystems across diverse terrains in its land area as the world’s second-largest national 
territory. Much of its territory is categorized as ecologically-fragile area with poor 
environmental carrying capacity, where 95% of absolute poverty is recorded (MEP & 
GoPRC State Council, 2008), while approximately 28 million people are under absolute 
poverty today.5  
Experts believe that China will be one of the countries most affected by climate 
change. Consequences of a warmer world are taking effect in China. In 2012 and 2013, 
frequency of extreme weather condition rose; the heat waves happening in the southern 
areas, flash floods which induced landslides and mudslides, and storms/typhoons struck 
those areas more often and more destructive. Glaciers are likely melting in the 
                                                
5 The absolute poverty line used by Chinese government is 1196 Chinese Yuan per year.  With 
the World Bank’s standard (1.25 dollars per day), however, China’s absolute poverty headcount 
can amount to 157 millions. 
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Himalayas, risking the water supply for not only China but also the neighboring countries 
like India. Freshwater supply is likely to fall by 5% by the end of this century (Wang 
2014). In parts of Yunnan Province, agriculture has been stricken by severe droughts for 
four consecutive years since 2009 (NDRC, 2013).  
The changing climate has prolonged the crop growth period in higher latitudes. In 
most Northeast region, the growing season is extended by about 10 days than it was in 
the 1960s. However, climate change had caused a drop of wheat and corn production by 
5% between 1982 and 2012, due to more frequent extreme weather events as floods and 
droughts (GoPRC, 2012, p. 12).  
For conditions about water, it has been reported that climate change has worsened 
the regional distribution of freshwater resources in China. For example, the river runoff 
and total water resource in the northern China decreased by 12%, while those in the 
southern increased by about 4% between 1982 and 2012. Since the 1950s, 82% of 
glaciers have been retreating, most of which are located on the fringes of the Qinghai-
Tibetan Plateau. 142 large lakes across the country have been shrinking, losing 12% of 
their original space. It is estimated that in next three decades, major rivers in China will 
continue experiencing reduction of runoff in the northern but increase in the southern 
region. Hai River and Luan River basins are regarded the most vulnerable areas to 
climate change on water resources.  Hotter and drier climate will likely further degrade 
wetlands, salinize local freshwater lakes and reservoirs, and reduce the diversity of 
inhabiting species. Boundaries of mangrove may be shifted north.  
Tree lines in China have risen to higher elevations. In the 2010s, the phonological 
period in spring has been advanced by 2 days than it was in the 1980s. Higher 
19 
temperatures and lessened precipitation have intensified the desertification and grassland 
degradation in the northern region, causing the forage yield to fall. In addition, sea levels 
have also risen. Between 1982 and 2012, the coastal sea level has risen at a mean rate of 
2.6 mm per year, higher than the global rate at 1.7 mm per year. Severe land erosion is 
happening in some coastal places, such as Yingkou, Liaoning province, where the 
shoreline retreats nearly 5 meters every year.  
One of the immediate threats from the hotter air to public health is heat waves, 
which can contribute to greater chances of death out of respiratory or 
cardiovascular/cerebrovascular diseases in summer. While statistics about heat wave 
damage in China are not yet available, officials have recognized that hotter weather is 
able to prolong the malaria transmission season in China, and may also expand the 
distribution of schistosome by allowing its host snails to be able to move further north 
under warmer weather (GoPRC, 2012, p. 13).  
China’s Attitude toward Global Climate Change Politics  
As mentioned in the previous chapter, as late as 2007, the Chinese government 
has fully recognized the urgency of coping climate change in major official documents 
and policy directives and been engaged in substantive actions to address it. In fact, the 
scientific attempt to approach the climate problem in terms of the rising earth temperature 
had a rather prompt start. By 1989, one year after scientific negotiations began, China 
had organized a climate change research program encompassing forty projects and 
involving about twenty ministries and five hundred experts (Economy, 1994, p. 159). But 
the willingness in research activity was not translated into political momentum for neither 
domestic nor international actions in the Chinese context until the 2000s.  
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After the UN-level climate negotiations began, China’s attitude on the emerging 
global climate regime had gone through four noticeable phases: passive-supportive from 
1990 to 1994, skeptical and reactionary from 1995 to 2001, actively participative from 
2002 onwards and more proactively engaging since 2007. 
During the FCCC’s negotiations and ratifications (1990-1994), China took a low-
profile position in this international scene because of the shortage of knowledge on the 
subject matter and insufficient negotiation skills, while its prime goal of foreign policy 
was to “return” to the international society to break the diplomatic isolation since the 
Tiananmen Square incident. Therefore, China’s initial response to the politicized climate 
issue was passive but rather cooperative, by participating in the talks and ratifying the 
FCCC almost right after its adoption at Rio.6 It was the first among the five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council to sign the treaty, and the 10th earliest state-party to 
join the Convention (Yan & Xiao, 2010).  
Starting from the COP-1 in Berlin in 1995 as parties began engaging in 
negotiations on specific matters such as funding and technological transfers, China 
gradually turned skeptical about the impact of climate agreements on its domestic 
economy, the practicality of funding and technological transfer mechanisms, and even the 
nature of the regime itself. The flexible mechanisms under Kyoto were once considered 
tools for “environmental imperialism” by a few political elites and climate policy makers 
(Yu, 2008, p. 57). Therefore, from 1995 to 2001, China acted tough on stressing the 
                                                
6 Chinese delegation signed the treaty in June 1992 during the Rio Earth Summit, and the 
People’s Congress Standing Committee ratified it in November. Ratification was received by the 
FCCC Secretariat in January 1993. 
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“differentiated responsibilities” between the industrialized (the Annex I countries under 
the FCCC) and the developing countries by forming the G77/China bloc during COPs, 
insisting on rejecting any voluntary emissions control, not to mention any legally-binding 
obligations. Its coalition with India, despite their regional military rivalry during the Cold 
War era, had been a most powerful opposition during and after the Kyoto talks (Wu, 
2012, p. 5). 
It took China four years to come to agree to the Kyoto regime.7  It ratified the 
Protocol in 2002, and the much longer ratification process compared to that for the FCCC 
can somewhat reflect the intensity of the debates both within China and between China 
and other nations (Kent, 2007, p. 168). In order for legal compliance, China submitted its 
initial National Communication to the FCCC in 2004. In the meantime, China issued a 
series of policies targeting energy efficiency and clean economy. Moreover, in 2007, 
after promulgating two of the most important comprehensive policy initiatives—The 
National Climate Change Program and The Scientific and Technological Actions on 
Climate Change—which place responding to climate change at the center of its economic 
planning and political discourse, China showed unprecedented proactiveness at the COP-
13 in Bali and became a main architect of the Bali Roadmap (Liang, 2010, p. 63; Sung, 
2011, p. 20). High leadership’s attention continued on to 2009 at the COP-15 in 
Copenhagen, where President Hu Jintao delivered a speech at the conference and pledged 
                                                
7 Chinese delegation to the Kyoto talks signed the treaty in May 1998, but the domestic approval 
did not come until August 2002. 
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China’s first quantified commitment on COⁿ emissions reduction,8 ⁠ and Premier Wen 
Jiabao oversaw the Chinese delegation through the duration of the conference. It was the 
first and the most recent time Chinese premier (head of the government) presented on 
behalf of the state to the FCCC annual convention.  
 
Table 2-1 Growth and Scale of China’s COⁿ Emissions 
Year 
Total COⁿ 
Emissions 
(Million 
Metric Tons) 
COⁿ 
Emission Per 
Capita 
(Metric Tons 
per person) 
COⁿ Emission 
Per Capita of 
the World 
(Metric Tons 
per person) 
China’s 
Share of 
Global COⁿ 
Emissions 
(%) 
1992 2375.621 2.017 3.914 11.1 
1993 2498.768 2.098 3.884 11.6 
1994 2681.799 2.228 3.852 12.4 
1995 2722.717 2.238 3.861 12.4 
1996 2841.263 2.314 3.893 12.6 
1997 3129.778 2.528 3.932 13.6 
1998 3197.556 2.563 3.898 13.8 
1999 3115.974 2.481 3.900 13.3 
2000 3271.809 2.589 3.965 13.5 
2001 3353.640 2.639 3.931 13.8 
2002 3776.828 2.956 3.991 15.2 
2003 4235.697 3.298 4.111 16.3 
2004 4744.988 3.675 4.241 17.5 
2005 5463.704 4.210 4.365 19.3 
2006 5936.036 4.551 4.430 20.4 
2007 6326.365 4.827 4.484 21.3 
2008 6684.651 5.075 4.510 22.1 
2009 7573.380 5.722 4.456 25.0 
2010 7997.044 6.012 4.590 25.4 
2011 8715.307 6.520 4.694 26.8 
  Source: USEIA (2015) 
                                                
8 China was committed to a 40-45% cut on its COⁿ emissions per unit of GDP on its 2005 levels 
by the year of 2020. Despite the controversies over the real contribution of this reduction and its 
influence on the Copenhagen conference, it was China’s first step towards quantified targets and 
timetables. 
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Hypotheses and Testing  
So why did this shift happen? Why was it 2007 that was marked as the turning 
point for the shift? This change is the dependent variable of the research of this 
dissertation. To approach the two questions posed here, a few hypotheses are formulated 
and tested below to get a preliminary picture.  
1. External material attraction 
The conventional behaviorist approach in political science postulated that material 
gains are the fundamental to drive a rational actor’s behavior. On the question why China 
joined the global atmospheric regimes that are currently operational, namely the Montreal 
Protocol and the Kyoto Protocol, financial implications have been contended. Economy 
(2010) argued that China ratified the former in 1991 only after a special multilateral fund 
for financial support and technology transfer was established (Economy, 2010b, p. 188); 
Kent (2007) argued that China’s ratification of Kyoto Protocol in 2002 was because an 
increase of GEF funding was promised at the COP-6 in 2000 (Kent, 2007, p. 171), and 
after it confirmed that its eligibility for CDM was assured (Economy, 2010b, p. 191).  
Can external material incentive explain the turn in 2007? We limit the specific 
source of external material incentive to foreign environmental aid as the aforementioned 
literature did. The derived hypothesis then is: “If foreign environmental aid causes 
China’s shift of policy attitude in 2007, then data should show significant financial 
inflows of this aid to China before (as condition for prospective cooperative behavior) or 
after (as rewards for cooperative behavior) 2007.”   
 
 
24 
Table 2-23Environmental Aid to China from Multilateral Agencies 
(Commitment amount in Constant USD 2011) 
Year GEF UN World Bank 
1991 3,157,404   197,337,765 
1992 44,897,731     
1993     384,259,105 
1994       
1995 26,183,862   33,431,897 
1996     271,376,807 
1997 89,622     
1998       
1999 1,131,118 2,731,439   
2000 38,993,994     
2001 7,076,310 401,804   
2002 4,869,385 432,751   
2003 1,637,819 648,002   
2004 32,440,964 597,328   
2005 57,257,140 622,609 1,130,964,320 
2006 39,980,039 14,512   
2007 49,580,538 429,199   
2008 23,222,342 137,406 40,132,220 
2009 23,267,702 98,559 107,679,964 
2010 26,033,979 84,600 159,796,447 
2011   150,000 130,000,000 
2012 49,044,968 1,526,579   
Source: AidData (2015)    
 
Data below are the committed amount of environmental aids, which include but is 
not limited to funds for climate-related projects, from the three major multilateral donors: 
the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank 
(Table 2-1). As shown in Figure 2-1 and Figure 2-2, it was in 2005 that China received 
the largest amount of environmental aid inflow. If we consider a time lag of one year in 
aid commitment process, the supposed behavior-changing timing should be 2004 or 
2006, disconfirming the hypothesis. However, if a two-year time lag is applied, then 
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either 2003 or 2007 could be the behavior-changing year, confirming the hypothesis. The 
details regarding how these aids were made were not attainable during this research, so 
the available evidence appears unable to disprove hypothesis that material aids drove 
China’s attitudinal shift in 2007.  
Figure 2-1 Environmental Aid to China from GEF and UN 
 
Figure 2-2  Environmental Aid to China 
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2. Internal material demand  
Lack of self-sufficiency is an important reason that drives a state to seek help 
from the outside. In the climate issue area, energy (in)security can push a state to pursue 
more cooperation or collaboration with the other actors in the international system. The 
second hypothesis is “If domestic energy insecurity causes China’s shift of policy 
attitude, data should show evident decrease of energy self-sufficiency immediately before 
the observed time.”  
The ratio between energy import and domestic consumption is a common method 
to measure a state’s energy dependence. Figure 2-3 and Figure 2-4 above clearly show 
the trend that China’s energy dependence on foreign supply has grown significantly over 
the last two decades. There was not a significant rise of dependence before 2007.9 
Moreover, if the hypothesis holds true, the time for China’s behavior change would have 
been between 2004 and 2005 because of a noticeable leap of foreign dependence (on both 
overall energy and oil) occurred between 2003 and 2004. Another hypothesis-confirming 
point of time would be 2009/2010 for the sharp increase of energy dependence from 2008 
to 2009, but not the year of 2007. Therefore, this hypothesis may be disconfirmed. 
 
                                                
9 Original data available in Appendix B. 
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Figure 2-3   Foreign Oil Dependence of China 
 
Figure 2-4   Energy Dependence of China 
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advance its foreign policy goals in the Kyoto negotiations. Indeed, the pressure imposed 
on China during climate negotiations had significantly increased since 2000, partly 
because it has approved the Kyoto Protocol and partly because its economic and GHG 
output roared during the first half of the 2000s. The awaiting 2008 Beijing Olympic 
Games also heightened the international attention to the environmental quality and 
climate responsibility of China, and perhaps contributed to China’s decision on furthering 
the climate issue in 2007.  
How to examine China’s pro-climate shift? — A Literature Review 
 As China’s environmental problems have been thought to pose great challenges to 
the world and stirred global concerns, a plethora of scholarly publications has been 
produce to discuss, analyze and predict China’s environmental policy in general as well 
as its climate policy. Most of them have noted the attitudinal and behavioral shift of 
2007, but relatively few focused on explaining why it happened. Nonetheless, the rich 
scholarship provides several investigative approaches to studying the research questions 
of this dissertation.   
 In the literature of environmental politics, the conceptual relationship between 
politics, economy and environment forms assumptions that appear to divide two research 
orientations in the field. The first one is what I call “ecological political economy.” This 
strand of research holds a general epistemological stance that the environment is the 
center around which human economic and political structures revolve, and it consists of 
knowledge from disciplines of political ecology, environmental and ecological 
economics, and ecological anthropology. Whether human is presumed to be a subjective 
agent independent from the objective nature or an integral part of an a priori order of 
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nature,10 a politico-economic problem is studied from an ecological perspective. If not as 
a subsystem under the environment, the economic system is at least seen as a channel 
between the natural and political systems in that political outcomes have inputs from the 
environmental factors of which effects are translated or mediated by economic outcomes. 
For example, ecological economics stresses the “metabolic flows” in the economy 
(Georgescu-Roegen, 1966, 1971) as the physical foundation for economic activities and 
then political stability or change.  
The second orientation is the “political economy of the environment.” Research 
results with this disposition share an assumption that political and economic conditions 
determine how the environment is utilized. Compared to “ecological political economy” 
which emphasizes the physical ecological makeup, “political economy of the 
environment” puts more stress on the economic and political origins of environmental 
problems and remedies. Thus, the system of “valuation” (Martinez-Alier, 2012) in these 
studies usually mirrors the existing business-as-usual practices, such as the monetary 
value of the services that can be provided by the environment. This is a more common 
approach seen in discussions of climate politics.  
                                                
10 The mainstream Western (Anglo-Saxon) environmental traditions inherit the philosophical 
subject-object dualism stemming from the 17th-century Continental Europe, represented by René 
Descartes, among other Enlightenment thinkers, though the legacy from the romanticist writers in 
the 18th century indeed influenced the modern eco-centric thought. On the other hand, Taoist and 
Buddhist philosophies have been considered two of the most ecologically-oriented thought 
traditions as they assume human are by nature equal to all other species, and that nature works out 
in its own way that human need not and should not interfere. More details about the 
oriental/ancient Chinese environmental thinking are discussed in Chapter 5.     
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Existing Approaches to Climate Change and China   
Social sciences literature on global climate change that belongs to the strand of 
ecological political economy largely focuses on energy, emissions, and economic output. 
The link between economic output and energy consumption is close, although scholars 
have been debating about in what ways they are related. The empirical examinations of 
the environmental Kuznets curve hypothesis have found mixed results regarding the 
relationships between income growth and environmental pollution (Dinda, 2004; Stern, 
2004). It is also inconclusive whether a statistical causal relationship from the increase of 
energy use to the increase of GDP exists. For example, Kraft and Kraft (1978) argued 
that only the reverse causality does, while Stern (1993), Stern (2000) and Soytas, Sari, 
and Ozdemir (2001) found the uni-directional relationship from the use of energy to 
economic growth in specific countries of the United States and Turkey. More others have 
found bi-directional causality between the two variables with various country- and time-
specific cases, and the majority of the existing works agrees that uni-directional causality 
runs from electricity consumption to economic growth (Ozturk 2010). That is, energy use 
and economic growth can reinforce each other, and most of the economic activities that 
produce outputs accounted directly into GDP—factory manufacturing, market-based 
exchange of commodities, and financial investments—are immediately dependent on 
electricity.  
For the single case of China, examples that examine the growth-environment or 
energy-environment nexuses have mixed but compatible results. Soytas and Sari (2006) 
found no Granger causality between income and energy use in China, while Yuan et al. 
(2008) showed a bi-directional Granger causality between GDP and energy use in the 
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long run, and unidirectional Granger causality from GDP to energy use in the short run. 
Additionally, Song et al. (2008) investigated the long-run cointegration relationship 
between per capita emissions of three pollutants (waste gas, waste water, and solid 
wastes) and per capita GDP. The results conditionally confirmed the hypothesis of 
environmental Kuznets curve in China—the three pollutants presented an inverse U-
shape trend over the period between 1985 and 2005. In sum, despite disagreement in 
method and data, studies on the economy-energy-environment nexus in China have so far 
reached an agreement that GDP and energy use reinforce each other in the long run.   
Other ecological economic works, such as Khan (2010) and Khan and Liu (2008), 
discussed more broadly the conditions of China’s energy security and water security 
respectively, assessed the future impact due to climate warming, and offered policy 
recommendations. Lin and Xu (2014) argued that environmental and climate reasons 
should drive China to change its course of economic growth and transform its overall 
economic structure, because China will be one of the main victims of climate change 
should no action be taken to facilitate a cleaner global economy.  
The most recent seminal publication on the climate change issue of China is an 
anthology by twenty-three leading climate researchers and experts in China (Wang et al. 
2012). It presents the latest Chinese understanding of climate change relevant to Chinese 
ecological and policy contexts. Most of the authors were from the major climate research 
institutions including the National Climate Center of the China Meteorological 
Administration, Research Center for Sustainable Development (RCSD) and the Institute 
for Urban and Environmental Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
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(CASS), and the Institute of Energy, Environment, and Economy at Tsinghua University; 
some were interviewed for this dissertation research.  
Chen (2012) analyzed and evaluated the economic and energy planning of the 
energy conservation targets in the 11th Five Year Plan (2006-2010). On mitigation, 
Zhuang et al. (2012) and Hu et al. (2012) reviewed and assessed the current COⁿ 
emissions reductions measures in China. On adaptation, Pan et al. (2012) constructed a 
framework for planning, monitoring, and enforcing the climate adaptative activities in 
China, and provided recommendations on future capacity building in agriculture, public 
health, coastal protection and water resource sectors. Pan and Chen (2012) discussed the 
“Carbon Budget Proposal” to constructing the post-Kyoto international climate regime. 
The proposal was said to employ a method calculating individual historical emissions and 
future responsibilities. It was presented at the FCCC venue for the first time during the 
Poznan Conference in 2008. With regard to the research questions of this dissertation, 
this set of literature in general does not (nor intend to) address policy or political change.   
Another bulk of literature belonging to the category of “political economy of the 
environment” can be further divided into three approaches when it comes to climate 
change and China.  
Structure-based approach 
This approach sees climate change as an international political conflict between 
China and the international society that wishes a greater emissions reduction commitment 
from China. Thus, studies following this approach tend to assume China as a rational 
unitary actor, most of the time represented by the central government and leadership 
only, facing external challenges from the domestic development constraints and 
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international power struggle forcing it to react. While not dismissing the physical risk of 
warming, their topics focus more often on the aspect of grand strategy and put climate 
change as an important part of the international structural change that China should or has 
been working on to respond.   
For example, Lewis (2008, 2009) reported China’s recent policy developments in 
terms of managing the strategic priorities in international climate negotiations. It was 
argued the security challenges arise due to climate change, so the leadership has been 
preparing to accommodate the adverse resource and economic implications and the risk 
of international retaliation. Climate-change policies thus have evolved to become one of 
the key components of China’s global strategy, and the cause is said to be the adjustments 
in China’s grand national strategy to suit the status as a rising power (He, 2010). China 
therefore wishes to maximize its national interests by balancing those competing 
priorities between domestic needs and international aspirations in terms of dominating 
the creation of the post-Kyoto regimes. By extension, Terhalle and Depledge (2013) 
posited that complex politics of climate change cannot be properly understood without 
reference to deeper geopolitical trends in the wider international system. So the growing 
great-power contestation between China and the US is at the core of an order transition 
that has prevented the institutional redesign in the climate governance structures.  
However, while not disapproving the importance of domestic politics and 
subnational actors, this approach does tend to downplay the complexity of social and 
even ideational factors, as well as other less visible (and most of the time less viewed) 
actors such as NGOs, public intellectuals, and expert communities, given its orientation 
from the rationalist tradition in International Relations. Therefore, when it comes to 
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change, the abovementioned studies appear to just take the 2007 shift as it is without 
feeling much need to explain it.  
Agent-based approach  
Studies with an agent-based approach tend to go into the subnational level of 
China to investigate the politics of climate change. They often focus on, but are not 
limited to, the bureaucratic structure and dynamic in the policy-making process. Policy-
making in China has become increasingly professionalized and institutionalized since the 
1980s reform (Hamrin & Zhao, 1995a, pt. 1). Although top elites have important roles, 
the dominance is fading and the competition among various bureaucratic agencies and 
organizations pervades the policy-making of many domestic national issues (Lieberthal & 
Lampton, 1992). Lampton (1987) found considerable bargaining among domestic actors 
in China, and that not all bargainers are equal because how much the ability to influence 
policies greatly relied on how far from the decision point one is situated. Lieberthal and 
Oksenberg (1988) characterized this “fragmentation” of authority in the Chinese political 
system despite a formal central-provincial-local hierarchy.  
Examining the environmental policy, Lieberthal (1997) demonstrated how the 
political domain’s vertical (tiao) and horizontal (kuai) lines of authority could impact the 
local implementation of environmental protection, because the kuai authority generally 
can exert more pressures on the local agencies. Jahiel (1997) argued that the reforms that 
have promoted economic development have also caused negative effects on the 
implementation of environmental policy. In addition, those reforms have enabled 
pollution-control policies to make use of economic incentives. 
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As climate change issue is the most closely related to economic and foreign 
affairs, which are the most professionalized fields in the Chinese policy-making system 
(Hamrin & Zhao, 1995b, pp. xxxix–xl), much research on China’s climate policy has 
taken this bureaucratic/organization approach. In her pioneering work on the topic, 
Elizabeth Economy (1994) outlined the roles and functions of various governmental units 
during the formative stage of the Chinese position in climate change negotiations. She 
found that the climate change as an issue had limited salability in the government and the 
opposition between the coalition of the environmental and scientific research bodies 
focusing on environmental protection, and that of the economic and foreign policy bodies 
emphasizing principles which did not compel them to assume responsibility for any 
action to address climate change (Ch. 5). Gørild Heggelund’s (2007) extensive account 
on the domestic and foreign policy aspects of China’s climate change policy continued 
with an organizational analysis of the climate policy-making system from the 1990s to 
2006, where the CDM inaugurated and Chinese enthusiasm for it caught the world’s 
attention. The involvement of multiple actors and bureaucratic institutions which 
represent different organizational interests may lead to fragmentation and ineffectiveness 
(Marks, 2010). Nevertheless, despite their creation of deeper understanding of actors and 
intuitions in the governmental policy-making process, most of the existing works in this 
category falls short of clearly explicating the dynamic between competing actors. This is 
not surprising given the lack of transparency in the Chinese regime; getting any access to 
know how particular interests could get adopted into policy outcomes could be risky and 
unlikely. 
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Process-based research  
Process-based approach emphasizes the interactional dimension between actors or 
between the agent and structure, and it is inclined to identify the process-variables or 
enabling mechanisms to explain “how” things happened. Yu (2008) and Kent (2007) 
focused on the interactions between China and international institutions, and both 
suggested that the domestic institutionalization under the influence of the international 
institutions is the main reason for changes in the climate policy of China.  
In recent years, attention has been given to the knowledge process in the Chinese 
foreign policy-making. The official negotiators and scientists at international negotiations 
often play the role as “knowledge brokers” between information and the domestic 
decision-makers (Litfin, 1995, p. 254). Also, more civilian research institutions and 
individuals are gaining access to affecting the actual policy process due to the increasing 
bureaucratization and professionalization in the official system (Glaser & Saunders, 
2002). On the climate issue, experts and the expert community as a whole are capable of 
affecting the climate policy outcome by bridging their research to power through 
mechanisms or channels such as government sponsored research, media presence, invited 
presentation at internal meetings, or serving on advisory committees (Wübbeke, 2013). 
With the rise of civil society in China, some have cast their focus on non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and transnational advocacy in the construction of 
China’s climate politics. Yang (2005) presented the rise of Chinese environmental NGOs 
in interaction with other social institutions in China. Schroeder (2008) examined the 
interactions between Chinese domestic environmental NGOs and the international 
environmental coalitions such as the World Wild Fund, The Nature Conservancy, 
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Greenpeace, etc. Using a similar method of process-tracing, Stensdal (2014) developed 
two mechanisms—socioeconomic developments and policy-oriented learning—to 
explain the changes in China’s climate policy in the past 35 years. These works may 
resemble the agent-based research because they also highlight the role of particular 
subjects. But what makes them process-based is that they center their analyses on how 
the subjects acquire and exercise agency, what strategies and conditions are enabling, and 
most importantly, what mechanisms via which changes have happened.  
Discourse Approach  
Applying a discourse approach to studying environmental politics in general or 
just climate change is not uncommon today (Dryzek, 2005; Pettenger, 2007; Hajer, 1995; 
Litfin, 1995). However, to the best of my knowledge, using discourse as a method for 
analyzing Chinese climate politics has been a rare practice. Yang and Calhoun (2007) 
explored China’s recent greenspeak in the public sphere consisting of environmental 
NGOs, mass and alternative media, and the Internet. They argued that in China a green 
public sphere has risen with the participation of nonstate actors such as private citizens 
and citizen organizations into the production and circulation of environmental narratives, 
and this discursive activity had created public pressure that halted the damming project of 
the Nu River in 2004. Eberhardt (2015) challenged Yang and Calhoun’s argument with 
the observations of the “low-carbon” lifestyle discourses in Beijing and found that the 
Chinese green public sphere appears to be driven by many things, particularly the 
government’s official propagandas, but clear concerns with the environment per se. In a 
different context, Sung, (2011) talked about the Chinese official rhetoric for climate 
negotiations, as China has used notions of “historical responsibility,” “survival 
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emissions” and “luxury emissions” extensively across time to position itself in the 
international climate talks and harness its economic interests.  
These works share the commonality that they treated discourse in a 
communicative rather than a generative sense. Discourse was conceptualized and utilized 
in the way that it is linguistic and symbolic means used for raising awareness (Yang & 
Calhoun, 2007, p. 214). The meanings conveyed and the articulated connections between 
different notions were not elaborated. As the discourse approach I propose stresses more 
on the generative sense, my research will contribute to this part of literature on Chinese 
climate politics. The construction a theory and analytical framework that I call discursive 
hegemony is the content of next chapter.  
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Chapter Three: A Theory of Discursive Hegemony 
Discourse Approach to World Politics and the Politicized Environment  
The rationalist theoretical approaches dominant in the study of world politics— 
neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism, and Marxism11— define goals and interests in 
terms of objective material conditions. In contrast, reflectivist approaches see policy-
making as a fundamentally intersubjective activity, rather than just as a mechanical 
pushing and pulling of nation-states and their agents around externally-determined 
interests. The “sociological and interpretative turn” (Guzzini, 2000, p. 147), which 
marked the challenge raised by the latter to the former in the discipline of International 
Relations (IR), took place in the late 1980s and continued on as the fourth “great 
debate,”12 and has generated a cornucopia of studies identifying new actors and 
developing new subjects, methods and research programs. A variety of “social facts”13 in 
                                                
11 The Marxist IR theories here refer to those applications built on the structuralist understanding 
of Marxism to especially the world economy, namely the world-systems theory (Wallerstein, 
1979; Arrighi, 1994) and dependency theory (Frank, 1967).  
12 The four major debates in the discipline of IR are: realism versus idealism, classicism 
(traditionalism) versus scientism (behavioralism), neorealism versus neoliberalism, and 
rationalism (positivism) versus reflectivism (post-positivism) (Kurki & Wight, 2010). The 
neorealist-neoliberal one is considered an inter-paradigm debate and has been mostly resolved, 
thus some scholars only recognized the other three as “great” debates (Lapid, 1989; Reus-Smit & 
Snidal, 2008).  
13 In the formulation by Émile Durkheim (1982), the notion of “social facts” refers to 
“representations and actions” consisting of “manners of acting, thinking, and feeling external to 
the individual (p.52)” as “states of the collective consciousness (p. 40)“. Examples of social facts 
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international life, such as identities, interests, norms, scientific experts, and discourse, 
have become available being articulated in theoretical, empirical and practical horizons of 
the field (Checkel, 1998).14   
To a significant extent, despite much divergence and disagreement among 
themselves, reflectivists in general share the recognition of the methodological 
inseparability between international and domestic realms. That is, a state-actor at the 
international level cannot be an atomized, unitary entity to have its preferences and 
interests constructed independently without the subnational-level entities.15 After all, the 
mission of the reflectivist project can be seen as “to erase the artificial boundaries 
between international and domestic politics so that the dynamic between structure and 
choice can be illuminated (Adler & Haas, 1992, p. 367).” The abovementioned 
international social facts are products of the constant mutual construction between agents 
and between agent and structure;16 their meanings and ways of operation can be better 
understood with a view of the world that is social and interactional.  
A key problem reflectivists also share, therefore, is the relationship between 
knowledge and power. Most of them defend the notion that reality is socially constructed 
based on interpretations. Interpretation, by its nature, is discursive. As Litfin (1995) 
                                                                                                                                            
can include formal or informal societal institutions such as the division of labor, kinship and 
marriage, language, religion, government organizations, etc.  
14 Some classic examples are Katzenstein (1996), Finnemore (1996), Klotz (1995), Enloe (1990), 
Haas (1990), Campbell (1992), and Milliken (1999), among others.  
15 For instance, the norm literature discussed “norm entrepreneurs”(Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998), 
and some discourse literature, while emphasizing more on the production of meanings, discussed 
“knowledge brokers” (Litfin, 1994).   
16 However, as Fearon and Wendt (2002) suggested, the rationalist-constructivist debate should 
halt at the methodological front as the radical/postmodern form of reflectivism that challenges the 
ontological level of social reality would not bring fruitful discussion.  
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rightly points out, “If reality is socially constructed, then it must be constructed through 
the primary medium of social exchange: language (p.252).” Conceptually, what is needed 
to connect knowledge and power is discourse and the exercise of it—discursive practices 
that include primarily, but are not limited to, all explicit forms of expression such as 
speaking, writing, painting, singing, publishing, etc.17  
Environmental issues are by nature some of the most knowledge-dependent 
political problems as the understanding of causes, measurements, and possible solutions 
of environmental degradation almost all the time requires scientific knowledge from 
multiple academic fields. Early interest in global environmental degradation as a political 
issue stemmed from the concern with the ecological limits of human societies, in which 
socio-economic catastrophes could happen in consequence of the breakdown of those 
limits (Hardin, 1968; Meadows, Meadows, Randers, & Behrens III, 1972; Ehrlich, 1968; 
Catton, 1980). These works suggested a doomsday picture of the future, warning of 
problems due to overpopulation and resource depletion over relatively long time 
horizons. The 1980s saw the merging of environmental degradation with world politics in 
two ways. One occurred in security studies. Analysts conceptualized environmental 
degradation as a security threat, with growing sophistication over time and increasing 
emphasis exclusively on climate change (Gleick, 1993; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Barnett, 
2003). The other path was institutionalist studies tackling ozone depletion and global 
warming as global commons problems (Haas, Keohane, & Levy, 1993; Susskind, 1994; 
                                                
17 In a Foucaultian sense, subjugation in the form of compliance with, silence from, or 
internalization of certain “truth” also comprises of many discursive practices that are equivalently 
powerful and worth investigating.  
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Yamin & Depledge, 2004) within the broader field of international regimes. In recent 
years, the further mainstreaming of the environment into IR has appeared as to the 
rethinking of conventional IR theories and even the nature of international relations from 
an environmental perspective (Eckersley, 2004; Stripple & Bulkeley, 2014; Laferrière & 
Stoett, 1999). The discourse approach to global environment arose almost in parallel with 
the reflectivist revolution in IR (Hajer, 1993; Litfin, 1994; Dryzek, 2005; Hulme, 2009). 
Sociologically informed, those works with analyses of discourses or discursive practices 
have shed light on the roles and operation of various agents and scientific knowledge in 
our understanding of world politics.  
Discourse Method and Climate Change  
Having presented the broad picture of the discourse approach and the 
development of its application, I shall discuss how the concept of discourse is used and 
introduce the other operational definitions in this dissertation. As mentioned in Chapter 1, 
discourse is an ensemble of ideational entities that has meaning-giving capacity and 
quality. Those ideational entities can be concepts, ideas, categories, and exclusions (i.e. 
what the subject is not).  Dryzek (2005) defines discourse as follows: 
A discourse is a shared way of apprehending the world. Embedded in language, it 
enables those who subscribe to it to interpret bits of information and put them 
together into coherent stories or accounts…Each discourse rests on assumptions, 
judgments, and contentions that provide the basic terms for analysis, debates, 
agreements, and disagreements (p.9).    
 As such, discourse is not the same as a text or speech itself, but the message the 
text or speech tries to convey or gets interpreted (depending on many factors such as the 
receiver’s understanding). The concept of discourse is usually beyond the concept of text 
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or narrative, as text or narrative portrays a protagonist act and emphasizes the subjective 
quality of an activity, while discourse is by definition social and interactional.  
Discursive practices, as mentioned above, are activities of expression with or 
without actual linguistic uses. If there are meanings created, messages sent and received, 
there exist discursive practices. A discourse approach is then a methodological position 
that stresses frameworks of meaning. These meaning may or may not have structural 
effects. By contrast, the rationalist and some reflectivist theories stress on agents or 
agent-derived structures.18  
 Discourse analysis is a mode of research investigating discourses and/or 
discursive practices with the purpose of identifying what meanings are at work, what 
effects they produce, and how they come into effect in the given society. To be noted, 
discourse analysis reserves the space for reflectivity between the social meanings in the 
society and the researcher’s interpretations of them. That is, epistemologically, discourse 
analysis would not require a separation between the research subject and object, but that 
does not mean there has to be no distinction as some postmodern thinkers contend. The 
researcher would normally set up her own rules of method for judging the quality of data 
and validity of arguments about her observations, and the fellow researchers in the 
discipline would evaluate the results with the disciplinary standards. Objectivity 
emanates from long-term intersubjectivities.     
                                                
18 By “agent-derived” structures, I mean the regularized patterns of the operation of some social 
fact that are a mechanical extension from or just a simple aggregation of the attributes of the 
consisting agents. For example, the neorealist theory (Waltz, 1979) posits that the international 
structure is ordered by the distribution of capabilities of the major powers (states) in the system, 
despite its stress on the structure determining individual agent’s behavior (Donnelly, 2000). In my 
view, neorealist formulation of structure illustrates an agent-derived structure. Studies of 
epistemic communities are agent-based (see Chapter 2).    
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Why do environmental studies adopt a discourse approach and how is it useful? 
Some environment scholars have offered their reasons (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005; Dryzek, 
2005).  
First of all, nature needs to be rendered linguistically intelligible. Environmental 
problems tend to be interconnected and complex; they are not simply physical events but 
inherently discursive phenomena because making sense of them requires studies as 
struggles among contested knowledge claims (Litfin 1995, 254). Without such an 
interpretative process, it would be hard to imagine problem-solving at all (Dryzek, 1997, 
p. 9).19  
Second, adopting a discourse approach reveals agency in the policy-making 
process, broadly defined. Identifying and investigating discourses enable one to see how 
a diversity of actors actively trying to influence the definition of the problem, particularly 
with environmental degradation. Discourse analysis may benefit the understanding of 
environmental politics and policy in this way. Moreover, various studies have shown how 
distinct actors exercise power through trying to impose a particular frame or discourse 
onto a discussion. This supports the point that discourse analysis should not be 
understood as a type of analysis in which ideas dominate but actors have no important 
                                                
19 However, linguistic activities generate the practical environmental problem-solving process not 
necessarily via mutual understanding or consensus. Drawing on the case of the “ecological 
modernization” in the Netherlands (Hajer, 1995), Hajer and Versteeg commented that “the fact 
that actors debate nature in shared terms does not mean that they understand each other…actors 
that can be proven not to fully understand each other can still produce meaningful political 
interventions” (2005, p. 177). Assuming that mutual understanding precedes collective action 
may conceal discursive complexity, while sometimes the effect of confusion and 
misunderstanding can be very functional for generating political coalition. One example nicely 
illustrating of this point is the construction and operation of the discourse of sustainable 
development, which will be discussed in Ch.4. 
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role. On the contrary, “they are actively ‘positioning’ themselves and others drawing on 
discursive categories” (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p.177). 
This brings out the third strength of discourse analysis: its capacity to illustrate 
processes. Political studies want to know answers to “how” questions once “what” 
questions are addressed. Because discourses help to define common sense and legitimate 
knowledge, meanings and relationships between the layers and dimensions of a problem 
are constructed through discursive practices. As such, the analysis of discourses can help 
illuminate why certain definitions do or do not catch on at a particular place and time and 
to explain the mechanisms by which a policy does or does not come about.  
The case of the contemporary climate change politics can illuminate all the three 
merits of discourse study above. For instance, the discourse of “survivalism” used to 
present the urgency of mitigating the warming in terms of the “2°C (3.6°F)” threshold 
can remind us some facts about the scientific complexity of the periodic average 
atmospheric temperatures. COⁿ is actually one of the key reasons why Earth is habitable 
compared to Mars for its heat-trapping capacity (McKay, Toon, & Kasting, 1991).20 
Besides, whether the threshold should be 2°C or another scale had gone through heated 
debates,21 not to mention the doubts cast upon the contribution of COⁿ concentration to 
the earth’s surface temperatures based on hypotheses such as the glacial cycles and the 
“global cooling” effect of volcanic activity. The meteorological system of the Earth and 
                                                
20 Recent proposals on “terraforming” Mars (National Geographic, 2010) illustrate the physical 
nature of COⁿ and its possible effects in different human and social contexts.       
21 In short, many have agreed 2°C is more of a political and ethnic campaign for mobilizing 
popular efforts, rather than a genuine consensus in scientific communities. See Jaeger & Jaeger 
(2010) for an assessment of this perspective.   
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its interactions with the other systems is extremely complex, and scientific investigations 
and articulation are the most organized and perhaps most important channel for human to 
understand it.  
Moreover, in the realm of politics, it was the climate sciences that have been use 
to settle political contentions despite the scientific complexity. One event happened in the 
United Kingdom in 2007, where a civilian campaign urged the British government to 
tighten the provisions of its forthcoming Climate Change Bill. The campaigners made 
newspaper and magazine advertisements, appealing to the authority of science by 
claiming, “scientists have agreed that the Earth must not exceed an average temperature 
rise of 2°C, otherwise catastrophic climate change will be inevitable” (Hulme, 2009, p. 
103). This example of tracing the survivalist discourse of 2°C also reveals more and more 
actors of various type— governments, businesses and civilian organizations—have been 
involved in the construction of the environmental problem and politics of climate change.  
Finally, the 2°C example can also inform us one key mechanism in the climate 
politics as a process: the discursive use of scientific knowledge and even the name of 
science itself. As Hulme (2009) notes, it is assumed that “…science has the authority to 
make definitive and universal statements about what is and what is not dangerous for 
people and societies and, ultimately, for the world.” Another symbolic discourse is equity 
in international negotiations. The G77/China have framed equity in terms of the equal 
rights to economic development, whereas the Umbrella Group,22 led by the United States, 
                                                
22 G77/China and the Umbrella Group are two party-groupings for the multilateral climate 
negotiations under the UN. The G77 is a historical coalition among developing countries 
currently with 133 members. It was founded in 1964 and now functions as one common 
negotiation position in the UN system. At the UNFCCC, G77 and China have allied since the 
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have framed the term as equal level of participation in the mitigation efforts when it 
comes to the allocation of responsibilities for mitigating GHG emissions. Tracing the 
other discourses such as “risk,” “security,” or “sustainability” can greatly help to 
demonstrate and explicate the evolution of state attitudes and positions on climate 
change.   
Construction of Discursive Hegemony 
The dissertation adopts a theoretical model called discursive hegemony to further 
examine the effects of discourse on China’s climate policy. The examination and 
evaluation will be presented in Chapters 4 to 6. In the rest of this chapter, I will explain 
what a theory of discursive hegemony is and discuss how it is formulated.  
The notion of discursive hegemony refers to a condition under which a confluence 
of material, institutional, and ideational forcings is formed to be an order with a dominant 
discourse that gives appropriate meanings to the development of each forcing and 
justifies the action contributing to the persisting of that order. This model is built upon 
the reading of the conception of knowledge/power by Michel Foucault into the 
conception of hegemony coined by Antonio Gramsci.  
                                                                                                                                            
1990s, and the Chair of the G77 in New York often speaks for the G-77 and China as a whole. 
However, because the G-77 and China is a diverse group with differing interests on climate 
change issues, individual developing countries also intervenes in debates, as do groups within the 
G-77, such as the African States, the Small Island Developing States and the group of Least 
Developed Countries. 
The Umbrella Group was formed following the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, and consists of 
non-EU developed countries including the Unites States, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, 
Norway, the Russian Federation, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (UNFCCC, 2014).  
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Gramscian Legacy 
A critical theorization of Gramsci’s notion of hegemony explores the interface of 
ideas, institutions and material capabilities as “social forces” (Cox, 1981) in the course of 
their shaping of the specific contours of the regime. While Gramsci’s writing was 
grounded in a specific historical context of the Italian State and society in the 1920s and 
1930s, nor did he give a clear-cut, modern social-scientific type of definition for 
hegemony as he believed that a concept cannot be considered in abstraction from the 
particular situations to which it is applied (Cox, 1996, pp. 49-50), a so-called “neo-
Gramscian” approach has emerged since the 1980s to address the global political 
economy (Cox, 1983, 1987; Gill, 1993, 2000; Morton, 2007).   
In traditional Marxist-Leninist literature, the concept of hegemony originally 
meant the political leadership of the proletariat over other exploited classes against the 
exploiting capitalist class. Gramsci picked up the concept and theorized it to explain not 
only the political but also the “moral and intellectual” leadership that requires “an 
ensemble of ideas and values [to] be shared by a number of sectors” in the society as a 
whole (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, pp. 66–7).  
In the context of class relations, Gramsci discussed hegemony in the sense of a 
historical moment at which the ruling class gains domination over the subordinate classes 
through primarily a mechanism of consent, as opposed to simple physical force or 
coercion. The conception of “historic blocs” refers to the dominant configurations of 
material capabilities, ideologies and institutions under hegemony; and role of elites acting 
as “organic intellectuals” forging the historic blocs. The collective consent on this 
hegemonic order thus can be viewed as a self-enforcing culture. For example, the 
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hegemonic culture of capitalism enables the bourgeoisie to maintain control over the 
other classes not just through violence, but also through ideology. This culture 
propagated its own values and norms, and they become internalized by the subordinate 
classes as being universally beneficial, thereby harnessing the leadership of a capitalist 
state and the class status-quo in the society. Likewise, achieving a cultural hegemony 
should be the grand strategy for the anti-capitalist alliance during its struggle in order to 
succeed in a social revolution.  
Discourse: the missing link 
Although Gramsci’s formulations of historic blocs and in turn, hegemony, 
recognize the political and social agencies separated from economic conditions, there 
seems to be still a theoretical problem as to how the agent-structure relationship can make 
social transformation happen—a central concern for practical politics for him. Gramsci, 
defying the economic determinism as what he called “mechanical historical 
materialism,”23 indeed emphasized ideology and the roles of intellectuals and education 
in the revolutionary effort. However, it appears that ideologies are more instrumental than 
generative; he explained ideology as forces that “‘organise’ human masses, and create the 
terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle, etc.” 
(Gramsci, 2006, p. 15). In other words, ideology is an effective tool that can be used by 
social classes (most of the time, just the elite intellectuals) under hegemony for status-quo 
                                                
23 In criticizing the simple economic determinist view, Gramsci wrote, “Mechanical historical 
materialism does not allow for the possibility of error, but assumes that every political act is 
determined, immediately, by the structure, and therefore as a real and permanent (in the sense of 
achieved) modification of the structure” (Gramsci, 2000, p. 191).  
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maintaining or counter-hegemonic purposes. It is similar to the “popular beliefs” 
mentioned by Marx, as Gramsci wrote:  
It is worth recalling the frequent affirmation made by Marx on the ‘solidity of 
popular beliefs’ as a necessary element of a specific situation… The 
analysis…tends, I think, to reinforce the conception of historical bloc in which 
precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form (2006, p.15, 
emphasis added).  
As such, theoretically, if the non-material ideational social force is instrumental 
and its exercise purposeful, while the agency of the elite intellectual class is granted, by 
what means do the intellectuals play their role in mobilizing the masses? Furthermore, as 
the analysis and theory construction of hegemony is class-centered and therefore still 
historical materialist (in a more sophisticated historicist way compared to the 
deterministic view that he rejected), what would be the theoretical origin of the 
counterhegemonic ideology? If ideas and ideologies originate from or along with class 
formation, then the agency of the intellectual to use them seems to be called into 
question.  
This is where I think discourse as a theoretical component can kick in. After all, 
the hegemony in Gramsci’s depiction is clearly discursive; material, ideas, and 
institutions all have structural power on individual and society. What is missing in the 
conceptual map is a mechanism to make the structuring process start. And discourse is 
the missing piece.   
Discourse, power, and Foucaultian insights 
The conceptions of discourse and discourse method in this dissertation are 
inspired by the work of Michel’s Foucault, which centers on the notions of truth and 
power/knowledge in terms of their mutual constitution and reinforcement. One cannot 
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probably define any one of these key concepts without the others as they operate together 
conceptually. In Foucault’s investigation of clinics, prisons, and sexuality, they were seen 
as working together producing real effects in human societies.  
Foucault’s writing is all about power. More specifically, it is the mechanisms of 
power (as he called a “microphysics of power”) that he had engaged in extracting from 
social and psychological contexts by studying not only institutions but knowledge. 
Foucault examined institutions such as hospitals and prisons, and the knowledge and 
identities operating underneath them (Foucault, 1979). The first feature of the Focaultian 
power is that it is omnipresent; one is never outside it (1980, p. 141). Power permeates in 
every aspect of an individual’s life as well as human history; domination and resistance 
exist everywhere (while whether they can be “known” is another matter). This is also the 
first point from which Foucault and the conventional liberal or Marxist (including 
Gramsci’s) conception of power differ: the conventional and the Gramscian power still 
hold a modernist belief in the possibility of emancipation from power relations (Litfin, 
1994, 20).  
The omnipresent and inescapable attributes relate to a second feature of the 
Foucaultian power that not only it is repressive, but also, more importantly, it is 
productive based on knowledge and discourse. As he asks:  
If power were never anything but repressive, if it never did anything but say no, 
do you really think one would be brought to obey it? What makes power hold 
good is simply the fact that…it traverses and produces things, it induces pleasure, 
forms knowledge, produces discourse (1980, p.119).  
In this sense, the power effects can be meandering, contingent and diffuse, while 
the power is still totalizing and structuralizing as “webs” or “networks.” As such, 
Foucault’s way of analysis is again unlike Gramsci’s which treats power as potentially 
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exercisable and controllable by a subject/class. Although Foucault does not disregard the 
real, directional exertion of power in the form of class domination, his main concern is 
“how” this form of power works by knowledge production, identity formation/exclusion, 
and social acculturation. In other words, it is to study how a cultural hegemony, 
regardless of the existence of class divisions, could come into being and keep operating.   
Discourse is therefore critical in analyzing this power/knowledge dynamic, with 
cultural hegemony as one of its tangible forms. The intermediate purpose of studying 
discourse is to extract a “discursive régime,” which is about “what governs statements.” 
As Foucault explains it, investigating a discursive régime asks “the way in which [the 
statements] govern each other so as to constitute a set of propositions which are 
scientifically acceptable”. And the ultimate purpose is to reveal the power relations that 
“at this level it’s…a matter of…what effects of power circulate among scientific 
statements, what constitutes, as it were, their internal régime of power, and how and why 
at certain moments that régime undergoes a global modification” (1980, p.112; emphasis 
added). As such, to understand cultural hegemony in a power/knowledge sense is to think 
about the discursive foundations of those beliefs, norms, and values promoted in the 
hegemony and those others that are rejected or ignored.  
Discursive hegemony as a research method 
Simply installing a Foucaultian discursive perspective on the Gramscian 
hegemony is not the theory of discursive hegemony. As a research method, it is a 
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synthesis of them with a few meta-theoretical settings.24 Regarding ontology, which 
refers to “theory of being,” the discursive hegemony theory holds an ontological 
pluralism shared with the critical realist position. The world is made of concrete objects, 
ideas and “things” that exist but whose existence may be beyond the available human 
comprehensibility. Epistemologically, the theory postulates the range of knowledge is 
within the discursivity of the ontologies. It is the range of human comprehensibility, and 
the means by which we come to have knowledge of the world is discursive ability. 
Discursive hegemony includes a hegemony of knowledge, which has defined the naming 
and ordering of the ideational or material “things” existing in the epistemic world, with 
the consent from the subjects of knowledge (human). Thus, the methodology of a 
discursive hegemony theory would be based on a discourse approach. Methods for 
unearthing data and evidence include those able to reflect the proper discursivity of the 
object of study. The method selection thus can be very inclusive as long as the researcher 
appreciates the process of research is a (re)construction of the knowledge in the system 
for hegemonic or counter-hegemonic purposes.     
Relating the discursive hegemony theory which presents a self-generating 
circulation of power, the methodological approach to studying an actual case of social 
change would focus on investigating two sets of problematiques. One is to identify the 
ontological social forces as material, institutional, and ideational kinds; they construct the 
“historic blocs” or hegemonic structure of the specific historical moment. The other is to 
                                                
24 Meta-theoretical specifications are the assumptions used by a theory to see the world. The 
categories are defined as follows: ontology as the different object domains, epistemology as the 
criteria for accepting or rejecting particular knowledge claims, and methodology as criteria for 
choosing particular methods of study (Kurki & Wight, 2010). 
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identify the mechanisms in discourses that circulate within the specific hegemonic 
structure; they construct the “discursive régime” that connects the discursive practices 
done towards the recognized ontologies, constructing the knowledge we have about them 
thus the world. Specifically, to detect and analyze the deployment of power, three axes 
need to be explored: institutional centralization around governmental agencies, the 
emergence of new instrumental knowledge, and the diffusion of power effects over 
society as a whole (Hajer & Versteeg, 2005, p. 180).25  
 The following three chapters will substantiate discursive hegemony at the global 
and national levels. While showing how the existing global climate regime can be a 
reification of discursive hegemony, more emphasis will be placed on China and its 
seeming transition toward an environment- and climate-aware government.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
25 These categories are formed partly in the light of Foucault’s notion of governmentality. Stripple 
& Bulkeley (2014a) explains the concept: “As indicated by the semantic linking of the words 
governing and mentality, broadly speaking governmentality deals with how particular 
mentalities—ways of thinking and acting—are invested in the process of governing… 
governmentalities were understood ‘in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing 
human behavior’” (p. 9). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 55 
Chapter Four: The Global Discursive Hegemony for Climate Change 
As one of the most entrenched global commons problems today, the career of 
climate change problem in the world politics is relatively short but complex. The finding 
of the warming the earth’s atmosphere has risen from a natural scientific exploration to 
become a center of multilateral negotiations and various subjects of study in politics and 
economics since the 1990s. The climate agenda today is loaded with many issues, so that 
the politics dealing with how to respond to the problem has become extremely complex. 
Climate issue is seen as an energy issue, a technology issue, an environmental issue, an 
economic issue, an international development issue, an equity issue and an international 
law issue. This chapter discusses the formation and operation of the discursive hegemony 
for climate change at the global level by briefing the history of the climate regime with a 
discourse approach.  
Problematizing the Climate 
Climate change as it is today is a “man-made” problem in two senses: physical 
and discursive. From a long-term perspective, meteorological changes in the earth’s 
climate in the past 800,000 years have been constant. Natural forces such as sun’s energy, 
volcanic activities, wobbles in Earth’s orbit, feedback of ice sheets, and ocean currents 
could all cause both long, gradual swings and short, sudden shifts in our climate. Carbon 
dioxide (COⁿ) is one of the heat-trapping gases existing in the earth’s atmosphere. Other 
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gases include methane, nitrous oxide, some chemical substances such as 
chlorofluorocarbons, and water vapor.26 Heat-trapping molecules of these gases that exist 
naturally in the atmosphere cause the greenhouse effect, keeping the Earth’s surface 
temperature 30 degrees Celsius warmer than it otherwise would be. COⁿ is thus essential 
to preserving life on Earth (Climate Central, 2012, pp. 31–32). 
The discursive turn started from the 1970s. In the aftermath of the great public 
attention to the several hot summers during the decade and the following tremendous 
scientific progress, the majority of scientists have come down to a general agreement 
over three things regarding climate change as the rising surface temperatures of the earth: 
(1) it is the anthropogenic emissions of COⁿ that increased the amount of COⁿ in the 
atmosphere; (2) increased atmospheric COⁿ caused warming of our planet; and (3) the 
warmer air and ocean waters melt glaciers and ice caps and the ocean waters expand, 
causing sea levels to rise and further contribute to accelerating the warming dynamic 
(Climate Central, 2012, pp. 21–24). Today, it is also believed that human activities have 
been accelerating the accumulation of heat. Compared to 1880, 2012 was recorded to be 
1.53°F (0.85ºC) hotter in terms of the average temperatures of all land and ocean surfaces 
according to the preponderance of evidence compiled by the IPCC (IPCC, 2013, p. 3). 
Also, two-thirds of the warming has occurred since 1975, at a rate of roughly 0.15-
0.20°C per decade according to an ongoing analysis conducted by NASA (Carlowicz, 
2014).  
                                                
26 COⁿ is the more significant component in global warming (despite the quantity of water vapor 
is 100 times of than its amount  in the atmosphere) because of it’s atmospheric lifetime, the 
second largest amount of the identified GHGs, and the associated warming ability. 
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Evolving from Science to Politics  
With the help from scientific knowledge, a new global problem emerged. To date, 
human response to global warming has been often depicted as a history of building an 
international regime.27 Having been conceptualized as a collectivity of material and non-
material (ideational) components (Ruggie, 1975; Haggard & Simmons, 1987; Keohane & 
Nye, 1987), regime is commonly defined as “principles, rules, norms and decision-
making rules around which actors’ expectations converge (Krasner, 1982, p. 186);” 
international organization thus constitute the best embodiment of an international regime 
over an international issue, and is taken as a proper example illuminating the Gramscian 
thinking on hegemony (Cox, 1983). The process of constructing the climate regime, as 
will be illustrated below, is a process in which many distinct actors and social forces are 
involved, constructing knowledge about the commons problem and a consented order (or 
disorder).   
The formation of the climate regime has gone through three stages: agenda 
formation, negotiation and operationalization (Young, 1998, pp. 4–20). The early 
development of the international climate change regime took place roughly between 1979 
and 1988. This period saw a transition of the concern about the problem from the 
scientific to the political arena. First identified by Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in 
1896, the greenhouse effect contributed by anthropogenic emissions of COⁿ was not 
treated seriously in the scientific community until the 1950s. In 1957, the Mauna Loa 
                                                
27 See Appendix A. for a chronological account of the construction of the global climate change 
regime.  
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Observatory in Hawaii was established as part of the research initiatives under the 
International Geophysical Year launched by International Council of Scientific Union to 
monitor atmospheric COⁿ concentrations. The research on the surface temperatures and 
the atmospheric COⁿ concentrations started to boom, and their findings, as well as the 
readings from the Mauna Loa Observatory soon convinced most of the scientists that they 
were growing at the same time in the post-industrial revolution period.28  
The scientific community, along with some national government delegates, was 
brought to the First World Climate Conference in 1979, organized by the World 
Meteorological Organization (WMO). The World Climate Conference established the 
World Climate Program, which later organized a series of workshops for international 
scientific community, which had generated an emerging consensus that climate change 
posed a legitimate threat to the globe by 1985. 
Agenda Formation Stage (1988-1990) 
The culmination of these scientific endeavors was the World Conference on the 
Changing Atmosphere, held in Toronto, Canada, in June 1988. At the Toronto 
Conference, participants that included researchers, policy officials, environmentalists, 
and business representatives, agreed on the first concrete target and timetable for 
controlling GHG emissions, calling upon states to reduce their COⁿ emissions 20% below 
                                                
28 Important scientific findings by the 1980s include the so-called Keeling curve (Keeling, 1960), 
showing this rise, is one of the few undisputed facts in the climate change controversy, and led to 
the initial growth of scientific concern in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Improvements in 
computing power during the 1970s and 1980s allowed scientists to develop much more 
sophisticated computer models of the atmosphere for global warming predictions. Additionally, 
later in the mid-1980s, scientists came to recognize other greenhouse gases such as methane and 
nitrous oxide, making the problem more difficult to tackle than formerly believed (Bodansky, 
2001, p. 24). 
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the 1988 levels by 2005 (WMO, 1988, p. 296). A few months later in November of the 
same year, the IPCC was co-created by the WMO and the UNEP as a neutral advisory 
board that aggregates, synthesizes, and circulates scientific knowledge on climate change 
and evaluates response strategies. Its First Assessment Report was published in 1990, 
serving the opening of the international political negotiations.  
Two concurrent episodes in the latter half of the 1980s boosted the successful rise 
of political and public attention to global warming. Firstly, the second half of the 1980s 
was a period of increased concern about global environmental issues generally. Depletion 
of the stratospheric ozone layer, deforestation, loss of biological diversity, pollution of 
the oceans, and international trade in hazardous wastes had emerged to the public horizon 
in the Western industrialized world. The discovery of the ozone hole over the Antarctica 
and the confirmation of its cause—chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)—spurred massive 
concerns beyond scientific or policy circles and raised the prominence of atmospheric 
issues generally. To a large extent, the early public concern about global warming rode 
the coattails of the ozone issue. Secondly, the severe heat wave and drought in North 
America in the summer of 1988 instilled significant popular support to the global 
warming cause in the United States and Canada. By this time, the narratives and 
discursive activities regarding global warming were primarily undertaken by the Western 
non-national-governmental actors.  
Negotiation Stage (1991-2005) 
Starting from 1991, the United Nations convened formal multilateral negotiations 
partly as continuation of the Toronto achievements and partly due to effort to 
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accommodate the developing countries (Bodansky, 2001, pp. 30–31). The negotiations 
were launched based on a political consensus that a new treaty was needed for the new 
problem of climate change, and it would follow the model of the Vienna Ozone 
Convention. As a result, under a UN General Assembly mandate, the Intergovernmental 
Negotiating Committee for a Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) met six 
times between February 1991 and May 1992. The negotiations took place as part of the 
preparations for the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (the Earth 
Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro. The FCCC entered into force in March 1994 and has 
been ratified by 196 countries as of June 2015. 
Immediately after the FCCC became effective, negotiations for next steps beyond 
began from 1995. The FCCC defined the objective, principles and commitments, and 
organizational structures of the regimes,29 but was left with many important substantive 
issues, specifically targets and timetables, implementation mechanisms and institutions, 
and financial assistance and technology transfer. The Kyoto Protocol aimed to address 
them as it was adopted at COP-3 in December 1997 but became a long battle afterwards. 
Firstly, on targets and timetables, the Protocol has assigned specific targets based on the 
principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibility (CBDR) for Annex I parties to 
reduce their GHG emissions, but specific rules and operational details for implementation 
remained unresolved, while non-Annex I parties industrializing countries were exempted 
from binding obligations for quantified reductions. Disagreement heated and the United 
                                                
29 Articles 1-4, 8-11 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1992) 
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States rejected the Protocol in 2001.30 The second issue during the COP-3 was whether 
market-based mechanisms should be established to allow developed states to meet their 
targets.31 In the end, the Protocol created several “flexibility mechanisms,” including 
emissions trading and joint implementation among industrialized countries, as well as a 
“Clean Development Mechanism” (CDM) for emission reduction projects in developing 
countries, but provided that these should be “supplemental” to domestic action. Finally, 
funding and technology transfer issues were very contentious between the North and 
South. Developing countries advocated for a new fund, while developed countries wished 
to stay with the existing Global Environment Facility (GEF) created with the FCCC 
(Yamin & Depledge, 2004, Chapter 10).32   
The Protocol finally could enter into force in 2005 without the participation from 
the United States,33 currently with 192 members. It took much longer for the Kyoto 
Protocol to be ratified than the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone 
                                                
30 The United Stated had signed the treaty in 1998 during the Clinton administration, but it was 
never submitted to the Senate for ratification because of the passage of the Byrd–Hagel 
Resolution at the Senate a year before. When asked about his position on the treaty, President G. 
W. Bush expressed his opposition because “it exempts 80% of the world, including major 
population centers such as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to 
the US economy” (Dessai, 2001, p. 5). 
31 One controversy was whether it is immoral, particularly for the developed countries, to “buy 
the right to pollute (Sandel, 1997).”  
32 Developing countries, led by India, also sought to include a commitment that developed 
countries provide “new and additional” financial resources to help developing countries 
implement the Convention. 
33 Article 25 of the Protocol required at least ratifications of fifty-five countries, and that the 
participating parties to account for 55% of 1990 emissions for the Protocol to be effective. The 
United States in 1997 accounted for 36% of 1990 emissions from industrialized country, making 
it very difficult for the Protocol to become effective. 
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Layer or the FCCC, reflecting the complexity of the issues involved and the deep schisms 
among its parties.  
Operationalization Stage (2005 - present) 
The Kyoto regime was designed primarily to address climate mitigation in terms 
of reducing the GHG emissions. Since it came into effect, however, its capacity in terms 
of the extent to which GHG emissions can be reduced has been called into question. 
More and more tend to see Kyoto as a flawed institution, and its design should be 
responsible for the setback of global climate governance (Keohane & Victor, 2011; 
Rosen, 2015; Victor, 2004).  
Institutionalist critiques aside, the Kyoto regime has produced practically mixed 
results. With regard to compliance, those states with binding reduction obligations have a 
spotty performance record. Emissions of COⁿ in fact increased in Canada and Japan by 
25% and 14%, respectively, from 1990 to 2012 (Olivier, Janssens-Maenhout, & Peters, 
2012). Though the overall success rates of Europe is slightly better, only 8 of EU-15 
countries were reported to have met their individual targets to cut emissions by at least 
8% at 1990 levels in 2014 (European Commission, 2014, p. 14).34 Furthermore, it has 
been argued that even full participation and compliance with Kyoto would still fail to 
manage global warming, as the 2007 IPCC report asserted:  
[T]he numerous mitigation measures that have been undertaken by many Parties 
to the UNFCCC and the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol in February 
                                                
34 Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Sweden, and the United Kingdom 
achieved the goals. The remaining seven—Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, and Spain were not on track to meet their requirements, according to 2014 data. 
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2005… are inadequate for reversing overall GHG emission trends (Metz, 
Davidson, Bosch, Dave, & Meyer, 2007, p. 97).   
On the other hand, the current climate regime has brought about some positive 
ramifications. CDM appears to be one of the successes. As of April 2015, the CDM 
Executive Board has certified 2,584 projects (of the more than 7,000 projects registered), 
which were equivalent to a reduction of 1.5 billion tons of COⁿ emissions. By the end of 
2020, the emissions reduction is expected to reach 3 billion tons (UNFCCC, 2015). 
Moreover, the existing climate processes and institutions under the FCCC-Kyoto regime 
may serve as catalysts for learning and generate shared understandings about long-term 
actions to addressing climate change. Indeed, new norms have been created to de-
legitimize business-as-usual practices—states and businesses will be pressured if they do 
not do anything to regulate the GHG emissions in one way or another (Betsill, 2011, pp. 
124–5). The idea that every actor has responsibility, as illustrated by the principle of 
CBDR upheld by the climate regime, has been accepted by all states, regardless of their 
negotiation positions or domestic considerations. Despite feeling frustrated almost every 
time since Copenhagen, state parties keep convening year after year for, to the least 
extent, maintaining the political will for pursing cooperation also because the practical 
and normative imperatives for combating climate change have formed such sense of 
necessity.  
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Sustainable Development as Discursive Hegemony  
Problematizing Development35 
“Development” as a general politico-economic movement and policy directives in 
the post-WWII era has been much infiltrated by a “modernization problematique”, which 
concerns the discussion over different approaches to understand the process of transition 
or transformation of a society from being “traditional” to “becoming” modern. 
Throughout the 19th century, “being modern” had become the normal condition of the 
people of Western European societies via discourses and practices constructing sets of 
features that distinguish “modern” from “premodern”: science versus religion, reason 
versus emotion, universalism versus particularism, democracy versus absolute monarchy, 
industrialized production versus agricultural or nomadic autarky, individualism versus 
feudal collectivism and so on. This mapping of contrasting notions was carried on after 
the end of the Second World War, well captured by what was considered the debut of 
development on the international stage—the inauguration speech of the U.S. President 
Harry Truman in 1949. He said,  
What we envisage is a program of development based on the concepts of 
democratic fair dealing…Greater production is the key to prosperity and peace. 
And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application of 
                                                
35 A brief genealogy of the term “development” in the context of social studies can probably trace 
its first appearance back to 1942, when Wilfred Benson, a former member of the Secretariat of 
the International Labor Organization, invented it when writing about the economic basis for peace 
and referring to the “underdeveloped areas”. In a similar context, economists Paul Rosenstein-
Rodan and Arthur Lewis continued to speak of “economically backward areas” or the gaps 
between the poor and the rich countries. Throughout the 1940s, the expression was utilized 
occasionally in technical publications and did not bear much political relevance until Truman’s 
remarks. The colonizing implication of the term, however, has lurked since its origin (Esteva, 
2010, p. 2).  
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modern scientific and technological knowledge (Harry S. Truman, January 20, 
1949, as quoted in Escobar, 1995, p. 3).  
Theories on development are primarily underpinned by the idea of progress. In 
practice, nations deemed in need of development had been prescribed to adopt the model 
of the Western states to achieve economic growth and political and social 
democratization. Progress is projected as the process of getting closer to the normal 
condition that the industrialized West has already occupied; it is the journey to “the end 
of history (Fukuyama, 1989)“.36 
The narratives of development and underdevelopment have constructed their 
discursive hegemony. They have defined specific geo-political regions, assigning them 
with certain political-economic qualities that need to be and eventually are 
problematized. As Arturo Escobar suggests, development can be seen as an apparatus that 
“links forms of knowledge about the Third World with the deployment of forms of power 
and intervention, resulting in the mapping and production of Third World societies 
(Crush, 1995, p. 207).” In this sense, this hegemony created the identity of the Third 
World.37 It was then enabled to articulate the material problems of the underdeveloped 
                                                
36 This (mis)interpretation of Hegel’s thought on progress in Reason in History shapes the 
fundamental way of understanding the so-called World History. This “Hegelian Shadow,” which 
I take the liberty of naming, is a stretch from temporality to spatiality with cultural essentialism. It 
bases its yardstick on the European experience to determine what progress means and what 
progression is. As a result, those criteria for “modernity” and “traditionality” also serve to tell 
between progressiveness and backwardness. The process to move from the latter to the former is 
the essence of development, referring to substantive increase in income and the quality of life. 
Moreover, despite that these notions got to be challenged due to the increasing awareness of 
cultural pluralism and the empirical fact of the Asian rapid growth in the 1970s, the Hegelian 
Shadow remains in the theoretical development of development thinking.  
37 Esteva (2010) remarked about the making of the identity of the Third World by development 
discourse. He figuratively commented that on the day of Truman’s speech, “two billion people 
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countries that needed to be solved, and generated the problem-solving means as policies 
and institutions globally. 
Early literature treats development from the economic aspect of modernization. 
From the 1950s to the 70s, development was equated to the enhancement of material 
well-being in terms of GNP growth, which was expected to eventually trickle down to the 
people.38 The principal concern is how to help industrialize/modernize the Third-World 
countries which had “fallen behind.” Thus the ways to accelerate their capital 
accumulation are considered the best strategies to develop, including the openness of 
market, reforming political institution, etc. As a counter-hegemonic discourse to this 
unidirectional and Eurocentric view, dependency school reveals the global structural 
inequality that has resulted from the history of colonialism, and critiques that the world 
economic order conspires to mask the continuing imperialist nature of those unequal 
relationships between rich and poor countries (Hoogvelt, 2001, p. 35).39   
                                                                                                                                            
became underdeveloped… they ceased being what they were, in all their diversity, and were 
transmogrified into an inverted mirror of other’s reality (p. 2). 
38 Two exemplary works are The Theory of Economic Growth by Lewis (1955) and The Stages of 
Economic Growth by Rostow (1960)  
39 However, while the dependency school attempted to resist the intellectual and practical 
hegemony of neo-liberalism, the dichotomy of core and periphery it created is another version of 
the Hegelian Shadow that measures one by the criteria originating from the other. Putting blame 
and responsibility on the Core, in fact, reinforces the ideological construct of the inferiority of the 
Periphery, at least when the periphery was made to be inferior. Therefore, the picture of the 
structure of domination the dependency school presents is, as Sanyal puts it, “the other side of 
imperialism.” It exhibits “how imperialism shapes the processes in the ‘imperialized’ economy 
(2007: 9).” In this sense, the old shadow remains; it is just a different form evolving from the 
direct application of external sources to the internalization of them. To be noted, this is the trap 
into which the Third-World nations usually have fallen in their developing process. Many of 
them—mostly also postcolonial nations—have been engaged in many ways in resisting the 
Western hegemony by adopting the tools it had used on them, though reluctantly or unintendedly. 
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In the 1960s-80s, after the increasing recognition that high growth rates did not 
bring satisfactory development progress, it was claimed that more means should be 
considered than just economic growth. In various international organizations, the 
discourse thus changed in such a direction that not materialistic but human oriented goals 
slid into the center of attention. The Cocoyoc Declaration, for example, stressed that the 
purpose of development “should not be to develop things but to develop man” 
(UNEP/UNCTAD, 1975, p. 896).   
The criticism on the prominence of economic growth also received support by 
increasing ecological concerns. It became widely accepted that growing industries and 
consumption are responsible for environmental degradation, as illustrated in, for 
example, the Club of Rome’s Limits of Growth, a pioneering report published in 1972. 
Nevertheless, also in the 1980s the economic agenda remained dominant in the 
development narratives and practices due to the expansion of neoliberal agenda, while 
recessions in the North and debt crises in the South later led this decade to be frequently 
deemed as “the lost decade of development”.  
The 1990s, on the other hand, saw fresh ideas and concepts emerging in the 
discussions of development paradigm (Sen, 1992, 1999). The new foci on human 
“capabilities” and “human development” aim to shift targets of development toward 
human needs (toward well-being, education, health, empowerment, etc.), with a 
theoretical recognition of the complex relationships between human and the physical and 
social systems, though economic development would still remains the main tool to 
achieve the new set of goals in practice. Yet, more issue and theoretical linkages have 
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been made to enrich the agenda of development, such as centering human freedom in the 
development thinking through diversification of human “functionings” and enhancement 
of capabilities. 
 As one of the counter-hegemonic movements, the concept of sustainable 
development (SD) emerged as a countercurrent to the post-WWII model of development 
for economic growth, and marked the ascent of the environmental aspect of the global 
life into the mainstream agenda of international relations and IR theory (Lélé, 1991; 
Meadowcroft, 2000; Redclift, 2005; Carruthers, 2001; Redclift, 1987; Escobar, 1995, pp. 
192–4). Since environmental concerns became prominent and legitimatized by the 1972 
UN Convention on Human Environment (UNCHE) in Stockholm in the 1970s, the 
rhetoric of sustainability and later SD has entered the international political and economic 
thinking (Carruthers, 2001, p. 94). Originally related to ecological economic concept of 
the thermodynamics of an economic system (Georgescu-Roegen, 1971; Daly, 1985, 
1990) and the broader problematiques of the ecological limits (Meadows et al. 1972; 
Lovelock 1979; Hardin’s 1968; Schumacher 1974), sustainability soon was absorbed into 
development discourse, became widely known as ‘sustainable development’ pronounced 
in the Brundtland Report of 1987 as a development that “meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED, 
1987). 
Through a series of events—the 1992 Earth Summit, Agenda 21, UN Millennium 
Development Goals, and the 2002 Earth Summit in Johannesburg featuring sustainable 
development—elevating the prominence and popularity of SD, the term has since then 
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permeated in policy narratives about economic development, environmentalism, poverty, 
state-building, community-building, and the governance of climate change, 
internationally and nationally (Bruyninckx, 2006; Cohen, Demeritt, Robinson, & 
Rothman, 1998; Srivastava, 2011). In the meantime, it is seriously criticized for its 
conceptual inconsistency and vagueness (Lélé, 1991; Peterson, 1997, Chapter 2; Adams, 
2001, pp. 4–7); the Brundtland definition was commented as “a better slogan than it is a 
basis for theory” (Adams, 2001, p. 5).40 Yet it is also the vagueness that has led to its 
success; the void has proved to be somehow politically useful to be highly adaptable to a 
broad array of ideological grounds (Redclift, 1992; Mebratu, 1998).  
When the environmental advocacy began promotion from the Western 
industrialized nations in the 1970s, some developing countries, including China and 
India, had been against the international environmental governance in the fear of concern 
“green imperialism.” Today, while tension still lingers between the North and South and 
the contention of green imperialism persists in trade or environmental talks from time to 
time, “protecting the environment” has secured its normative legitimacy as a global norm 
that very few would oppose largely because the idea of SD can contain so many 
divergent and even contradictory initiatives that each actor can articulate its particular 
identities and interests through many discursive practices. Northern and Southern 
countries are joined together under the big tent of SD, as SD soon incorporates other 
                                                
40 Adams’s criticism continued that “words about sustainable development…very often prove to 
have no coherent theoretical core. The literature is strewn with the terms ‘sustainability’ and 
‘sustainable development’…but too seldom are any of them given a clear and consistent 
meaning” (p. 5). Redclift (1987) had the similar opinion that sustainable development “seems 
assured of a place in the litany of development truisms” (p. 3). 
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agendas for human rights, global equity, technological and human capital development, 
etc.  
From a perspective of discursive hegemony, the roles of SD as an ideological void 
and political common ground enable the global environmental issues to epitomize a 
construction and operation of discursive hegemony. While there are always dissents over 
means of implementing sustainable development, and sometimes even over definitions of 
sustainable development; yet there is always the consent from all to adhering to SD as the 
common goal. Responses to climate change can be a good example.  
Climate Change in the Context of Sustainable Development 
On the particular issue of climate change and the concept of sustainable 
development, one would likely ask: “how are initiatives on climate change to be 
interpreted in terms of perspectives about development?” and “does the support of certain 
initiatives reflect the implicit adoption of certain prescriptions or values about sustainable 
development?” (Grist, 2008, p. 785). 
Among the rich literature conceptually dissecting and elaborating SD, Adams 
(2001), Grist (2008) and Hulme (2009, Chapter 8) provide a simple categorization that 
distinguishes two groups of ideas that address SD (Table 4-1). Each idea informs the 
current climate practices or debates in one way or another, so I will briefly introduce each 
idea in the context of the connection between climate change initiatives and SD, and 
focus more on those that were most powerful within the formal operation of the FCCC 
and Kyoto regime—market environmentalism and eco-socialism.  
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Table 4-14 Climate-related Ideas in Sustainable Development Discourse  
Mainstream/Reformist 
group 
Radical group 
Market environmentalism 
Ecological modernization 
Environmental populism 
Neo-Malthusianism 
Eco-socialism 
Eco-anarchism  
 
 
Mainstream/Reformist SD 
The “reformist” label here refers to a discursive absorption of the initial SD 
concept into the prevalent neoliberal globalization project in the 1990s (Carruthers, 
2001). As mentioned earlier, the initial SD concept originated from the notions of 
“scarcity” and systemic “limits” or “carrying capacity,” urging for serious changes of 
economic thinking paradigms and practices. However, when the concept started to move 
from academic discussion to become mainstreamed into the more visible policy world, 
with the Brundtland Report as the first significant politically successful promotion, it has 
also begun losing its critical quality by dropping those original emphases.41 Instead, it has 
increasingly allied with the neoliberal ideological positions as ensuring economic growth, 
continuous accumulation of capital, and a minimally-regulated market that is maximally 
independent from the state. As such, this variant of SD discourse is labeled “reformist” 
while the other variant is called “radical” as it preserves some of the conceptual elements 
                                                
41 In the Brundtland Report, limits was elaborated as follows: “The concept of sustainable 
development does imply limits - not absolute limits but limitations imposed by the present state of 
technology and social organization on environmental resources and by the ability of the 
biosphere to absorb the effects of human activities. But technology and social organization can 
be both managed and improved to make way for a new era of economic growth (WCED 1987, 
emphases added)”. 
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that the reformist abandoned. This division is roughly mapped to the differentiation 
between “weak” and “strong” sustainability.42 
Within the mainstream group of ideas associated with SD, market 
environmentalism is one that holds the best applicability of market approach to 
addressing environment and climate issues. The idea of ecological modernization favors 
industrial and technological advancement in solving environmental problems (Hajer, 
1995). And environmental populism focuses on the individual or societal actors, such as 
NGOs, in forming individual or community-based actions.  
Radical SD 
Neo-Malthusianism insists on the system limits and the contradiction between 
population size and resource availability. Eco-socialism and eco-anarchism share the 
assessment that environmental degradation has the very origin as the economic, political, 
and cultural system of capitalism. The main difference between them is that, while eco-
anarchists demand an overhaul of the capitalist system and world order  to solve the 
problem fundamentally, eco-socialists tend to work on resistance and try to tame the 
power of capitalism (Dryzek, 2005, p. 209). 
In creation of the FCCC, Southern countries embraced the ideal and have indeed 
contributed to the articulation of SD into the principles of “common but differentiated 
responsibility” in recognition of different “historical responsibilities.” This reflects one 
side of the notion of equity, which is highly stressed by the socialist views. The FCCC 
                                                
42 A lot of debate has been made over the definitions of the conceptual variants of sustainability; 
see Ayres, van den Berrgh, & Gowdy (2001).  
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treaty states that equity should he a guiding principle in the development of a global 
response to climate change. The other ways in which equity has been interpreted are, for 
example, the basis to calculate emission rights. Many developing countries argue that 
only a per capita allocation of GHG quota for their emissions is equitable, considering 
their low levels of emissions in both historical and current terms. By the same token, they 
demand equity to be achieved through reasonable financial and technology transfer for 
their lack of resources for responding to the negative consequences to which they are 
often more vulnerable vis-à-vis the industrialized countries.  
On the other hand, the development of carbon markets through tradable emissions 
permits is one of the Kyoto flexible mechanisms and the most economically important 
initiative. Carbon markets are strongly linked conceptually in ideas of sustainable 
development to concepts of “market environmentalism.” Some of the central tenets of 
market environmentalism are that “environmental services” can be valued through the 
markets; markets are a cost-effective way to regulate individual behaviors and achieve 
policy goals; and that economic growth is mandatory to reduce poverty (Adams, 2001, p. 
104; Grist, 2008, p. 787).   
As of 2014, the carbon market was worth approximately 30 billion of U.S. 
Dollars. Thirty-nine national economies and twenty-three sub-national jurisdictions have 
implemented or are scheduled to implement carbon pricing instruments, including 
emissions trading schemes and taxes. These entitles are responsible for almost a quarter 
of the global greenhouse gas emissions, and China is currently the world’s second largest 
carbon market (World Bank, 2014).  
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Summary 
With a theoretical lens of discursive hegemony, this chapter reviewed the 
construction of the global climate regime from a discourse perspective that underlines the 
conjunction of social forces and the working of discourse within it.  
Sustainable development performs discursive hegemony as it is a structural, 
consensual, and diffuse kind of power that can affect policy preference, shape interests, 
and generate policy actions, as I have discussed in the climate change regime. In addition, 
the definitional debates regarding what SD really means and to where it should lead do 
not shed the hegemonic status of the sustainable development discourse; the contention 
rather strengthens its power. Hegemony in a discursive sense is a process in which 
domination is socially constructed through internalization of ideas and co-option of 
rhetoric.  
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Chapter Five: Social Forces in Chinese Discursive Hegemony 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the social forces of hegemony outlined in Chapter 3. 
Material conditions, institutions and ideas together formed the historic bloc or 
“background abilities” (Schmidt, 2008, p. 305) in the policy process of the evolution of 
China’s climate change policy. The chapter does so mainly by contrasting the country’s 
economic development before and after the watershed year of 2003. In this year, a few 
events happened and set the direction for subsequent decisions affecting the overall 
policy towards climate change.  
In the context of climate change discussion, economic growth, energy needs and 
environmental quality are the three most relevant components of material conditions. To 
examine the institutional force, the policy-coordination paradigm of Chinese policy-
making is chosen to illuminate the debate between fragmented authoritarianism and the 
consensus-coordinating model. For the ideational force, several ancient philosophical and 
modern political ideas are discussed in their relationship with environmentalism. This 
discussion attempts to explore the influence those ideas may have with both the 
environmental destruction between the 1950s and 1990s and the pursuit for a changing 
course in the 2000s.  
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Social Forces for China’s Development Thinking  
Material Force I: Economic Growth 
From a long-run perspective, the Chinese economy has experienced many 
dramatic changes in the past 200 years, one of which is its economic growth in terms of 
quantity and speed. In the early nineteenth century, China possessed 33% of the global 
gross domestic product and was the greatest economic power. However, natural disasters, 
poor governance, and consecutive warfare from 1840s to 1950 had brought down its 
share of the global GDP to 5%, reducing the nation to one of the poorest in the world 
(Table 5-1). The decline continued after the Communist regime came into power. At the 
closing of the Great Leap Forward campaign in 1962, China’s share of the global GDP 
dipped to 4%, the bottom in its entire economic history, according to Angus Maddison’s 
estimation (Maddison, 2008).  
The hundred-year decline drew to a close with the official conclusion of the 
Cultural Revolution. The “Open and Reform” began to drive up the Chinese economy 
from 1978. Since then, the world has been presented an unprecedented growth in 
industrialization and rapid reduction of poverty in China. According to the World Bank 
data, China has surpassed the United States to lead the world’s industrial production since 
2011 (World Bank, 2015). In late 2014, the International Monetary Fund confirmed that 
China has overtaken the US to become the largest economy in the world in terms of 
purchasing-power adjusted GDP (Bird, 2014). Disagreement exists from the validity of 
the PPP method in evaluating a country’s real economic performance to the meaning of 
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such event to the global economy. But to China, few would disagree that it has 
dramatically risen up from the bottom to the top in the world economic system.  
Some other macro-level figures indicate that China’s growth was not only fast but 
stable. Between 1990 and 2013, China’s average annual growth rate was 10.16%. The 
average inflation rate was 4.6% and unemployment rate 4.4%, both lower than those of 
several other emerging economies over the same period. Industrializing economies 
generally have higher consumer price inflation rates. For example, between 1990 and 
2013, the average inflation rates in India and Indonesia were 6.9 and 10%, respectively, 
while Russia and Brazil had 82% and 355% due to their domestic political and economic 
unrest in the early 1990s (Table 5-2). Even in the stabilized 2000s and 2010s, in which 
their national and international environments have been more favorable for them, the 
average annual inflations amount to 6.9, 7.5, 11.6, and 6.6% age for India, Indonesia, 
Russia, and Brazil, respectively (World Bank, 2015).  
Micro level data also confirm China’s progress in the traditional sense of 
development. Its GNI (gross national income) per capita grew almost 7 times within the 
same 23-year-timespan. Life expectancy at birth increased by 5.9 years, greater than the 
global average of 5.3 years, and adult literacy rate increased from 78% in 1990 to 95% in 
2010. Both of these were just two indicators of the remarkable achievements of improved 
basic healthcare and education systems. 
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Table 5-15 Share of the World GDP, 1700-2030 
Shares of World GDP, 1700-2030  
(per cent) 
  1700 1820 1952 1978 2003 2030 (forecast) 
China 22.3 32.9 5.2 4.9 15.1 23.1 
Japan 4.1 3 3.4 7.6 6.6 3.6 
W. Europe 21.9 23 25.9 24.2 19.2 13 
United States 0.1 1.8 27.5 21.6 20.6 17.3 
USSR/Russia 4.4 5.4 9.2 9 3.8 3.4 
India 24.4 16 4 3.3 5.5 10.4 
Source: Adapted from Maddison (2007) 
 
Table 5-26 Comparative Macroeconomic Conditions, 1990-2013 
  
Average (per cent) 
GDP growth* Inflation Rate Unemployment Rate 
China  10.70   4.58   4.40  
India  6.53   8.00   3.99  
Russia  0.71   82.00   8.30  
Brazil  2.96   355.00   7.80  
Indonesia  4.89   7.47   7.13  
* calculated based on PPP (constant 2011 international $) 
Source: calculated from World Bank (2015) 
 
Material Force II: Energy Needs 
General trends 
What follows economic growth is the growth of energy use (Chapter 2). China’s 
current energy situations have two features: an expanded size of energy demand in the 
2000s, and a constant, heavily coal-reliant structure of energy consumption.  
The geographical distribution of China’s natural energy resource endowment is 
uneven. Its coal resources are vast, even by international standards, but they are 
concentrated in the north of the country. Its significant but declining oil reserves lie in the 
northeastern and northwestern regions, while the natural gas is found mainly in the 
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northern, northwestern and southwestern areas with more limited reserves. Hydro-
electricity is concentrated in the center and southwest of the country. Not only are these 
primary energy resources probably insufficient to meet the long-term demand, but they 
lie far from the main economic centers with heavy energy demands in the south and east 
of the country. This natural condition has significant impact on China’s energy supply as 
the energy storage and transport across extremely long distance has posed tremendous 
challenges to China’s energy development, increasing risks to its energy security and 
self-reliance.   
China is currently the largest commercial energy user in the world. It has been the 
world’s largest primary energy producer since 2007 and consumer since 2010, taking up 
almost 1/5 of the amount of energy used by the entire world. It is now the 2nd largest oil 
importing country, a fastest natural gas importer and renewable energy builder, and the 
largest greenhouse gases emitter from energy since 2007. It is also estimated that by 
2030, the total amount of Chinese demand will grow by 60% based on the level of 2014, 
and 76% by 2040 (USEIA, 2013).  
China’s energy demand had grown enormously (Table 5-4). From 1992 to 2012, 
China’s total energy consumption tripled. The Chinese energy demand has also grown 
much faster than other comparable developing economies. Between 2003 and 2012, the 
average growth rates of energy consumption of Brazil, India, and China are 3.8%, 5.8%, 
and 8% respectively (BP, 2013). Additionally, between 2000 and 2005, during which 
China implemented its Tenth Five-Year Plan mainly focusing on heavy industrialization, 
45% of the world’s total increase in primary energy consumption was attributed to China. 
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Since 1994, the total energy supply from the domestic energy sector had been 
closely followed by the increasing demand of the expanding economy. The total 
consumption surpassed the total production for the first time in 1998, marking the end of 
energy self-reliance (Table 5-5).  
As Figure 5-1 shows, the two series (production and consumption) nearly 
overlapped until the early 2000s. After the supply fell behind in 1998, production was 
increased to meet the demand from the next year. But very soon the gap got widen again 
in 2001 and only had gone greater ever since.  
The literature also has pointed out the China’s energy consumption has grown 
faster in the 2000s compared to the period between 1980 and 2000, where its GDP 
quadrupled while its energy consumption “merely” doubled (Heggelund, 2007, p. 161). 
Between 2003 and 2005, economic growth has been more than 8% per annum. At the 
same time, energy demand grew by about 15% annually while oil imports grew at 30% 
per year (Khan 2010, p.1). As such, the early 2000s, precisely between 2003 and 2004, 
where the foreign energy dependence jumped from 3% to 6% (Appendix B), was a 
critical timing to contrive new plans as the economy could confront very difficult 
constraints from the supply side.  
The demand side could only make the situation harder, as energy consumption 
grew faster in the post-2000 period as opposed to the previous decade; the average annual 
growth rate between 1992 and 2001 was 3.62%, whereas that between 2002 and 2013 
was 8.1%; the average annual growth rate over the entire timespan of this research was 
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6.05%. The energy use in the latter period has expanded significantly (Table 5-4).  
Finally, the per capita consumption of energy doubled between 2003 and 2008.  
Figure 5-1  Trends of China’s Total Energy 
 
 
Regarding the sourcing of energy, fossil fuels currently takes up around 90% in 
China’s primary energy consumption. This ration had been as high as 96% in the 
beginning of the market reform (Table 5-4).  
Coal 
Coal is the most important source to provide for China’s energy needs. In 1989, 
China became the first country in the world to produce more than one billion tons of coal 
during a single year. By the early 1990’s, coal provided over 76% of the total energy 
needs of China; it accounted for 75% of industrial fuel and power, 65% of the raw 
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material for the chemical industries, and 85% of the fuel for urban residents43. While high 
demand and environmental concerns ended its self-reliance on coal in 2009, China still 
leads the world in both the production and the consumption of coal. In 2013, 78% of the 
energy produced in China came out of coal, and 69% of the Chinese consumption of 
energy was based on coal (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014). The long-term records 
show that coal has taken up approximately 70% of the energy consumption since the 
1980s.  
In 2007, when China became the world’s largest COⁿ emitter, its coal 
consumption reached 2.62 billion tons— more than the United States, Japan, and the 
United Kingdom combined. In 2000, China anticipated doubling its coal consumption by 
2020; it surpassed this mark by 2007. Consumption in China is huge partly because it is 
inefficient. As one Chinese official told Der Spiegel in early 2006, the amount of 
resources generally used by Chinese manufacturing industry was seven times of the 
amount of resources used by Japan, almost six times of the that of the U.S., and even 
nearly three times of that for India—that official deemed this “a particular source of 
embarrassment” (Economy, 2010a, p. 309).  
China’s coal sector does not appear to have the juncture in the early 2000s, for the 
consumption and production of coal have grown in tandem consistently.  
Although many studies have forecasted that the peak of Chinese demand for coal 
is approaching, their opinions diverge with regard to when and at what level this peak 
                                                
43 The rest of China’s fuel needs were met by oil (17%), hydropower (4.8%) and natural gas 
(2%).  
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will be (Andrews-Speed, Herberg, Li, & Shobert, 2014, pp. 35–38). In November 2014 
after a joint pledge between President Xi Jingping and President Obama on COⁿ 
emissions reduction, the Chinese government announced that it will cap its coal burning 
at 4.2 billion tons and will have coal be no more than 62% of its primary energy mix by 
2020 (Xinhua, 2014). 
Being aware of the hazardous consequences of burning coal, China seems to have 
tried incrementally to lower its use of coal since 2010 in terms of reducing the ratio of 
coal in the energy consumption mix (Table 5-4) though the total amount of coal used is 
still increasing. The existing energy mix is unlikely to change in a short run. In the 
meantime, the coal-fired power capacity is even expanding. As of November 2012, there 
are 363 coal-fired plants newly proposed to be built in China, according to a working 
report published by the World Resource Institute (Yang & Cui, 2012). The total planned 
capacity is estimated to be 557,938 megawatt-hours, amounting to more than half as 
much as the entire coal-fired output in the United States (Forsythe, 2014). However, 
some of these power plants may not be built, or may not even be put into operation after 
they are completed due to the recently tightened control on outdoor air pollution to 
respond mainly to the rage of its citizens as well as the COⁿ pollution to the international 
pressure on climate change. The reason why there are more coal-fired power plans being 
built on paper was partly because of the excessive domestic capital needing outlets for 
reinvestment (Myllyvirta, 2015). 
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Table 5-37China’s Primary Energy Consumption and Composition 
Year Total Energy 
Consumption  
(10,000 tons of 
SCE) 
As Percentage of Total Energy Consumption (%) 
Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas Hydro, 
Nuclear, Wind 
Power 
1992 109170 75.7 17.5 1.9 4.9 
1993 115993 74.7 18.2 1.9 5.2 
1994 122737 75 17.4 1.9 5.7 
1995 131176 74.6 17.5 1.8 6.1 
1996 135192 73.5 18.7 1.8 6 
1997 135909 71.4 20.4 1.8 6.4 
1998 136184 70.9 208 1.8 6.5 
1999 140569 70.6 21.5 2 5.9 
2000 145531 69.2 22.2 2.2 6.4 
2001 150406 68.3 21.8 2.4 7.5 
2002 159431 68 22.3 2.4 7.3 
2003 183792 69.8 21.2 2.5 6.5 
2004 213456 69.5 21.3 2.5 6.7 
2005 235997 70.8 19.8 2.6 6.8 
2006 258676 71.1 19.3 2.9 6.7 
2007 280508 71.1 18.8 3.3 6.8 
2008 291448 70.3 18.3 3.7 7.7 
2009 306647 70.4 17.9 3.9 7.8 
2010 324939 68 19 4.4 8.6 
2011 348002 68.4 18.6 5 8 
2012 361732 66.6 18.8 5.2 9.4 
2013 375000 66 18.4 5.8 9.8 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014)  
 
Table 5-48China’s Primary Energy Production and Composition 
Year 
Total Energy 
Consumption  
(10,000 tons 
of SCE) 
As Percentage of Total Energy Consumption (%) 
Coal Crude Oil Natural Gas 
Hydro, Nuclear, 
Wind Power 
1992 107256 74.3 18.9 2 4.8 
1993 111059 74 18.7 2 5.3 
1994 118729 74.6 17.6 1.9 5.9 
1995 129034 75.3 16.6 1.9 6.2 
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1996 133032 75 16.9 2 6.1 
1997 133460 74.3 17.2 2.1 6.5 
1998 129834 73.3 17.7 2.2 6.8 
1999 131935 73.9 17.3 2.5 6.3 
2000 135048 73.2 17.2 2.7 6.9 
2001 143875 73 16.3 2.8 7.9 
2002 150656 73.5 15.8 2.9 7.8 
2003 171906 76.2 14.1 2.7 7 
2004 196648 77.1 12.8 2.8 7.3 
2005 216219 77.6 12 3 7.4 
2006 232167 77.8 11.3 3.4 7.5 
2007 247279 77.7 10.8 3.7 7.8 
2008 260552 76.8 10.5 4.09 8.62 
2009 274619 77.3 9.9 4.1 8.7 
2010 296916 76.6 9.8 4.2 9.4 
2011 317987 77.8 9.1 4.3 8.8 
2012 331848 76.5 8.9 4.3 10.3 
2013 340000 75.6 8.9 4.6 10.9 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook (National Bureau of Statistics, 2014) 
 
Oil 
Oil composes 18% of China’s energy consumption in 2013, but only 9% of the 
energy China produced in that year was oil. This signifies that China relies on imported 
oil a lot.  
Currently, China is the world’s second-largest oil consumer and oil importer 
behind the United States. It became the world’s second-largest net importer of crude oil 
and other petroleum products in 2009. The foreign oil dependence, defined as the ratio of 
net oil imports to the total oil consumption, has been on a constant rise since 1994. The 
recently greatest dependency ratio happened in 2010 (64.6%), since which it has been 
decreasing. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) had estimated that China 
would surpass the United States as the largest net oil importer by 2014 due to China’s 
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rising oil consumption and increase of domestic supply in the US (USEIA, 2013). But as 
of the time when this dissertation is completed, the data for 2014 is not yet available to 
verify this projection. China’s oil consumption growth accounted for one-third of the 
world’s oil consumption growth in 2013, and this share is expected to stay the same for 
2014.  
 The government seems to have tried to remedy the increasingly greater 
dependence on foreign oil by lowering the proportion of oil in both the production and 
consumption sectors, and also by adjusting the quantities of different oil products. 
Imports of crude oil go to the production sector while imports of most refined products 
are for consumption use. Up until 1998, majority of the net imports was refined products. 
Since 1999, China has mostly imported crude oil and increased its refining capacity to 
feed its internal oil demand (Appendix C). This change first happened in around the end 
of last century, with a faster decline in oil production and increasing consumption of 
refined products, such as motor gasoline and fuel oils. These products were the essential 
and exclusive demand from industrial and household sectors in China’s speedy 
industrialization and urbanization at this time.  
There was a seeming substitution effect between coal and oil in China’s energy 
production. Around 1999-2001, the production of coal was on a slow but steady rise. In 
other words, while the proportion of oil in the energy production mix fell, coal was used 
more instead to feed the expanding demand. On the other hand, the increasing coal 
consumption from 2001 complements this finding as well. Coal became a substitute for 
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oil as a strategy to reducing the importance of oil in the energy mix when the dependency 
on foreign oil leaped from 41% to 52% from 2002 to 2004 (Appendix B).   
Others 
As for natural gas and non-fossil fuels, the former takes about 4% in both energy 
consumption and production, but has been increasing rapidly in recent years. Natural gas 
is a major “cleaner” alternative to coal and oil, so China has sought to secure its imports 
via pipelines from central Asia (Turkmenistan) and Myanmar. Since 2010, Chinese 
companies have reportedly spent up to US$ 8.5 billion on unconventional oil and gas 
projects in the United States. In particular, there have been recently a number of high 
profile investments related to liquefied natural gas (LNG) by Chinese corporations 
(White & Phua, 2014).44 
In the meantime, nuclear and renewable sources (including hydro, wind, solar and 
others such as biomass) have been booming in recent years as well. Their growth 
between 2005 and 2011 was more than double, but their shares in the total energy use 
were still low, thus are unlikely to become major energy sources for commercial use in 
China in the near future. For the 12th Five Year Plan period, targets for non-fossil fuel 
sources have been set to reach 11.4% in the primary energy consumption mix by 2015, 
and 15% by 2020.   
                                                
44 Some cases are Sinopec’s acquisition in 2014 of a 15% stake in the Pacific Northwest LNG 
project in British Columbia, Canada; CNOOC’s US$ 18 billion acquisition in 2013 of Nexen, a 
Calgary based company that has large oil sand and shale gas reserves in western Canada;  
CNOOC’s US$ 1.93 billion acquisition in 2013 of additional interests from the BG Group of the 
Queensland Curtis LNG project in Australia (White & Phua, 2014). 
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The recent rapid expansion of solar and wind power in China has called 
worldwide attention. China has become the largest manufacturer of photovoltaic panels 
since 2008, and Chinese companies has taken almost 18% of the market share of the 
global wind turbine supply, only slightly behind Germany (21%), as of the end of 2014 
(Energy Digital, 2015). In terms of domestic capacity, China is now the largest investor 
in these two types of alternative energy among nations, and has led the world in new 
capacity installations since 2009 (Pew Environment Group, 2010; REN21, 2015). The 
total renewable energy capacities China currently possesses were estimated to be 153 
GW (hydro excluded), about 23% of the that of the entire world (REN21, 2015, p. 33).   
Despite all the impressive accomplishments, developing renewable energy 
resources has been facing considerable challenges that can become substantive 
constraints. First, the comparative economic efficiency of renewables, particularly the 
solar and wind power, is discounted because of insufficient infrastructure. For example, 
though the total installed capacity for wind power in China has been the greatest in the 
world, 20-30% of the generated electricity has been discarded for no grid access (Wong 
& Zhu, 2015). Many wind farms in China are located in remote western areas where 
energy resources abound but small population provides little incentive for grid 
construction by State-run grid operators. The profit margin on wind power to them is 
generally lower than that on coal-based electricity, resulting in higher prices and waste of 
productivity in the wind industry. The vicious circle is also seen in the case of solar 
power. The over-capacity due to excessive, policy-driven investment has put many 
Chinese solar panel companies at risk since the export setback due to the Great Recession. 
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Suntech, a Jiangsu-based Chinese company that was once the biggest solar cell 
manufacturer in the world, declared bankruptcy in 2013. The under-utilization of 
generated electricity for lack of smart-grid integration is a main block for bringing down 
the prices and the commercialization of solar energy.  
The second and related problem is that not only regular grid is needed, but also 
smart electric grid is essential in the deployment of renewable energy. To date, the degree 
to which each of the smart grid technologies differs, adding to the uncertainty for the 
general applicability of renewable energy in the near future. Moreover, the Chinese 
government has input significant public investment in energy technology innovation to 
moving up the value chain, and policy efforts such as encouraging renewable financing, 
simplifying administrative procedures, and promoting “green credit” (China Dialogue, 
2014). In short, whether these measures will be effective to stimulating energy innovation 
for China remains a question; technological bottleneck remains a key material constraint 
on China’s renewable energy industry.  
 The market reforms of the domestic energy sector is another highly complicated 
and controversial issue impacting the renewables market. Half of the coal consumption in 
China attributes to electricity generation, and the important nexus between coal and 
electricity businesses had been regulated by the government by supervising contracted 
coal supply to the power companies even after the coal industry became marketized in the 
1990s. The attempt to marketizing the electricity industry has been done several times in 
the past decade, but the most recent policy to abolish the contracted coal supply in 2013 
is considered the most significant step. It is expected to cut down the reliance of the 
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power companies on the cheap coal guaranteed by the state, and to stimulate competition 
in the electricity generation industry and create market space for alternative energy 
options. More importantly, as the current electric grid industry in China is substantively 
monopolized by the State Grid Corporation of China, this market reform may introduce 
competition into the grid business and related technological developments (Q. Wong, 
2014).   
Finally, the rapid advancement in China’s renewable energy has caused negative 
ecological impact, seemingly calling into question the hope for protecting the 
environment by developing alternative energy. The production process of solar cells is 
highly energy and pollution-intensive. For every kilowatt capacity of a solar cell, around 
10 kilograms of polycrystalline silicon are needed, which requires 6 kWh of electricity 
for manufacturing this major elements of solar cells. Coal has produced constantly 
around 80% of the COⁿ emissions of China over the past three decades (Figure 5-1). 
When the total carbon pollution grew at a 9% rate annually between 2002 and 2012, the 
emissions due to coal consumption grew at 9.3% per year as well (Appendix D). Besides 
COⁿ, another byproduct, silicon tetrachloride, is a very toxic substance emitted during the 
manufacturing of polycrystalline silicon and its recycle is costly. Most of the photovoltaic 
companies in China do not have proper equipment to manage this toxin. Hydropower is 
another compelling case. Most of the damming projects in China, including the Three-
Gorge Dams, have been criticized for destabilizing seismic conditions, destroying forests, 
spreading pollution, endangering animals and displacing people. Because it is relatively 
“cheaper” (in terms of construction investment) and supply is more stable than solar and 
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wind power, the central and local governments have sought a considerable increase in 
hydropower in order to meet the energy targets for the 11th Five Year Plan.  
The use of fossil fuel and massive industrial development have produced severe 
pollution, but pollution controls were ineffective particularly in the non-state-owned 
enterprises. China’s reliance on fossil fuels and its poor implementation of pollution and 
efficiency technologies have contributed to severe air and water pollution and public 
health hazards.   
Figure 5-26COⁿ Emissions of China by Energy Type 
 
 
Material Force III: Environmental Quality 
Degrading air and water 
Among China’s many ecological crises,45 the pollution of air and water are two of 
the most serious sources and outcomes. While each of them has interconnections with 
                                                
45 Besides air and water problems, China is facing severe desertification and land loss, 
deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and pollution from persistent organic pollutants, among others.  
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each other and the other types of environmental degradation, they are closely related to 
the causes and impact of climate change. The burning of fossil fuels, particularly coal, 
has been confirmed as the major anthropogenic cause of disease-inducing air pollutants 
such as sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, and particulate matter; as well as the heat-trapping 
carbon dioxide that can raise the temperature in the atmospheric system. Also, as climate 
change has been changing the weather patterns, enhancing floods and droughts in areas 
that are already under the risk of freshwater shortage, water pollution can no doubt 
intensify the crisis. 
For China, air pollution being a serious problem is no news. While the poor air 
quality in the capital city was publicized with much international media attention prior to 
the opening of the 2008 Beijing Olympics, air pollution has been worse and more 
protracted for other places in the country. According to the World Bank, “20 of the 
world’s 30 most polluted cities are in China, with Shaanxi Province’s coal mining city 
Linfen the dirtiest (Shapiro, 2012, p. 7). The Asian Development Bank (Q. Zhang & 
Crooks, 2012) has also reported seven Chinese cities were ranked among the ten most 
polluted cities in the world, and that fewer than 1% of the 500 largest cities in China have 
met the WHO’s air quality standards (p. 55).  
China’s heavy reliance on coal is responsible for the poor air quality. 
Approximately 90% of the sulfur dioxide emissions and 50% of the particulate emissions 
in China result from coal use (Economy, 2010a, p. 309). China is also the largest SOⁿ 
emitter in the world. From a sectoral perspective, the industrial sector produces around 
90% of the total SOⁿ emissions, and, particularly, the electric power industry makes 
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around 60% of total industrial SOⁿ emissions (Q. Zhang & Crooks, 2012, p. 61). As 
around 77% of China’s electricity generation is based on fossil fuels (USEIA, 2015), 
70% of SOⁿ emissions can thus be attributed to the combustion of fossil fuels, with coal 
being the major part of it.  
Another source of air pollution, primarily in cities, is the vehicular exhaust. Up to 
2007, the number of privately owned vehicles had increased at a compound rate of 26% 
per annum, starting at zero in the late 1980s. The number of civilian vehicles had gone 
3,200% higher than it was in 1978 (Q. Zhang & Crooks, 2012, p. 61). Vehicular exhaust 
consists of pollutants such as nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and fine 
particulates.  
From a temporal perspective, however, the overall air quality China has been 
improved since 2007. The industrial SOⁿ emissions have be on the decline after a 
significant hike between 2003 and 2006 because of the rapid industrial expansion in the 
first part of the last decade. Tougher measures under the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-
2010) have been enacted to close down small and inefficient factories and power stations 
and ensure more thorough enforcement of existing regulations. Compared to the SOⁿ 
emission trends, particulate emissions (soot and dust) have been declining since at least 
the late 1990s. Besides policy factors, structural changes within the industrial sector, and 
increased availability of technologies that improved energy efficiency and waste 
treatment have contributed to reduce the overall air pollution loads. However, regional 
disparities exist. Pollution situation gets better in some areas but worse in the others. For 
example, between 2007 and 2013, SOⁿ emissions were lowered from 1.52 to 0.87 million 
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tons for Beijing (42% lower), while those in Gansu Province, Tibet and Xinjiang 
increased by 0.39 million tons (7%), 2.5 million tons (43%) and 0.022 million tons 
(52%), respectively.   
Compared to air pollution, water pollution in China is less noticed to the 
international public but no less serious with an even longer history. Among the three 
events that marked 1972 as the beginning of China’s environmental protection history—
blackening of the beach at Dalian Bay, discovery of tainted fish appearing on the Beijing 
market from the Guanting Reservoir, and the United Nations Conference on Human 
Environment in Stockholm, Sweden—two of them were directly related to pollution of 
water bodies. The coast off of Tianjin, the fifth most populous metropolis with the 
highest per capita GDP in the country, has become heavily contaminated by chemical 
discharge from factories along the Hai River and tributaries, which enter the Bohai Bay, 
causing the Bay itself to have experienced frequent red tides in recent years.46  
The first problem with China’s water is the scarcity and continued withdrawal of 
freshwater resources (Khan & Liu, 2008, pp. 5–7). Currently, with China’s enormous 
population, the Chinese per capita internal freshwater resources is about one-third of the 
world’s average and one-fifth of that in the United States. Also, this amount has dropped 
from 4425 cubic meters in 1962 to 2072 cubic meters in 2013 (World Bank, 2015). 
China’s largest freshwater lake, Poyang Lake, has suffered severe shrinkage in the recent 
                                                
46 The largest macroalgal bloom in human history occurred in the nearby area, too. In late June 
2008, a green tide covered almost the entire coastal area of Qingdao, the host city for sailing 
regatta of the Beijing Olympic Games. The massive outbreak was observable from the space, said 
to result from the seaweed aquaculture in the Yellow Sea (Liu, Keesing, Xing, & Shi, 2009). 
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decade partly due to the construction and operation of the Three Gorge Dam. In 
December 2013, it recorded its ever lowest water level as 7.5 meters (Davidson, 2014).  
The second problem is the degrading quality of these scarce resources. The 
quality of China’s surface water, including rivers and lakes, has been deteriorating. About 
30% of the river water throughout the country is evaluated as unfit for human use, and 
“more than half of the groundwater nationwide is categorized as ‘polluted’ or ‘extremely 
polluted,’ according to government statistics (Ivanova, 2013). For example, one-fifth of 
the Yellow River is not supposed to be used for drinking, irrigation, or energy 
production. Elizabeth Economy, depicted the “death” of the Huai River in the opening 
paragraph of her most recent book on China’s environmental problems:  
In late July 2001, the fertile Huai River Valley—China’s breadbasket—was the 
site of an environmental disaster. Heavy rains flooded the river’s tributaries, 
flushing more than 38 billion gallons of highly polluted water into the Huai. 
Downstream, in Anhui Province, the river water was thick with garbage, yellow 
foam, and dead fish (2010, p. 9).   
 
Economy has presented a saga in which how damming, floods and droughts, poor 
regulations on waste discharge, inappropriate central policy design, and the lacking local 
commitment altogether resulted in the terminal status of the Huai River, as well as the 
chronic pollution of many other rivers and lakes in China. The situation for Chinese lakes 
is even graver than that of the rivers. Based on government statistics, 50 to 68% of the 
water of key lakes and reservoirs was ranked as Grades V or V+ (poor and extremely 
poor) and under 10% as Grades I and II (good and fair)47 over the period between 2003 
                                                
47 China’s environmental and resource authorities use a six-level scheme for grading the surface 
water quality of their monitoring points. Grade I water is completely unpolluted water that is 
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and 2009, while river water still had as least 40 to 68% that was categorized as Grades I 
and II (Zhang & Crooks, 2012, pp. 38–42).  
Related to the surface water pollution, groundwater pollution is another insidious 
and dangerous problem. China’s groundwater provides 70% of the country’s total 
drinking water, but it is under threat increasingly due to hazardous waste, polluted 
surface water, and runoff pesticides and fertilizers. Aquifers in 90% of Chinese cities 
were polluted48 (van Wyk, 2013). The government has confirmed that, as of 2014, 61.5% 
of the tested groundwater nationwide is polluted to the extent of “poor” or “extremely 
poor” quality, and so is 85% of the groundwater in the densely populated Northern China 
plain (MEP & GoPRC State Council, 2015, pp. 16–7). Contaminated groundwater 
unavoidably contributes to contaminated soil. Although the Chinese government has 
conducted the nationwide soil survey of since 2006, it did not formally released the 
findings until April 2014, two month after it denied a civil request of the soil information 
in the name of “state secret” and made overwhelming domestic and international media 
repercussions. According to these latest official data, 16.1% of the country’s soil is 
polluted, including nearly 20% of farmland. 83% of the polluted land was tainted by 
inorganic material, most common of which were cadmium, nickel and arsenic (E. Wong, 
                                                                                                                                            
suitable for drinking without treatment. Grade II is water that is drinkable after treated and is 
suitable for rare aquatic species and spawning grounds. Grades III and IV are moderate quality 
that is suitable for general industrial or recreational uses that do not involve direct human contact. 
Grades V and V+ are considered unfit for human touch or any actual use. 
48 This finding was originally found in the draft text of the National Plan for Preventing 
Groundwater Pollution 2008-2020, released jointly by the Ministry of Environmental Protection 
and the Ministry of Land and Resource in July 2008, but when its final version got promulgated 
in 2011, the figure was deleted.  
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2014). The most recent annual report of the Ministry of Environmental Protection has 
noted the respective percentages of land polluted by each of them as 7.0, 4.8, and 2.7% 
(MEP & GoPRC State Council, 2015, p. 46) 
Numerous studies have confirmed that environmental pollution can negatively 
impact the human and the other species in many ways. The bad air quality resulting from 
coal-based heating during wintertime in the Northern China caused a resident to have a 
five-years shorter life expectancy than her non-resident fellow citizens (Chen, Ebenstein, 
Greenstone, & Li, 2013). Besides toxic gases of SOⁿ or NOⁿ, suspended and fine 
particulates are the top reason for health and life hazards.     
Particulate matter, including PM10 and PM2.5, is a severe threat to human health. 
PM2.5 refers to fine particulates that measure 2.5 microns or less in diameters. They are 
small enough to pass through the throat and nose, entering deeply into the lungs and 
bloodstream and causing serious health effects on the lungs and heart, including ischemic 
heart disease, stroke, lung cancer and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (Burnett et 
al., 2014).  
PM2.5 has been confirmed as the primary pollutant for the recent outbreaks of 
smog—appeared as “Airpocalypse” on the Western media—in many industrial cities in 
China. The Chinese authorities used to refuse to reveal information about the particulates 
concentration; formal research activity was unlikely, nor could the publication of data or 
estimates by foreign actors proceed without interference (E. Wong, 2014). Starting from 
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2011, the particulates concentration data have become available in official statistics.49 
Based on the readings of PM2.5 in 31 major cities (provincial capitals and province-level 
municipalities) in 2013, a Chinese research team calculated that the premature deaths 
from PM2.5 pollution-related diseases in the year came to 257,000. That is an average 
rate of around 0.1%. This is reported to be higher than those of cigarette smoking 
(0.07%) or traffic accident (0.0009%) (Greenpeace, 2015). The numbers for 12 out of 
those 31 cities were even greater than 0.1%, converted to more than 134 deaths per 
100,000 people per year. Shijiazhuang (Hebei Province, northern region), Jinan 
(Shangdong Province, northern region), Changsha (Hunan Province, central region) were 
the three locations with the highest rates of PM2.5 pollution-related premature death 
(Greenpeace East Asia, 2015).  
Unsafe water in China has supplied nearly 700 million people with drinking water 
in the urban areas, as less than 25% of the river water is considered suitable for drinking 
or fishing. In the rural areas, that treated piped water is not available for two-thirds of the 
rural population is a leading cause of death among children under the age of five in China 
(Economy, 2010a, pp. 331–314). One-third of China’s land suffered from acid rain, 
which is caused by emissions of SOⁿ, in terms of erosion of buildings, diminishing of 
agricultural output and poisoning of water bodies thus water and fishery resources (BBC, 
2006).  
                                                
49 China Statistical Yearbook, the annual publication by the National Statistics Bureau, started to 
include the annual average quantity of PM10 of 31 major cities (provincial capitals and province-
level cities) from 2011, and PM2.5 from 2013, respectively. 
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At least 459 Chinese villages with severe air, water, or soil pollution also have 
cancer death rates that are far above the national average. These “cancer villages,” while 
being denied of their existence by the authority until February 2013 (He, 2014), were 
revealed to the world with the collective effort of the media and Internet. Typically, they 
are located in poor counties near major cities in the wealthy Eastern part of the country, 
but they are currently distributed across 29 of China’s 31 provinces (Liu, 2010), and are 
anticipated to increasingly spread westward due to continuous industrialization and 
urbanization.  
Institutional Force: China’s Climate Policy-Making Model 
The first character of the institutional basis for China’s climate is the wide range 
of functionality and responsibility being spread in the overall policy process, which 
involves a few governmental bodies as major actors, and semi-official organizations and 
individuals as secondary actors. The Weberian rationalization of each of bureaucratic unit 
represents interests in economic growth, environmental protection and research/scientific 
enterprise. And the changing status of the individual bureaucratic unit reflects the change 
of focus on the complex climate change issue in China.   
The second distinctive character of the Chinese climate policy-making process is 
the coordinating role of the special “coordination committee” or “leading group” that 
consists of the head of the government and chief officials from various branches inside or 
outside the State Council. This group of around 30 people resembles the brain for making 
China’s climate attitude and behavior, but the representatives from the economic affairs 
branch now have the most power in influencing policy outcomes.      
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The economic considerations to the climate issue have been harnessed by the 
National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC, 国务院发展与改革委员会) 
and its predecessor. The NDRC, succeeding the State Planning Commission (SPC) and 
State Development and Planning Committee (SDPC), is the locomotive of economic and 
social development policies in the Chinese central government.50 It bears the main 
responsibility for drafting Five-Year Plans, the most authoritative official documents 
outlining the government’s directives on economic and social development of the 
country. On the climate work, it had been the host of the Climate Change Office, the 
secretariat to the National Climate Change Coordination Committee (NCCCC) since 
1998.  
The NDRC is also the most influential bureaucratic actor in China’s energy 
policy. China does not have a separate energy ministry, whereas the Energy Bureau has 
had primary responsibility for China’s energy industry since 2003. The Energy Bureau 
was assigned the responsibility for energy supply, while the power over energy 
consumption and efficiency belonged to the Department of Environment and Resources 
Conservation. In 2005, with the increasing salience of energy issues in the economy and 
the politics of China, the National Energy Leading Group, a high-level taskforce led by 
Wen Jiabao was established. Its mission was set to determine the grand strategies on 
                                                
50 This governmental unit had been called State Planning Commission between 1952 and 1998. 
This organization was renamed as the SDPC in 1998, expected to carry out the mission of 
China’s market-oriented transition and the economic macro-management. Then in 2003 the 
SDPC was reorganized as a newly created NDRC, which merged State Council Office for 
Restructuring the Economic System and part of the State Economic and Trade Commission. The 
word “planning” was removed for good from the name of the most important governmental 
organization overseeing the economic development of China. 
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energy for the country. To serve the executive needs of this Leading Group, the Office of 
the National Energy Leading Group was set up and the NDRC chairman was appointed 
as the head of the office. Furthermore, a new post as vice-chairman was created to be in 
charge of energy and environment, and was given to a former minister of the State 
Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA). These changes indicate that energy 
issues have been elevated to the highest political level and that there is a specific focus on 
climate (Heggelund, Andresen, & Buan, 2010, p. 237). 
The Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) is currently the highest-level 
governing body of environmental policy planning, supervision, evaluation, and 
coordination of enforcement efforts. The earliest predecessor of the MEP was the State 
Council Leading Committee on Environmental Protection (国务院环境保护领导小组) 
in 1973, established after the United National Stockholm Conference in 1972. This ad 
hoc committee was later normalized to become the Environmental Protection Bureau (国
家环境保护局) under the Ministry of Urban-Rural Development and Environmental 
Protection in 1982, and then further promoted to the ministerial level as the National 
Environmental Protection Administration (NEPA, 国家环境保护总局) in 1988. In the 
organization of the Chinese government, despite their same level in the formal 
organizational hierarchy, a ministry differs from an administration in that the former is 
part of the cabinet, the highest decision-making body in the State Council, while the latter 
is one type of the affiliated organs of the State Council (国务院直属机构) and is granted 
more implementing power than decision-making power over an issue. In general, 
affiliated organs of the State Council are responsible for carrying out the policies 
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designed by the cabinet and stamp-approved by the People’s Congress, and their path to 
influencing the policy-making is often more indirect as they are viewed as more technical 
and professionalized bureaucratic units. This is one institutional explanation why the 
NEPA was considered to have much less say than the economic representatives in the 
domestic politics during the formative period of the climate policy (1989-2005), because 
the NDRC (along with the SPC and the SPDC) has been a cabinet member but the NEPA 
was not. And this is also why the institutionalization of MEP was deemed an essential 
promotion in the regard of political prominence of environmental issues in China, for not 
only the environmental interests can now participate directly in the debate and 
discussions at highest-level executive meetings in the government, thus more possibly 
shaping the national development strategy; but also the pro-environment directives are 
now co-signed by the MEP and the State Council together when they are sent to the local 
governments, thus increasing the authority of the pro-environment policies mostly drafted 
by the MEP as well as the pressure for compliance at the local levels.  
The China Meteorological Administration (CMA) and the Chinese Academy of 
Sciences (CAS) are the two of the lead agencies to provide scientific evaluations on 
climate change. The CMA had led China’s climate change policy in the early 1990s, until 
the leadership role was officially replaced by the NDRC in 1998 (Harrington, 2005, p. 
111). However, it still is the portal of scientific communication between the Chinese 
government and the IPCC, and its former chief administrator, Qin Dahe, has been the co-
chair of the IPCC Working Group I since 2002, leading the completion of the Group’s 
fourth and fifth assessment reports. The CAS, along with other research-centered 
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institutions, is an important origin of the expert community on climate change in China. 
In addition, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MST) is another actor with stakes 
in science and research. Firstly, it funds research projects on energy and environmental 
technologies, and is considered sympathetic to environmental concerns. Secondly, it is in 
charge of the scientific research and technology transfer as the portal between China and 
the Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM). It has played a central role in laying the 
ground for the development of CDM projects in China, and its officials serve as the 
Chinese representative on the Executive Board of the CDM at the UNFCCC (Heggelund, 
2007, p. 173). Twenty-eight Chinese experts were selected for the write-up of the fourth 
assessment report of the IPCC (Heggelund, 2007, p. 169),51 and the number of Chinese 
experts increased to forty-two for the fifth assessment report published between 2013 and 
2014 (IPCC, 2014b).  
Besides the economic, environmental, and scientific bodies, the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) is the last but not the least important player which plays a key 
role in the international political process on climate change. The mission of MFA is to 
ensure China’s political and economic interests to be served in bilateral or multilateral 
negotiations, so the MFA has shared the general position on the primacy of China’s 
economic needs with the NDRC. Because climate change initially emerged as a 
“Western” problem in the late 1980s to the Chinese leaders’ eyes, MFA has been very 
                                                
51 Scientists have been involved in the climate governance of China, with a shift of role from 
coordinating to a consulting. But this may not mean science is getting increasingly politically 
neutral; the ways in which it affects politics can be less institutionalized and more nuanced.  
Wübbeke (2010) discussed channels via which science and scientists in China have influenced 
the country’s climate policy. 
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influential in formulating China’s response to climate change and has shaped China’s 
international image as a tough negotiator especially at the COPs. It has continually 
argued to protect China’s sovereignty and economic considerations, and that the 
industrialized countries are responsible for taking the lead on global climate change by 
helping the developing countries with the technology transfer and funding needed. As 
such, the MFA sees China as speaking for the interests of the developing world 
(Heggelund, 2007, p. 173).    
Finally, there are ‘window agencies’ to communicate with international actors, 
and coordinate different bureaucracies for special policies. For example, the Ministry of 
Finance has communicated with the GEF and coordinated (Yu, 2008, p. 6) among 
bureaucratic bodies within the Chinese government on international financial support and 
technology transfer. 
In sum, several actors are engaged in formulating China’s climate policy within 
various state institutions. Currently, the NDRC and MFA are the locomotive of the policy 
process. The NDRC has responsibility for both economic policy and energy policy, thus 
setting the agenda on domestic issues that defines the perceived material conditions and 
limits for climate policy. The MFA has exercised great influence both internationally and 
domestically as climate change has been a foreign policy matter that is only gaining more 
weight in the global politics. Within the Chinese government, these two actors have been 
seen as the “winning coalition”; internally, they supervised the socioeconomic 
assessment of climate change mitigation in the National Climate Change Assessment, and 
externally, they have represented China’s core national interests on the climate issue. On 
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the other hand, the MEP and MST belongs to another coalition that pursues more 
proactive environmental and climate actions, but has had much less influence on 
especially the climate issue as it is perceived primarily as development (in terms of 
sustainable economy and energy) and foreign policy issue (Heggelund et al., 2010).  
Because of the involvement of multiple bureaucratic units and individuals with 
divergent interests, one might misunderstand that Chinese climate policy-making is 
fragmented and thus inefficient and ineffective (Marks, 2010; Gilley, 2012).52  The 
making of climate change policy, as part of the foreign policy, centers on coordination 
and consensus-building among units and sub-units with broad common goals (Yu, 2008, 
pp. 17–20). These goals are usually strategic rather than substantive, and have been 
approved and assigned by the top party and government leadership.  
What I would argue is that, the Chinese coordination model is efficient in 
decision-making because of its “consensus-ensuring” character, but whether the 
“consensus” can be communicated successfully largely depends on the attitude or 
position the top leaders hold. And policy effectiveness would be a different matter.    
Yu (2008) explained the Chinese “consensus building (Tong Yi Kou Jing)” as 
follows:  
When Chinese government express[es] consensus toward some international 
regimes, obey[s] the norms of international regimes, and acquire[s] interests 
according to procedures of international regimes, different bureaucratic sections 
try to achieve policy making and policy implementation through communication, 
consultation, and bargaining…[O]n climate change policy, the final policymaking 
mostly occurs at the coordination level. (p. 19).  
                                                
52 They adopt the concept and framework of “fragmented authoritarianism (K. G. Lieberthal & 
Oksenberg, 1988)“   
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If Yu’s description is accurate, what drives communication and bargaining within 
the Chinese government among bureaucratic sections is achieving a policy orientation or 
goal that has been announced by the top leadership. Therefore, this mechanism (Tong Yi 
Kou Jing) is closer to “consent-ensuring” instead of consensus-building, as the highest-
level decision has been done and imposed on the bureaucratic actors. Although this 
understanding does not mean bureaucratic actors do not have flexibility or power over the 
policy process, it does suggest that in the context of the authoritarian nature in the 
governing order of the regime, decision-making can be quick and smooth among sub-
national actors with conflicting interests or identities. But the degree to which the 
quickness and smoothness of the process to transform a policy goal into practical 
implementation may largely depend on how serious the top leadership treats the goal.  
In practice, a cross-sectional unit is necessary in order to coordinate among the 
multifarious institutional actors. The initial setup in 1990 was a coordination committee 
under the then Environmental Protection Committee of the State Council, with Mr. Song 
Jian53 as the chair. The executive function of the committee was assigned to State 
Meteorological Administration, leading the other ten units from across the entire 
government: Ministry of Development and Planning, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Ministry of Science and Technology, State Economic and Trade Commission, Ministry 
                                                
53 Mr. Song is a cybernetics scientist and technician with a doctorate degree from the former 
Soviet Union. His academic background made him one of the principal architects of China’s anti-
ballistic missile system and the policy on population control. He was State Councilor, one of the 
ten most powerful political officers under the Premier and Vice Premiers in the Chinese system of 
government, as well as the director of State Science and Technology Commission and when 
appointed the Coordination Committee chair in 1990 (NCCU, 2015).  
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of Finance, State Environmental Protection Administration, Ministry of Construction, 
State Forestry Administration, State Oceanic Administration and Chinese Academy of 
Sciences. Later during the government restructure in 1998, this organization was replaced 
by the National Coordination Committee on Climate Change (NCCCC, 国家气候变化对
策协调小组) under the SDPC, chaired by Mr. Zeng Peiyan, then SDPC Chairman and 
Vice Premier of the State Council. This marked the shift in the official recognition of the 
climate change problem from being a scientific-technological challenge to an economic 
and development task.  
The NCCCC was updated for the first time in 2003 as part of the institutional 
adjustment of the State Council. The adjustment replaced the SDPC with the NDRC, 
therefore transitioned the chief of office on the Chinese economic policy and climate 
policy to Mr. Ma Kai, Mr. Zeng’s successor. This decision re-confirmed the prioritization 
of the economic dimension in climate policymaking.  
The latest major transformation of the centrally-coordinating organization took 
place in 2007, changing the NCCCC to the National Leading Group on Climate Change 
(NLGCC, 国家应对气候变化领导小组). The significance of a Leading Group is that it 
signals the attention from the highest level of leadership to the climate change issue, for it 
includes the Premier and Vice Premiers as leading members to preside meetings among 
twenty-nine head ministers and officials. The establishment of the NLGCC is therefore 
considered an elevation of the climate change issue from a relatively executive agenda to 
a primary national-security agenda. This highest-level organization finalizes national 
strategies and plans on climate change in areas of coordination of policies within the 
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government and domestic mitigation and adaptation, as well as international negotiations. 
Its most recent adjustment took place in July 2013 to include 33 officials from 27 
bureaucratic units in the State Council. Only the NDRC has more than two seats in this 
Leading Group.54  
Ideational Force I: Philosophical Traditions 
Many studies have regarded the relationship between economic development and 
environmental protection a necessary contradiction, and attributed the environmental 
problems in China today to it. It appears that that it was an unavoidable and unintended 
consequence of the voracious pursuit for GDP growth of the Chinese state and society 
altogether, and that China was repeating the old development path taken by the now 
highly-industrialized Great Britain or the United States, albeit with a greater speed. This 
assumption is not entirely true. China’s environmental crises today partly result from 
people and leaders’ intentional negligence on the matter of protection the environment. 
During Mao’s era, environmental problems were not regarded as an issue in socialist 
China as they were supposed to only belong to the “capitalist” nations (Qu, 2000, p. 12). 
Environmental concerns were intentionally ignored under Mao’s reign; both the 
government and the general public neglected the conservation of nature and natural 
resources, which resulted in large scale deterioration of natural ecosystems and disruption 
of many ecological processes (Edmonds, 1999). They also were mentioned just 
                                                
54 The 2013 State Council reform was the first reform after the new government under Xi Jinping 
and Li Keqiang assumed power. The roster of the current NLGCC is available at 
http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2013-07/09/content_2443020.htm  
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occasionally and conditionally in the two decades after the launch of the market reform 
between the late 1970s and mid-1990s.  
In my view, the Chinese civilization did not have systemic and influential ways of 
thinking and talking about the environment or human-nature relations perhaps until the 
1980s even 1990s. Ancient literature and philosophical traditions indeed commented on 
nature. For instance, Taoist classics and Shan-Shui poetry appreciate the aesthetic value 
and express spiritual feelings about nature. But they were not equivalent to the ecological 
thoughts in the modern sense because when “nature” was referred in their texts, the 
contexts were usually either metaphorizing the scenery for literary creation, or depicting 
nature as “everything as it is.” In other words, there seems to be very little signs of 
structure nor agency. After all, as some have pointed out, generally the Chinese 
philosophical thoughts do not hold a subject-object separation and division (Mou, 2005). 
Additionally, several classics on history, governing techniques, or political ethics had 
addressed coping natural disasters, water-utilization, agricultural and economic 
management in society, they rarely examine the subject of nature-human relation 
explicitly, thus cannot be viewed as ecological or environmental philosophy.    
Nevertheless, ancient philosophical ideas can provide intellectual resources for 
modern interpretations. Environmental historians have acknowledged that pre-modern 
China possessed a rich cultural tradition of environmentalism. With regard to views on 
nature, literary and artistic references abound in the Chinese classic poetry and painting. 
A respect for nature and an appreciation of its importance and beauty characterize these 
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works and highlight the environmental tradition from the intellectual-elite perspective 
(Hou, 1997).  
In contrast, views from the mass culture tended to portray nature as a force to 
impose hardships on men, so great efforts and persistence were requisites to overcome 
the hardships or even alter the origin of problem—the physical nature. The success was 
therefore deemed worth praise and honor from others. One Chinese folktale of Hou Yi 
tells the story of a mythological legendary archer who shot down nine of the ten suns that 
were burning the earth, thereby saving the earth and becoming a world hero. Another 
myth of Yu, who successfully stopped floods of the Yellow River after working for 
thirteen years without going home even when he passed by his house for three times, 
eventually solved the gravest natural disaster for China in the ancient time and became 
the founding emperor, Yu the Great, of the Xia dynasty (c. 2070-1600 B.C.E.). He is 
generally admired as one of the most respectable emperors in Chinese (mythical) history. 
With regard to the relationship between human and nature, the traditional 
philosophical thoughts—typically Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism and Buddhism—
demonstrate influential ideas in the Chinese environmental tradition. Understanding them 
can inform the intellectual and discursive origins of the practices in political and 
economic contexts, because these philosophies have “influenced Chinese authorities, elite 
and popular attitudes, and the overall ordering of Chinese society in ways both distinctive 
and important for the natural environment” (Economy, 2010b).   
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The discussion below will focus on how each of the Chinese philosophy 
approaches the question of human-cosmos relationship as reflected in their respective 
principles regarding social relations.  
Confucianism 
Although Confucianism is by no means a single unified discourse and many 
strands of thought have been developed throughout 2500 years of time, a set of moral 
ideas such as benevolence (ren), propriety (li), righteousness (yi) are commonly upheld. 
The epistemological foundation for the functioning of these values, on which the 
Confucian social order is based,55 is harmony (he) in terms of a “healthy, stable 
interplay” between different entities (Li, 2006, p. 588). These entities include all human 
and non-human subjects. In a typical Confucian view of the world that contains a triad 
structure of tian (sky/heaven), di (earth) and ren (man/human), the conception of 
harmony presumes that the original condition for human to live in the world is a healthy 
and stable one under tian. Tian as heaven refers to an impersonal but the ultimate source 
of life, political power, and spiritual authority; it governs the entire universe, including 
the earth (di) and mankind (ren). Di is close to the current Western notion of nature, 
referring to the physical non-human beings such as land, forests, mountains, rivers, rocks, 
etc. Since tian is the source and generator of moral principles and symbolizes the 
                                                
55 In the general Confucian vision, society is composed of “five fundamental relationships”: ruler 
and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, elder sibling and junior sibling, friend to another 
friend. Under this social model, as long as the first subjects in each dyad behaves in accordance 
with the Confucian moral values and the second subject respects the first accordingly,  
then both of them are considered fulfilling their personal and social duties, thus harmony and 
freedom from conflict would be assured. 
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original, righteous order, the purposes for di and ren are defined to maintain the 
harmonious order: the role for di is to nourish and support the needs of ren, and ren is 
supposed to appreciate the giving from di and respect for both di and tian. In the 
literature, this triad has a common parallel to one’s filial relationships, in which tian is 
analogous to the father and di to the mother. Therefore, the triad is also clearly of a 
hierarchical structure down from tian, di and to ren, since both the earth and mankind 
should fulfill their purposes under the heaven’s principles (Murphey, 1967, p. 314).  
However, the Confucian thought grants much higher agency to human than it 
appears to be in the worldview depicted above. For ren is an indispensable integral part 
of the triad, the universe would be meaningless without this element. It is also human that 
is the agent to realize all the virtues derived from tian, thus Confucius himself and many 
of his followers put a great emphasis on education and self-cultivation because it is 
believed that though the human nature is good and the world is harmonious in the very 
beginning, sometimes bad influences prevail and harmony gets disrupted, so human 
efforts are genuinely needed to gain the right balance back. In a sense, the core of the 
Confucianism as a humanist philosophy lies in the persistent efforts to align personal 
values and behavior with the principles of tian (天道) at the individual level, and to 
safeguard harmony and carry out harmonization at the collective level (Tu, 1993, pp. 1–
56; Li, 2014, pp. 6–7).  
The centrality of the role of mankind in Confucianism has invoked two distinct 
interpretations regarding the legacy and impact of the Confucian thought on China’s 
environment.  Some have argued that Confucian ideas, especially those related to inter-
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entity harmonious relationships, espouse a great respect for nature (Kassiola, 2010; Li, 
2006). Laws of the nature regarding natural resources were particularly proposed by key 
Confucian thinkers to advise regular people how to utilize the environment (i.e. the 
earth/di). For example, in the Rites of Zhou— a Confucian classic on the theory of 
bureaucracy and political organization published in the Warring States period (403-221 
B.C.E.)—It was stated that local governors were responsible for protecting mountains, 
forests, rivers, and animals. Mencius, once counseled a King that “plant the crops 
according to the changes of season, you will have more food than you want; limit the size 
of the holes in the net, you will have more fish than you want; bide your time to fell the 
trees, you will have more fuelwood than you want.”56 
However, it may be problematic to say that Confucianism’s influence is irrelevant 
to the Chinese environmental degradation. China has a “three thousand years of 
unsustainable” relationships with nature (Elvin, 1993) in terms of “cereal cultivation, re-
engineering by hydraulic works for drainage, irrigation and flood-defense, and 
deforestation for the purposes of clearance and the harvesting of wood for fuel and 
construction” (Elvin, 1998, p. 733). Although the link between cultural tradition and 
economic behavior can by no means be deterministic, one would notice the human-
centered quality in Confucianism has been a likely force added to the anthropogenic 
demands as agriculture, water development, and deforestation. The address by Mencius 
                                                
56 This passage is from the chapter of Liang Hui Wang I in Mencius and is often cited as a textual 
evidence for the environmentally- friendly attitude of the Confucian thought; quoted in (Mao, 
1994, p. 43). 
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quoted above was immediately followed by his real concern—what makes of a good 
king. As he said, once the grain, fish, and wood become more than needed,  
…this will mean that the people can nourish their lives, bury their dead, and be 
without rancor. Making it possible for them to nourish their lives, bury their dead, 
and be without rancor is the beginning of kingly government [emphasis 
added]…Let mulberry trees be planted around households…people of fifty will be 
able to be clothed in silk…do not neglect the appropriate breeding times, and 
people of seventy will be able to eat meat…do not interfere with the appropriate 
seasons of cultivation, and families…will be able to avoid hunger. Attend 
carefully to the education provided in the schools, which should include 
instruction in the duty of filial and fraternal devotion, and gray-haired people will 
not be seen carrying burdens on the roads. The ruler of a state in which people of 
seventy wear silk and eat meat and where the black-haired people are neither 
hungry nor cold has never failed to become a true king. (Mencius, 2009, pp. 3–4)  
Therefore, talking about proper measures of handling natural resources is meant 
to make the proper relationship between the ruler and the subject; engaging with the earth 
(di) by using right methods is considered beneficial to the living conditions for people 
(ren) and their social relations. Both the good relation between di and ren, and that 
between different groups of ren in society, are part of the harmony project under 
heavenly (tian’s) wills. Moreover, Confucianism in general praises the mastering of all 
kinds of knowledge, including those about nature to better utilize its offerings. While 
overuse is discouraged, it nevertheless could stimulate human’s will and confidence in 
controlling at least part of the great nature. Xunzi, a contemporary of Mencius, expressed 
a belief in man’s ability to meet nature’s challenges and control it for his needs by 
articulating the notion of “zhi tianming er yungzhi” (master nature for use) (Economy, 
2010b, p. 31). Later, two of Xunzi’s protégés, Li Si (c. 284-208 B.C.E.) and Han Fei (c. 
281-233 B.C.E.) became proponents of Legalism.  
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Legalism 
To a certain extent, Legalism is an Aufheben of Confucianism. Legalist thinkers 
generally criticized and dismissed the moralism in Confucianism, but appreciated the 
Confucian ideal order as the collectivity of proper behaviors, and thought codifying the 
propriety with concrete rewards and punishment would be the best way to achieve the 
order. Legalist thought is similar to IR realism or mercantilism in its practical purpose, as 
the proponents anchored their work to the enhancement of wealth and strength of the 
kingdoms they served. Building comprehensive legal systems governing political, 
economic, education, cultural and social, and environmental and population matters was 
the primary subject of study for Legalist scholars. In order to produce statecraft, 
epistemic tools such as a simple materialist epistemology (as opposed to the Confucian 
idealist epistemology) and a theory and political model of “rule by law” (as opposed to 
the Confucian “rule by sage”) were developed.  
Therefore, the Legalist approach to the environment was somewhat similar to the 
modern strategies of resource conservation and management. As an early Legalist, Guan 
Zhong—the prime minister of the first hegemonic state during the Spring and Autumn 
Period (771-403 B.C.E.)—advised his people to exploit the nature within a reasonable 
extent. He asked them “not to raise too many cattle on the grassland, lest it fail to recover 
from over exploitation; and not to plant crops too close together, otherwise the fertility of 
the soil would be insufficient (Mao, 1994, p. 43)“. Some Legalists argued that a growing 
population and increasingly scarce supply of food and other goods would require stricter 
rules and controls on both ends of the supply and demand.  
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Taoism 
In contrast to the human-centric tendency of Confucianism and Legalism, Taoism 
holds nature-centrism as its axiom. As China historian Charles Hucker comments, 
Taoism is a lyrical, mystical, but by no means irrational advocacy of 
individualism, quietism, and spontaneity in union with Nature (tao)…. Nature is 
conceived as all-encompassing, as an impersonal, purposeless cosmos in which 
everything has its natural place and function; it is what it is for no reason other 
than that it is what it is, and can only be distorted and misunderstood when it is 
defined, labeled, or evaluated by standards such as good and bad that do not exist 
in nature (Hucker 1995, 90; quoted in Economy, 2010b, p. 33). 
Nature itself is the ontology of the philosophy; epistemologically, the notion of 
nature is absolute and has no social or moral connotation, whereas in Confucianism and 
Legalism, “nature” is laden with values based on morality or utility.  
Taoism was founded by Laozi (Lao Tzu) and reached its maturity in Zhuangzi’s 
(Chuang Tzu) works. In his seminal work Dao De Jing (Tao Te Ching), Laozi revealed 
the credo of Taoism as “let Nature take its course” with these famous lines: “Earth gives 
the rule for people. Heaven gives the rule for Earth. Tao gives the rule for Heaven. [T]he 
rule for Tao: things as they are (Laozi, 1992, p. 84)“. To be noted, while also using terms 
of “earth” (di) and “heaven” (tian) as the Confucians, Laozi argued that these concepts 
were subsumed under Tao—the cosmic order and the ultimate law of nature completely 
independent of human intervention. Zhuangzi further developed a transcendental notion 
as Nature, and founded a value-judging system based on Nature, thereby demonstrating 
an environmental theory that is non-anthropocentric, holistic and embraces universal 
egalitarianism (Xie & Fang, 2002).  
Because of the belief in the absoluteness of Nature, Taoists worship a life of 
simplicity and disregard human’s willful engagement with Nature except for minimal 
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subsistence. Acts of state should be limited to enabling people to acquire things from 
Nature for the same minimal purpose. To some, although such perspective on man-nature 
relations and the role of the state might protect the environment, it might hinder 
economic progress and development at the same time.   
Buddhism 
Unlike the previous three philosophies, Buddhism is not a native thought legacy, 
but it has created great impact on Chinese society and culture since its entry via India by 
the second century. The religion was practiced by not only peasants but intelligentsia in 
some dynasties, and it spread to nations such as Japan, Korea, and Vietnam, which 
belonged to a common cultural circle, where the Chinese writing system was adopted to 
circulate goods and ideas, similar to the role of Latin in premodern Europe .   
The Buddhist views on the environment are non-anthropocentric. Derived from its 
religious content, one fundamental belief is all creatures are equal, because in 
reincarnation, a person could return to the earth as another species, while an animal in the 
present life could be reborn into a human in the next life, based on the good mind and 
deeds committed. This notion of spiritual equality can induce a reverence of nature, as all 
things in the world—living or dead, in the past or in the future—have been connected in 
the cosmos by a kind of power that may be beyond human perceptibility but by no means 
contingent. Buddhists in China, therefore, advocated avoiding killing of animals and 
promote vegan diet. Buddhist monks not only observed these behaviors, but also 
protected the environment in the mountains in which they typically lived. Mao Yu-shi, a 
Chinese economist and founder of one of the earliest environmental NGOs in China, 
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thought that “one-third of the most beautiful and famous scenic areas in China [today] are 
Buddhist temples surrounded by ancient trees reflects the harmony between man and 
nature espoused by Buddhism” (Mao, 1994; as quoted in Economy, 2010b, p. 36).  
Contemporary Forces  
Overall, traditional Chinese philosophies—Confucianism, Legalism, Taoism and 
Buddhism here—share a general respect for the power and importance of nature. 
However, as environmental historians have suggested, the official effort to translate non-
anthropocentric ideas into actual actions in political and economic developments in 
China’s premodern history was little or hardly successful, mainly because of the 
imperatives of war, population expansion, and agricultural and economic development 
(Dunstan, 1998; Elvin, 2004). Furthermore, environmental degradation constantly lurked 
in much political and social turmoil leading to dynastic changes. Flooding, droughts, 
deforestation, soil erosion, along with changing climatic patterns impacted food 
production, creating famines and spurring conflicts among people divided along class, 
racial/ethnic or ideological lines. Starting as late as the early 19th-century, it was a co-
degeneration of economic, social and environmental conditions in China (Zhu, 1972; 
Zhang, Brecke, Lee, He, & Zhang, 2007).  
By the end of the imperial rule in 1911, 80% of Chinese people were employed in 
agriculture, but most of them suffered from severe poverty and hunger. A republican 
government in the mainland (1911-1949) was unable to relieve the deteriorating 
circumstances, while continuous warfare—the warlord era (1916-1928), Japanese 
aggression, and the nationalist-communist Civil War (1927-1950)—not only directly 
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aggravated the levels of degradation by destroying the existing natural resources and 
resource-management infrastructure, but also deprived any official authority of its ability 
to mobilize meaningful attempts for improving the environmental decay. Moreover, the 
communist state established in 1949 seemed to have only followed in the footsteps of its 
precedent regimes, particularly during the rule of Mao Zedong (1949-1976). Three more 
ideational factors need to be addressed prior to an investigation of the official discourse 
in the post-2000 period.  
Nationalism 
Nationalism in China is largely about the face rather than rationally-calculated 
material interests. Studies about the history of China in the twentieth-century cannot 
avoid the theme of “century of humiliation.” It is an indoctrinating narrative in standard 
history textbooks used for school children in China. This history narrative attributes the 
suffering on their fatherland to the invasion of the imperialist Western powers and Japan 
from 1840 to 1945. Beginning with the Opium War and concluding with the victory of 
the Second World War, it is generally perceived that China was treated unjustly not only 
for its material losses in money and territory, but, more importantly, for the deprivation 
of respect as the Middle Kingdom in the “Under-the-Heaven” world system of which it 
used to be the center. It was a sense of self and the self-other connection that was 
shattered and caused the sentiment of humiliation. This sentiment as a mix of defeated 
pride, anger and self-inflation, has progressed to become the emotional core of Chinese 
nationalism, and was carried by the narratives and even transformed into the belief that 
the contemporary “new” China, following the Communist Party’s lead, is proudly 
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“standing up” and shaking off of the nearer humiliating past, and will regain the glory of 
an older China—as those powerful dynasties before the mid-18th century—with the hard 
work of all Chinese people. The belief has been expressed in narratives of patriotism and 
solidarity, used by the Communist party-state as a means to justifying and mobilizing 
many political campaigns (Wang, 2008). “Face-saving” is main related concept and an 
essential element in studying about Chinese foreign policy especially when it comes to 
issues about international status.  
Campaignism  
Campaigns in the Communist China are extreme mobilization of the masses by 
the state. Numerous campaigns took place under Mao with the stated purposes of war 
preparation, purging the reactionary force, enhancing production output, building 
socialist utopia, etc. Two of the most extensive ones are the Great Leap Forward (1958-
1960) and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), both of which caused severe negative 
impact on China’s environment.  
Two ideologies sustaining the campaigns were nationalism and man’s ability in 
conquering nature. During the Great Leap Forward, the most advertised official 
propaganda as “Surpass the U.K. and Catching-up with the U.S.” (超英赶美) in crop 
harvest and iron/steel output epitomized the nationalist motivation of all economic 
campaigns, including the later “Learning from Dazai in Agriculture; Learning from 
Daqing in Industry” throughout the Cultural Revolution. Economic progress was 
perceived more as the first and foremost step toward the nation’s honor than the 
improvement of living conditions for individuals.  
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One may trace the roots of the “taming-the-nature” ideology back to the 
Confucian and Legalist intellectual traditions. Mao himself was convinced of and 
committed into the necessity and viability of altering nature for people’s use,57 and mass 
mobilization was what he believed to be the effective way. His approach to nature after 
he acquired the leadership role of the world’s most populous country eventually became 
an assault wrecking havoc on China’s economy, social fabric, and environment. Judith 
Shapiro summarizes this outright anti-nature attitude of Mao and the China under his 
rule:  
…[T]hrough concentrated exertion of human will and energy, material conditions 
could be altered and all difficulties overcome in the struggle to achieve a socialist 
utopia… Maoist ideology pitted the people against the natural environment in a 
fierce struggle. To conquer nature, the power of ideas was unleashed through 
mass mobilization in political campaigns, often accompanied by the use of 
military imagery. Official discourse was filled with references to a “war against 
nature.” Nature was to be “conquered.” Wheat was to be sown by “shock attack.” 
“Shock troops” reclaimed the grasslands. “Victories” were won against flood and 
drought. Insects, rodents, and sparrows were “wiped out” (Shapiro 2001, pp. 3-4). 
The low availability of quality data has made it difficult to conclude the damage 
from China’s “war against nature” between 1953 and 1976. At least 10% of China’s 
                                                
57 Scholars suggested that this tendency of Mao could be found his writing, for example “The 
Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains” (Economy 2010a, p. 48; Murphy 1967, p. 320). 
In 1945, Mao penned this essay, which became his closing address at the Seventh National 
Congress and one of the very few mandatory (and only available) materials from young students 
during the Cultural Revolution. The article retold a very famous folktale that Yu Gong (literally 
the “Foolish Old Man”) and his sons shoveled two big mountains blocking in front of their house. 
When being mocked for the futile attempt, Yu Gong replied that, his sons and descendants will 
keep growing and leveling the mountains, while mountains wouldn’t grow. Restless efforts will 
win in the end. Thought the article was not to address any nature and environmental issue, the 
analogy between traditionalism (fengjiang zhuyi) plus imperialism, which were the top enemy of 
the state, to the two big “mountains” that modern Yu Gong (the CCP) should destroy, was seen to 
reflect a modern Chinese “war against nature” ideology (Shapiro 2001).   
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forest was cut down at the beginning stage of the Great Leap Forward (Shapiro 2001, p. 
82).   
Marxism 
Marxism is a crucial ideational force in the contemporary China. Its most 
common representation in the context of Chinese environmentalism is perhaps the 
opposition to capitalism of which the Western rival nations (especially Japan, Russia, and 
the United States) are the embodiment. On the other hand, in the academic realm, 
Marxism serves as an ideology and social theory in the form of a synthesis of philosophy, 
economic theory, sociology and political science. As an institutionally legitimatized 
ideology, Marxism has been a dominant methodology in terms of the dialectical 
materialist approach in scientific research and practical problem-solving attempts (Shi, 
2002). However, intellectually connecting Marxism with the ecological studies did not 
emerge in China until the late 1980s. Ecological Marxism as a subject of study in China 
currently still appears to be at a bourgeoning stage where the introduction and discussion 
of the works by Western writers such as William Leiss, Ben Agger, James O’Connor, 
Joel Kovel and J. B. Foster has been the major activity in the Chinese Marxism field 
(Wang, 2012; Wang, Fan, Dong, Sun, & Li, 2013).   
Summary 
This chapter was the first part of the empirical analysis of the case of China’s 
climate policy. It examined the material, institutional, and ideational forces shaping 
China’s climate policy.  
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In the section on material force, I tried to show the important change in material 
conditions happened in the early 2000s. The economy went through a re-industrialization 
to sustain its growth rate, driving up energy needs and the risk of shortage and bringing 
the degrading environment in front of the national and international public eyes. In the 
institutional section, two important finding are about the coordinated authoritarianism 
and the timing of 2003 again. While the coordination argument refutes the fragmentation 
argument with the case of climate change decision-making, it perhaps unintendedly 
accentuates the authoritarian characteristic on the subject matter. Indeed, since climate 
change became adopted as a problem with development and national grand strategy in the 
2000s (See next chapter), Chinese top leadership has noted it more seriously, which 
contributed to the more coordinated patterns of policy-making on the issue.  
Besides, through the investigation of the Chinese institutions, it is worth noting 
that it was in 2003 that the principal bureaucratic actor in the central coordination 
committee (NCCCC) was taken again by the economic section (NDRC) in the cabinet 
during the organizational reform of the State Council. It was a reconfirmation of the 
central role of economic goals in China’s climate policy thinking, formulating, and 
practicing.  
My conclusion from the coordination-fragmentation debate leads to my next 
attempt to ask what the top leadership thinks of climate change and the related issues, as 
their ideas (or the ideas they want the others to think as theirs) would be what the policy-
makers in the government have to make mutual consent on. As such, following the 
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discussion of the environmentalist ideas in China, I will move on to the official ideas and 
discourses about development and climate change.  
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Chapter Six: Development and Discursive Hegemony in China 
The global climate change politics has incorporated development agenda since its 
birth. Prior to the launch of international negotiations, developing countries demanded 
the first INC to be convened by the United Nations instead of WMO in 1990, as the 
almost purely technical discussions in the WMO settings made the developing nations 
beware that the scientific and technological gaps between them and the industrialized 
West might risk their interests (Bodansky, 2001). They made their voice heard in the 
making of the FCCC. In the text of the UNFCCC, “development” appeared 10 times in 4 
pages, and it was stated that “[t]he Parties have a right to, and should, promote 
sustainable development.” On the other hand, international development started to note 
the plausible consequences of rising sea levels and droughts as early as the 1980s. The 
Brundtland Report addressed climate change as one of the problems needed a new 
international convention to respond, and Agenda 21 included climate change in several 
aspects of international development projects. Google Ngram searches also show the 
symbiosis between climate change and development could first appear around 1983 in 
global narratives, and the rhetorical marriage of climate change with sustainable 
development (SD) emerged from 1990 (Appendix E). Sustainable development was a 
crucial ideational force for global climate politics.  
However, as discussed in Chapter 4, the concept of SD has split, as the current 
mainstream version has espoused neoliberal beliefs in market centrality, state-
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minimalism, and the advantage of de-politicization of development policy with a resort to 
technology and bureaucratiziaiton (Ferguson, 1990) as seen in the ecological 
modernization discourse. For the climate change regime-building, the neoliberal political 
economic influences not only contributed to the establishment of Kyoto Protocol but also 
induced its unsatisfactory results in both practical (Chapter 4) and normative terms as 
threatening global equity (Okereke, 2008, Chapter 6).  
This discursive relationship between neoliberalism, conceptualization of 
(sustainable) development, and climate change politics also affects China’s climate 
policy-making discursively. I will move on to the discussion on China.  
China’s Probe into Development 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the notion of “development” has evolved. What 
economic development means today can incorporate many things from GNP growth and 
eradicating poverty, institutional reforms, technological system building, to 
diversification of capabilities, depending on the specific issue and levels of analysis in 
question. In the contemporary China, the isolation from international influence prior to 
the 1980s compelled its leadership and people to search for their own ideas and ways to 
development. 
When the Communist Party took over China in 1949, the economic circumstances 
were far more backward than those of the Soviet Union in the 1920s when it started 
industrialization. The newborn state had no clear development strategy but a rough idea 
to “steadily transform China from an agriculture-based nation to an industry-based 
nation, thus a great socialist nation (Mao, 1949)“. Industrialization would be the sole idea 
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to suffice development.58 Besides, the leadership’s main focus at this point was the 
immediate need for postwar recovery; industrialization was not yet seen as urgent. 
During this time, the economy had a mixed-ownership system, in which the state 
possessed most part of the industrial sector, but smaller private sector sustained and even 
prospered compared to the pre-revolution era.59  
With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 and China’s soon participation, 
Chinese leaders began fast, large-scaled resource mobilization for fighting the war. 
Industrialization became needed. When China requested for assistance from the Soviet 
Union for this purpose, leaders chose to adopt the Soviet Union model—mass heavy 
industrialization through collectivization of agricultural sector with the totalized state 
command.60  Therefore, starting from 1952, nationalizing ownership and agricultural 
collectivization set forth the ways of mobilizing resource and labor, and by 1956 these 
projects were basically completed. Development at this time would be defined and 
determined by outputs of grain and steel. Features of the Chinese economic system from 
the 1950s to the 1970s were: state ownership of the means of production in the cities; 
collective ownership of the means of production in the countryside; and centralized 
planning with targets and quotas for physical outputs and employments (Li, 2008, pp. 27–
                                                
58 Mao Zedong and his colleagues at this time might not have acquired the vocabulary of 
“economic development” as another term “economy-building (jingji jianshe)” was more often 
seen. But “development” (fazhan) had certainly appeared.  
59 In 1953, the private sector still accounted for 37% of China’s industrial output (Li, 2008, p. 
27). 
60 When China drafted its first Five-Year Plan in 1952, building heavy-industry sector was 
included in the text as the first priority. The Chinese envoy soon brought the draft to Moscow for 
consultation and financial assistance.   
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28). In terms of development thinking, the dominant ideology was a nationalist and 
developmentalist paradigm: extracting maximum surplus from the society with state 
power to win China’s international status. Rapid heavy industrialization was the set goal, 
despite that the initial levels for primitive accumulation were low. Over-extraction, 
collective fervor, misinformation, and failed governance system as happening during the 
Great Leap Forward eventually induced disastrous outcomes including a great famine. It 
was said more than 45 million Chinese people died unnecessarily between 1958 and 1962 
(Dikötter, 2010).   
Mao’s death in 1976 marked the decline of the leftist economic agenda in China. 
In 1975, Premier Zhou Enlai enunciated the Four Modernizations (agriculture, industry, 
science and technology, and military) to revitalize China’s economy and society. With 
attainment of the Four Modernizations as their overarching objective, Deng Xiaoping and 
his supporters initiated a wholesale reform of the country’s economic and political 
system. In the early 1980s, China began to gradually relax the formerly tight state 
control; this signaled the beginning of a transition from a state-directed, command 
economy to a more market-based economy. Beijing devolved significant economic 
authority to provincial and local officials, removing political constraints on their 
economic activities and diminishing Beijing’s own ability to influence the development 
and outcome of these activities. China also began to invite participation from the 
international community in China’s economic development through foreign direct 
investment and trade (Naughton, 2007, Chapter 4).  
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The 1992, during his trip to the southern China, Deng explicitly called for 
transformation in the direction of the “socialist market economy,” which was officially 
confirmed by the Fourteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The Congress 
then, for the first time, made the commitment to “property rights reform,” thus 
legitimizing the privatization of state and collective-owned enterprises. As such, China 
experienced its second and deeper capitalist economic transformation throughout the 
1990s. Most of the state and collective-owned enterprises, which had been the foundation 
of the urban economy, were privatized. Private and cooperative ventures were 
encouraged to expand, smaller-scale township and village enterprises were encouraged to 
launch to energize the rural economy.  
However, as Li (2008) critiques, the capitalist turn in China was just another 
triumph of the global neoliberal project in the 1980s and 1990s. The privatization of 
agricultural production and state/collective-owned enterprises had removed the previous 
socialist entitlements for workers (ensured employment, healthcare, housing, etc.), and 
caused tens of millions of workers to be laid off. Hundreds of millions peasants had been 
forced into the cities where they became “migrant workers,” constituting an enormous 
cheap labor force that would work to serve the profits of transnational corporations and 
Chinese capitalists for the lowest possible wages under the most demeaning conditions.   
To sum up, the development thinking for China before the neoliberal/capitalist 
paradigmatic shift did not share resemblance with the evolution of the global 
development discourses. But since the 1990s, China has been receiving and reacting to 
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the global discursive hegemony of a neoliberal mode of development—the sustainable 
type included.  
China’s Sustainable Development (SD) Discourse 
The mainstream SD discourse was brought to the attention of Chinese leaders in 
the early 1990s. The Chinese government officially adopted an SD discourse in 1994 its 
Agenda 21 in July 1994, after its participation in the Rio Conference in 1992. The term 
did not appear again in high-level official statements again until September 1995 when 
the government was about to announce the Ninth Five-Year Plan. Neither did it appear in 
Premier Li’s address delivered at the UN Summit on Social Development in March of 
that year, where sustainable development was the theme of the summit as well as the 
resulting declaration endorsed by world leaders.  
What China’s Agenda 21 presented was a vision for the future Chinese economic 
and social development rather than concrete policy planning. It outlined an array of 
programme areas and framed sustainable development as a high-level grand strategy for 
“a good starting point for China as it moves towards the 21st century and strives for a 
better future (GoPRC, 1994),” but did not (and maybe yet could not) specify how the 
listed aims in those programme areas could be practically approached.  
The Ninth Five-Year Plan and the Prospects for 2010, published in 1996, marked 
the beginning of the SD discourse getting mainstreamed into official consideration and 
integration into real policy planning of economic and social development. For the first 
time, topics that used to be separately categorized and/or very little mentioned—natural 
resource management, pollution regulation, rural housing and sanitation, and, 
 131 
intriguingly, mass physical education and media production—were put under the section 
heading of “Implementing Sustainable Development (GoPRC, 1996),” making SD appear 
to be a “fundamental development strategy” of the country ever since (CAS , 2012, p. 5). 
At the Fifteenth National Party Congress (NPC) in 1997, President Jiang Zemin included 
SD in his keynote speech—in the politics of rhetoric in China, it is the highest official 
approval of a political idea.  
However, the Chinese SD narratives during the 1990s appear to be more close to 
a mimicking or window-dressing act as a gesture of China’s convergence with the rest of 
the world. The 1992 Rio Conference was not only an UN meeting on environmental 
issues for China, it was seen as an opportunity for China to re-blend into international 
relations after the isolation and embargos due to the Tiananmen Massacre in 1989. 
Besides, “development (fazhan)” has become a buzzword in Chinese political rhetoric 
since Deng’s reform. In the NPC keynote speeches, “development” was mentioned 32 
times in 1982, 125 times in 1986, 113 times in 1992, and 152 times in 1996.61 As the 
leaders cared improvements of economic and social conditions, it was not surprising that 
they could accept the notion of SD quickly after the 1992 Rio Conference.  
As to the content of the Chinese SD narratives, in the 1990s there were two 
characteristics. First one is the strict emphasis on conservation and population control, 
framing population as the most important reason for environmental degradation. Second 
                                                
61 Only those mentions of “fazhan” used in the contexts of economic, social, and sometimes 
cultural matters including the past achievement, planning and encouragement/prospects were 
counted. 
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one is the linkage of SD with science and education. These two features will reemerge in 
the more recent discursive practices of the Chinese government.  
A Sustainable Development “with Chinese Characteristics” and Views on Climate 
Change 
The beginning of the 21th century saw an important change for China in material 
terms, namely it rapid re-industrialization along with the entry into the WTO, which have 
made it the world’s factory and the second largest economy. The re-industrialization had 
three immediate drivers. Firstly, after almost two decades of primitive accumulation of 
capital, the surplus capital now would need somewhere to go. Secondly, the economy 
would welcome a new thrust to re-accelerate growth, which had been slowing down since 
the second half of the 1990s. Thirdly, in 2001, the International Olympic Committee 
announced Beijing would host the 2008 Olympic Games. As a result, in addition to 
investment from the private sector, the government also launched mega development 
projects such as the South-North Water Transfer and the Great Development of Western 
China, both had been under planning for a long time and were put into action within the 
first three years of the 2000 decade. These economic and development activities and the 
uprising world economy contributed to China’s industrialization in the first half of the 
2000s, generating an averaged 10% growth rate for another decade, as well as enormous 
amount of energy use and GHG emissions.  
Institutionally, China saw a major change at this point of history. In 2002, when 
the succession of political power within the Chinese Communist Party took place 
smoothly for the first time in more than 50 years of the party-state history, the new 
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government led by Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao turned to underscore more seriously the 
environmental aspect of development in coping with growing crises mentioned above. 
The official tone has been raised on problems of energy and resource shortages and 
pollution outbreaks compared to the 1990s. The topic of resource and environment in the 
text of the 9th Five Year Plan in 1996 was listed in Section 9, but it was promoted Section 
4 in the 10th FYP in 2001, accompanied with a few more quantified targets on resource 
management. Trivial as it is, this slight change in the words of official documents may 
have reflected a changing paradigm on the environmental issue in the Chinese 
government. Important new laws focusing on environmental aspect in the course of 
developing the economy were passed, such as the Law on the Promotion of Clean 
Production and the Law on Environment Impact Assessment. However, within the 
governmental bureaucracy, the NDRC has been charged with the greatest power in the 
fields of economy, energy and climate change (Heggelund et al., 2010, pp. 237–8).    
Ideationally, the discourse of vulnerability was introduced to domestic policy 
context. On the discourse of development, a series of policy ideas mushroomed in the 
course of China’s changing development model: “the New Path to Industrialization 
(2002),” “the Science-based Development (2003),” “Circular Economy (2004)” 
“Resource-saving and Environment-friendly society (2004)” “Harmonious Society 
(2005),” “Conserve (Energy) and Cut (Emissions) (2006)” “Innovative State (2006),” 
“Ecological Civilization (2007)” “Green/Low-carbon Economy (2009),” “Change of the 
Growth Model (2010)” and “Green Low-carbon development (2011),” to name a few. 
These ideas were typically products of official and non-governmental and societal actors. 
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They were generated and refined by government-sponsored research institutes at 
universities, think tanks, and NGOs before they become part of the official rhetoric; they 
have added to a more localized Chinese version of SD discourse. 
Among them, “Science-based Development” (SBD) and “Ecological Civilization” 
are the most interesting because they both speak to a context broader than just the 
“hardware” improvement in economic growth and social conditions as many of the other 
ideas did. They both try to draw a picture of the future in which China lies, providing 
“software” to the building of vision and hope. Here I will focus on the SBD as it is the 
first substantive concept Chinese government raised in the 21st century and the first one 
directly addressing development a decade after the Agenda 21.  
President Hu Jintao proposed the SBD in 2003 and presented at several highly 
political venues including the Seventeenth National Party Congress. During his trip to 
Jiangxi Province in 2003, Hu gave a long and expansive explanation of his new idea: 
It is necessary to solidly adopt the scientific development concept of coordinated 
development, all-round development, and sustainable development, [and to] 
actively explore a new development path that conforms to reality, further 
improves the socialist market economic structure, combines intensified efforts to 
readjust structure with the promotion of rural development, combines efforts to 
bring into play the role of science and technology with efforts to bring into play 
the advantages of human resources, combines the development of the economy 
with the protection of resources and the environment, combines opening up to the 
outside world with opening up to other parts of the country, and strives to take a 
civilized development path characterized by the development of production, a 
well-off life, and a good ecological environment (Fewsmith, 2004, p. 2). 
It is a model that seemed attempting to contain every problem China was facing 
then. But rural development, regional gaps, science and technology, and ecology are the 
main points. A month after the Jianxi trip, the Third Plenary Session of the 16th Central 
Committee endorsed Hu’s concerns though not the term itself. But the plenum decision 
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did align with the new president and say that it was necessary to “take people as the main 
thing (yiren weiben), establish a concept of comprehensive, coordinated, sustainable 
development, and promote comprehensive economic, social, and human development.” 
This sentence has since been invoked by Chinese media as the locus classicus of the idea 
of SBD (Fewsmith, 2004, p. 3).  
So, what is a “comprehensive, coordinated, and sustainable development? 
Practically, the most noticeable in the SBD narrative is that it promoted an approach 
aiming to correct the presumed overemphasis on the pursuit of increases in GDP, which 
has encouraged false figures and dubious construction projects along with neglect for the 
social welfare of those left behind in the hinterland. Researchers and writers from the 
Publicity Department of CCP elaborated the reflection on the former GDP-ism:   
Single-minded pursuit of economic growth while overlooking social progress and 
fairness and neglecting environmental protection and energy and resource 
conservation in some countries has resulted in unbalanced economic structure, 
poor social development, growing shortages of energy and resources, and drastic 
ecological and environmental degradation, as well as greater division between 
haves and have-nots, increased unemployment, corruption and political unrest, 
and other problems that can arise with a high growth rate. In these countries, 
economic growth did not bring tangible benefits to the people, the growth was not 
sustainable and development was not true development. The development practice 
of the world has shown that development is certainly more than just economic 
growth. Development should mean comprehensive economic, political, cultural 
and social development, and development should be sustainable and maintain 
harmony between man and nature (CCTB, 2012, p. 5). 
Conceptually, SBD can be seen as a localization of the mainstream global SD 
because it infused traditional Confucian, Taoist and Maoist-Marxist references into the 
reframing of a development model, and made itself to become the theoretical reference 
and the source of political authority for the other above-mentioned ideas that came in 
later times. To be sure, this model is not entirely new. But its innovation rested in the 
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acceptance of the nature’s limits on GDP growth and the justification of this acceptance 
through a linguistic practice using the indigenous language, and has made itself 
distinguishable from the previous SD discourse in China and has been able to play a role 
in policy-thinking and policy-making. Below I explicate what SBD as an action-guiding 
concept means with three generalizations in the context of the evolution of energy policy.  
Economic Primacy 
When SD first as a global hegemonic discourse was first received by Chinese, it 
had been translated and equated to “sustained development, “62 narrowly referring to 
continued economic growth as the foundation for the other aspects of social progress. The 
primacy of continued economic growth, for example, was expressed clearly in the text of 
China’s Agenda 21:  
“[T]he precondition for sustainable development is development. The path of 
relatively rapid economic growth and gradual improvements in the quality of 
development must be taken in order to meet the Chinese people’s current and 
future needs for basic necessities and their desires for higher living standards, and 
in order to consolidate the nation’s strength. Only when the economic growth rate 
reaches and is sustained at a certain level, can poverty be eradicated, people’s 
livelihoods improved and the necessary forces and conditions for supporting 
sustainable development be provided. While the economy is undergoing rapid 
development, it will be necessary to ensure rational utilization of natural resources 
and protection of the environment. And while it is necessary for China to embark 
on a gradual path to sustainable development, it must do this at the same time as it 
is improving economic conditions and structures, enhancing their effectiveness 
and maintaining an annual average GNP growth rate of between 8 and 9%.” 
(GoPRC 1994) 
Here, development is framed as the mission to reduce poverty and supply for 
people’s livelihood. Economic growth is believed to have to be “ensured” as the 
                                                
62 Interview, Peiking University, December 10, 2012  
 137 
“precondition” to allow development to happen. Although the tone has been softer the 
importance of GDP growth has been downplayed, and  common claim can be found in 
the SBD discourse, which has insisted that the “middle-income society” is the foremost 
pursuit of development.  
Ecological viability 
The concerns for the environmental degradation and protection started back in the 
early 1970s, in which negative environmental consequences from the movement of Great 
Leap Forward surface to public attention. In1972, the beach at Dalian Bay became black 
from polluted shells and the port became clogged, and tainted fish appeared on the 
Beijing market from the Guanting Reservoir (Economy 2010). Another event that 
sparked the official awareness of the environment was the Conference on Human 
Environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden, which was viewed by the leaders a chance 
to enter the international society after the long isolation during the Cultural Revolution 
(Yan & Xiao 2010). Therefore, the Chinese environmental policy was rather instrumental 
and auxiliary in terms of being made to serve the purposes of other issues in the early 
years.  
One reason for this status of environmental policy may be traced back to the 
revolutionary discourse treating nature as an enemy to be transformed. Mao Zedong’s 
favorite Chinese idiom, literally translated as “human determination must conquer the 
sky,” became a motto for the mass during the Great Leap Forward, turning a pursuit of 
economic prosperity into a “war against nature” (Shapiro 2001). In this discourse, 
economy and environment were treated as mutually exclusive and conflicting values. As 
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the majority of Chinese population was still trapped in poverty, caring for the 
environment could be only a luxury that Chinese people couldn’t yet afford. “Pollute 
first, clean up later” was the leading principle for especially local officials in dealing with 
the economy-environment nexus until the 1990s.  
In this context, the mainstream SD discourse presented an alternative to this 
antagonistic framework of the economy-environment dilemma. For what was interpreted 
in the Chinese context was that economic development (i.e. increase GDP growth) does 
not necessarily sacrifice the quality of life in the environmental aspect. So, if the 
leadership could choose a right model of development, filthy air, heavy-metal water and 
hazardous soil would be corrected without harming the economic growth on which the 
improvement of material living conditions depends. This view was later further combined 
with the ancient idea of “Harmony (between the nature and humankind as in Taoism; 
between each person and the groups as in Confucianism)” and transformed into the SBD 
discourse.        
However, the SBD discourse does not place the priority of the nature over man. 
The nature-human relationship is similar to the kind depicted in Confucian and Legalist 
literature (Ch.5). A “people-centered” approach in the SBD discourse suggests that 
development, under which environmental and economic values are seen incorporated and 
in harmony, is the right kind of development and has to serve people’s needs. 
Environmental issues, therefore, still have to be considered against economic viability. 
For example, unlike its predictions for control of ozone-depleting substances, China’s 
Agenda 21 was pessimistic about the chances of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
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At the outset, it had noted that, in view of China’s substantial coal resources and its 
developmental level, a coal-based energy structure would continue well into the future.  
Social engineering of “going green” 
The social dimension of the mainstream SD discourse usually addresses the 
poverty and equity concerns in the course of economic development. In some literature, 
including the Bruntland report, the sustainability of an economy’s development requires 
democratic practices and public participation.  
In the Chinese context, the element of equity is underscored in the SBD rhetoric 
in different ways, while public participation is supposed to be limited to enhancing the 
public awareness of environmental protection by media and education. In recent years, 
many public educational campaigns have been launched to propagate those “green” ideas 
and policies mentioned earlier in this section. In the meantime, the enforcement of green 
polices could be rapid and forceful. Compulsory shutdowns of factories in some places 
and lax regulations in the other places both incurred public discontent and unrest that 
could be understood as “destabilizing” and created more power to the “stability-
maintenance” system pressuring the society.    
State-owned newspaper is an important means of the Chinese government for 
circulating authoritative opinions, defending government’s policy actions and thus 
reproducing its authoritativeness. Whether or not this tool is effective in terms of 
producing social conformity, the contents in those newspapers embody the official 
power’s hegemonic discourses and its attempt to build hegemony over the society.  
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A Text Analysis on Climate Change  
The People’s Daily (Renmin Ri Bao), one of the most historical state-owned 
newspapers in China, began to report on climate change from as early as 1960s, but those 
early articles did not discuss climate change in the current sense, rather the term was used 
to refer to the changing weather patterns and natural disasters. Therefore, 418 reports on 
climate change or global warming were collected from the People’s Daily dated from 
1990 to 2012 to see how the articulation of climate change and other related ideas had 
changed. In this corpus, as Table 6-1 shows, climate change is the most related to 
“global” and “development” linguistically.63 The term “development” did not appear for 
the first time until 2000, and had been mentioned steadily since then. If the original data 
were complete and my methods of compilation were reasonable, this finding should 
support the argument that a new linkage between climate change and development indeed 
was generated, which was the precondition for views on development to affect the views 
on climate change, and by extension, for the development policy to possibly affect the 
climate policy.  
It is interesting that, while “environment” is ranked lower than “development” in 
Table 6-1, as opposed to the latter, the former in fact appeared in the climate change 
coverage of the People’s Daily through the 1990s. In the 2000s, “development” 
apparently took over “environment” as the most popular buzzword when it came to the 
topic of climate change. But a co-occurrence analysis also indicated that almost one 
                                                
63 The data was collected based on two keywords as “climate change” and “global warming”, so 
“climate” cannot be the most related term.  
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quarter of the discussions on development also addressed environmental concerns, 
reflecting the development-environment nexus in the reality of China’s attitude on the 
global climate problem.  
Table 6-19Top 50 Frequent Words in People's Daily Reports on Climate Change 
(1989-2012) 
Rank Word  Length  Count  Percent64 
1 氣候 climate 2 2674 12.609639 
2 全球 global 2 1939 9.143639 
3 發展 development 2 1795 8.464585 
4 國家 state 2 1767 8.332547 
5 變化    change 2 1528 7.205508 
6 中國    China 2 1394 6.573611 
7 變暖   warming 2 1239 5.842686 
8 環境   environment 2 1167 5.503159 
9 問題   problem 2 1109 5.229652 
10 經濟   economy 2 1067 5.031595 
11 國際   international 2 986 4.649627 
12 世界   world 2 961 4.531736 
13 地區   area 2 906 4.272376 
14 美國   United States 2 862 4.064887 
15 人類   human 2 666 3.140621 
16 影響   impact 2 649 3.060455 
17 社會   society 2 644 3.036876 
18 溫室   greenhouse 2 643 3.032161 
19 排放   emissions 2 614 2.895407 
20 政府   government 2 612 2.885976 
21 能源   energy 2 608 2.867113 
22 氣體   gases 2 599 2.824672 
23 研究   research 2 564 2.659625 
25 天氣   weather 2 508 2.395548 
26 生態   ecology/ecological 2 505 2.381401 
27 保護   protection 2 473 2.230501 
                                                
64 The percentage is calculated by dividing the frequency of the given word (“Count” in the 3rd 
column) with the number of the total word count in the corpus.  
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28 技術   technology 2 469 2.211638 
29 減少   reduction 2 463 2.183344 
30 聯合國 United Nations 3 461 2.173913 
31 資源   resource 2 455 2.145619 
32 會議   meeting 2 443 2.089031 
33 科學   science 2 442 2.084316 
34 持續   sustain 2 430 2.027728 
35 地球   earth 2 427 2.013581 
36 氣溫   temperature 2 412 1.942846 
37 發達   developed  2 389 1.834386 
38 建設   construction 2 384 1.810808 
39 合作   cooperation 2 381 1.796661 
40 減排   emissions reduction 2 359 1.692917 
41 極端   extreme 2 330 1.556163 
42 災害   disaster 2 324 1.527869 
43 科學家 scientists 3 322 1.518438 
44 自然   nature 2 322 1.518438 
45 企業   businesses 2 309 1.457135 
46 氣象   meteorology 2 306 1.442988 
47 嚴重   severe 2 300 1.414694 
48 冰川   glacier 2 296 1.395831 
49 水      water 1 294 1.3864 
50 非洲   Africa 2 288 1.358106 
 
Table 6-1 also reveals that economy and foreign relations are the primary 
rationales in the climate change hegemonic discourse the Chinese authority wished to 
construct. Words connoting the economic concerns (e.g. development, economy, and 
energy) and foreign relations (e.g. global, international, world, United States) are ranked 
in the top half of the list; whereas words with meanings related to the environment (e.g. 
ecology, earth, disaster, nature, glacier, water) are mostly in the bottom half.  
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Chinese Energy Policy under SBD 
Prior to the reform, China’s energy industry was highly dependent on the capital, 
financial and technical assistances from the Soviet Union between 1949 and 1960, and 
these inputs were mainly for fostering heavy industries. From 1960 to the dawn of the 
reform in the late 1970s, isolation and the Oil Crisis in 1972 strengthened the doctrine of 
self-sufficiency in the economic policy also dominated the energy development.  
Chinese leaders have paid growing attention to the symbiosis between energy and 
economic development since then. Deng Xiaoping’s remark that “energy is the most 
important issue in our economy” in 1980 was said to found the strategic energy planning 
in China. In the same year, the book The Third Wave by Alvin Toeffler was translated 
and published, and became the bestseller particularly among academics and government 
officials.65 The book influenced the energy thinking of the Chinese policy elites with the 
introduction to and discussions on alternative energy sources as the basis for the 
upcoming “third wave” of the human civilization.  
To serve the need of producing growth, the government started to expand the 
production of energy from the inception of the Ninth Five-Year Plan (1995-1999). In 
retrospect, since the Economic Reform in 1978 until the end of the Eighth FYP in 1995, 
the central government had encouraged small-scaled energy production by the local 
governments, largely elevating the country’s overall capability for energy production. 
One reason for this was to buffer the world energy crisis at the beginning of the reform, 
and the other reason was sort of due to ideological impact that sovereignty and self-
                                                
65 Interview, RCSD, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, October 22, 2012. 
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subsistence as principles in Chinese foreign policy also dominated economic policy. And 
then, from 1996-2000, the focus of economic planning shifted from light industries to an 
upgrade for manufacturing machinery parts and more capital-intensive products, further 
bringing up the demand and production capacity for domestic energy. The next stage was 
the first decade of the twenty-first century, which saw a sharp increase of energy use. 
Heavy industries including steel, cement, petrochemical, were launched with the state’s 
strong investment and institutional support, driving up the energy demand faster than the 
domestic energy sector’s ability to cope with and causing an energy shortage.  
The early 2000s was also significant in that SBD discourse was granted the 
highest political and ideological authority starting from 2003 and became the doctrine of 
the Eleventh Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). While the entire energy sector continued 
expanding, what marks these five years was the forced closure of thousands of old, small 
and inefficient coal-fired power plants were in the name of emissions reduction and 
achieving a sustainable development. 
The most significant change in China’s energy policy in this period was the 
quantified energy targets that were set compulsory in the Five-Year Plans. Before 
launching its Eleventh Five-Year Plan, China for the first time announced quantitative 
goals on energy and pollution problems. In the Guidelines for the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan issued by the State Council in 2005, China aimed to drive down the national energy 
intensity for 20% and the emissions of primary pollutants for 10% by 2010.  
In 2009, China pledged a 40-45% cut on its carbon emissions per unit of GDP on 
2005-level by 2020 prior to the UN climate negotiations in Copenhagen, on which it 
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made further pledges for the period between 2010 and 2015, that it would cut down its 
energy intensity, carbon-emissions intensity, and emissions of primary pollutants for 16, 
17 and 10 percent, respectively. The NDRC had concluded that the Eleventh Five-Year 
Plan had successfully achieved the 20% goal.  
As for the Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the government has also set up several 
important targets concerning energy development by the end of 2015. First, energy use 
per unit of GDP should reduce by 16% on 2010 levels. Second, the total energy 
consumption is capped at 4 billion tons of coal equivalent (tce). Third, non-fossil energy 
sources including hydro, nuclear, and renewable energy are aimed to increase from 8.3% 
to 11.4% of total primary energy consumption. While the current 16% reduction target on 
energy intensity may seem less ambitious than the previous 20% goal, it likely presents a 
more substantial challenge, for the largest and most inefficient enterprises and plants 
have been shut down or have undertaken improvements. There is much less room for 
improvement as to the ongoing second round of restructuring.  
Economic Primacy 
China’s current energy strategy based on SBD represents the insistence on 
economic primacy. This may be seen in the policies on emissions reduction. The 
involved programs all emphasize economic efficiency in terms of conserving energy use 
while minimizing negative impact on the existing levels of GDP growth. One of the 
often-mentioned policies for getting there was the Top 1,000 Program, starting in April 
2006 under the execution of the NDRC leading other governmental units. The program 
assigned energy-saving targets to 1,008 enterprises in energy-intensive industries such as 
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steel, coal, petrochemical, electricity production, and implemented monitoring, auditing, 
reporting, rewarding and punishing mechanisms. Another policy was the Ten Key 
Projects Program, which has provided financial support to companies to adopt or upgrade 
more energy-efficient equipment. In the post-2011 period, a new Top 10,000 program is 
modeled after the Top 1,000 Program, but it adds an order of magnitude of companies to 
the mix. Another mitigation program centering on economy efficiency is the cap-and-
trade market. In 2011, the NDRC announced and appointed seven pilot cap-and-trade 
programs for carbon dioxide. Currently, Shenzhen, Guangdong, Beijing and Shanghai 
markets are operative, whereas Hubei, Tianjin, and Chongqing are scheduled to launch 
by 2015. The commonality between the idea of market environmentalism and SBD is 
clearly seen.  
Ecological Viability  
 In 2005, the outline for Eleventh Five-Year Plan called for changing the 
economic growth pattern by adjusting economic structure and energy mix when 
announcing the official goal of driving down energy use per unit of GDP for 20% from 
2005 to 2010. In this document and the following policy articulation describing the ideal 
development model, the key phrase changed from what used to be “fast and sound” to 
“sound and fast” development. Switching the order of words was believed to signify a 
shift in policy orientation.66 By putting the quality of soundness ahead of fastness, the 
importance of environment was accentuated and the weighing between the economy and 
the environment seemed to be switched.  
                                                
66 Interview, RCSD, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Oct. 12, 2012. 
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This evaluation is both right and wrong. Take the non-fossil fuel energy policy for 
example. In retrospect, China indeed saw the environmental benefits of renewable energy 
sources, but its primary aim has been to fulfill what the SD and SBD discourses 
portrayed: a continued growth without sacrificing a livable environment.  
The passage and effectuation of the Renewable Energy Law in 2006 kick-started 
the Chinese enterprise in seeking renewable sources as its new energy strategy and an 
exit for the burden of mitigating climate change. Investments to clean coal technologies, 
carbon capture and sequestration, and smart grid have been on constant big rise every 
year. In 2009, President Hu Jintao announced China was aiming to promote the use of 
renewable energy source to 15% in its overall energy consumption by 2020. This promise 
indeed followed the fact that China’s deployment in solar and wind power has roared 
since 2007. In 2009 alone it invested more than 30% of the total amount invested by all 
G20 countries, becoming the world’s largest investor in renewable installment (Pew, 
2010). And in 2010 the amount it invested was $50 billion, far more than that of any 
other country in the world, not only for deployment but also for manufacturing renewable 
energy technologies. Hydropower and nuclear power are also treated as critical energy 
options. The share of hydropower in total energy consumption in 2011 was 6%. It is said 
the Chinese thirst for hydro energy and its urgency to meet the 15% target by 2020 may 
endanger the hydrology of south and southeast Asia by damming its southwestern region 
(Jacobs, 2013), but it seems the government is convinced that technological capabilities 
can overcome the risks. The quest for a “cleaner” source of energy despite the ecological 
impact perhaps presents the greatest split between the Chinese SBD and the conventional 
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idea of environmental sustainability. But the SBD presumes the Confucian-Legalist 
beliefs in human capacity to alter and remain harmony with nature (as man and nature are 
never supposed to be opposite and conflicting entities), and the socialist notion of intra-
generational equality. So from the Chinese perspective, the choice for dams over 
ecological soundness may not be contradictory to SBD; somehow SBD can justify this 
position as if utilizing the gift from heaven with collective persistent efforts and expertise 
is worth glorifying.  
Social Green-Engineering  
 Local governments along with private companies and factories, were also 
required to work toward energy efficiency. In order to do so, the collective target of 
central government to cut energy intensity by 20% was dissembled into local levels, and 
each province and province-level city was assigned its own target ranging from 12-30%. 
Consequently, many inefficient power and industrial plants were targeted for closure. The 
government “decommissioned small thermal power plants with a capacity of 72.1 million 
kW and eliminated a number of outdated coal, steel, cement and coke production 
facilities” between 2006 and 2010 (Wen, 2011)(Wen 2011). What happened later between 
July 2009 and March 2011, the last several months of the 11th Five-Year Plan period, was 
that many local governments switched off power supply in order to lower their electricity 
readings to meet their assigned targets. In provinces like Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hebei, and 
Shanxi, electricity was shut down, sometimes lasting more than 20 hours in one 
occurrence, in not only factories and houses but also hospitals and schools and even in 
bitter winter. Moreover, people turned to small electric generators that run on diesel, 
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which would produce more GHGs and more serious air pollution that was unable to be 
traced and accounted for. Two interviewed researchers from the Center for Sustainable 
Development at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences confirmed that the closure has 
resulted in great economic and social costs. “Many workers lost their jobs! They have 
family and children…Efficiency is important, but we should also take equity seriously,” 
said one of the interviewees.67 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
67 Interview, RCSD, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, October 22, 2012. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
Looking Ahead  
On June 30, 2015, China submitted its Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs) to the FCCC as its proposal for the COP-21 in Paris, after a 
widely-reported joint statement on responding to climate change with the United States a 
few months ago in January. The Paris Climate Convention, scheduled to be in December 
2015, is aimed to create a more enforceable and effective global climate regime than the 
Kyoto Protocol. “Enforceability” means the measuring, reporting, and verifying 
mechanisms, and “effectiveness” means to include the majority of global GHG emitters, 
including the United States, China and other large emerging economies in order for a 
truly global mitigation effort. China’s pledges this time contain halting growth of carbon 
emissions and the use of renewable energy sources (Buckley, 2015).  
The Chinese government had promised in 2009 to cut its carbon emissions per 
unit of GDP by 40 to 45% from its 2005 level, and to do so by 2020. Premier Li Keqiang 
announced a new goal in June this year, to extend the cut to 60 to 65% by 2030. It was 
analyzed that China had already fulfilled much of its original commitment. By late 2014, 
according to government data, carbon intensity was down by 33.8% from the 2005 level. 
Other proposed targets in the submission include the promise to peak greenhouse gas 
emissions by 2030, which was first announced in 2014. Li also reiterated that renewables 
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should make up 20% of China’s primary energy supply (China Dialogue, 2015). With the 
effectuation of the revised Environmental Protection Law, China has introduced new and 
toughly-enforced regulations and penalties to hasten changes to how energy, raw 
materials and goods are produced and consumed in the country. Although many technical 
issues over how the proposed goals can be realized have arisen, it is no doubt that how 
much and how quickly China’s emissions can be reduced plays a crucial role in the 
management of global climate change, and the actions of Chinese government will very 
likely stir political debates among policymakers in Washington, creating impact that 
bears great significance on the history of global climate governance. For years, 
international negotiations have brought little agreement on how to assign responsibility 
for cutting greenhouse gas pollution. Many have hoped, even expected that Paris will be 
very different from the Copenhagen in 2009 that substantive cooperation can happen 
between wealthy and developing economies, especially between the United States and 
China. Understanding what drives China’s policy positions thus has been essential 
empirically and practically.   
Summary of Findings and Arguments 
In answering the empirical questions on why and how China changed its position 
on climate change, the study has examined them with a discursive hegemony framework, 
and come to a few findings summarized below. 
Firstly, the issue of climate change is now merged with the development policy 
for the Chinese government. Although China has insisted on its status as a developing 
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country at climate negotiations, the policy linkages between climate mitigation and 
economic and energy policies took place only recently.  
Secondly, it was the co-evolution of several changing conditions that together 
shaped the outcome of the policy shift. Three types of “social forces” in material, 
institutional, and ideational forms embodied in a conglomerate of events took place in the 
first several years of the 21st century, causing the development agenda to absorb the 
climate issue with the operation of a set of policy narratives based on the official idea of 
Science-based Development. 
As a third finding, energy shortage and the growing cost of environmental 
degradation were perceived to be most acute problems in the material aspect. The 
expanded energy demand reflected on the increased energy intensity during the first few 
years in the 2000s, the increasing reliance on foreign oil, and the constraints on using 
domestic coal together constitute the problem of energy shortage for the Chinese 
government. While the international pressure on emissions reductions and internal 
struggles over reforming state-owned enterprises (targeting some of the largest oil and 
energy companies) are present, shortage is the most salient propelling force to China’s 
rethinking of its development, energy, and the extended environment and climate policy.  
Institutionally, the consolidation of power-transition rules within the party and 
government seemed to have reduced the political uncertainty within the party so that the 
government could be more concentrated on national development issues. The elevation of 
climate issue to the centrally-coordinating level in 1998 and the following stepping-up to 
the highest-executive level in 2007 represented at least one important point. The 
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leadership came to perceive that the climate issue has becoming an issue beyond 
diplomacy and international politics. The complexity of the problem has gotten noted in 
many dimensions particularly those under the agenda of development. An integral 
framework thus was needed. 
Fourthly, what development means changed in the process as seen in the changing 
emphases in the official narratives. Within the agenda of development, the old perception 
on energy-growth relationship and growth-environment relationship was reconstructed. 
Although energy security is still believed to be the foundation of necessary amount of 
economic growth, the government has noticed that the sourcing of energy matters, as 
using “dirty” energy may cause large human and social hazards impairing economic 
growth. The Chinese SBD narratives consist of conceptual elements of economic 
primacy, ecological viability, and social engineering. The notions distinguishing single-
minded growth and quality growth, urging fairness and environmental protection are 
notable changes from the previous development discourses. Reformist ideas of the global 
sustainable development discourses, such as market environmentalism and ecological 
modernization, are the pillars of SBD as it still puts the building of economy at the center 
of China’s development scheme and it is believed that the process must rely on science 
and technocracy. Although many ideas in the SBD narratives were not entirely new nor 
original in contrast to previous official narratives, the way in which the ideas were 
articulated was different, and the extent to which the environmental-awareness was 
upheld was greater. 
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As such, the most important empirical finding for this dissertation would be the 
co-evolving process of three ontologically independent forces. Their co-occurrence 
brought the rethinking of development models, thereby accepting that taking actions on 
climate change could be compatible with new development goals. The SBD discourse 
helped justified climate-related policies, such as energy conservation and emissions 
reduction, as economically rational and socially harmonious, thus normatively 
imperative. 
The discursive hegemony perspective developed in this research was helpful in 
process-tracing and organizing the causes of change in this case of China. The Chinese 
government, which was assumed to be an actor that is internationally socialized and 
internally homogenized (through the coordination decision-making practices), received 
the global SD discourse in the midst of the prosperous wave of neoliberalism during its 
course toward the second (1990s) and third waves (2000s) of industrialization and 
development. Material and institutional forces evolved with the SD ideas together created 
the discursive framework as the SBD to re-rank priorities, facilitate policy designs, and 
justify policy practices.  
A comment from one Chinese senior researcher on development and climate 
economics can summarize China’s position on climate change in light of the analysis 
above:  
Before the Kyoto Protocol came into effect, climate change served as matter of 
diplomacy to China. But today it is no longer simply seen as merely a diplomatic 
matter. There are still many gaps between the rich and the developing countries in 
scientific research and ways of allocating responsibilities. But to China, the 
government had realized the potential value of taking climate change seriously 
when the IPCC published the third assessment report in 2001. Academics were 
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backed by the authorities to step up their participation in the production of the 
fourth Assessment Report…Rapid economic growth has occurred since 2001, 
which means resources and environmental issues have become more acute and 
perceptible by the public. Reducing power use and controlling greenhouse gases 
have become primary strategic goals in the 11th Five Year Plan and at the 17th 
National Congress of the Communist Party. Reducing energy use is still given 
priority because it has been considered as the one stone that can kill two birds, 
because it can be used to bring domestic development goals in balancing growth 
and environmental quality; and international climate-change foreign policy into 
line.68   
Finally, through the investigation with a discursive hegemony framework, this 
study has found that the “turning point” of Chinese climate policy can be traced back to 
as early as 2003, in which a series of changes of material, institutional, and ideological 
forces happened. This is a different from many existing literature which assumes China’s 
change of climate policy started from 2007.  
Contributions  
The contribution of this research is twofold. First, this study tried to answer the 
highly interesting question regarding “change” with a causally-deeper theoretical 
approach (Khan, 2008). The approach of discursive hegemony helped me investigate the 
question from several different perspectives and defined the relationship between 
analytical levels. To the best of my knowledge, while connecting discourse analysis, 
development and climate change has been seen in the literature, same type of research 
specifically focusing on the case of China is yet available. I think the present piece can 
contribute to the field of climate and environmental empirical studies by filling this void.  
                                                
68 Interview, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, November 14, 2012 
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Second, theoretically, my initial scheme included to build a cross-level analytical 
framework that can capture the interactive movement of the global discursive hegemony 
and a national one. In my original contrivance, the dominant mainstream SD discourse 
with the ideas of market environmentalism and ecological modernization have impacted 
the Chinese construction of SBD in aspects of the three axes suggested by Hajer and 
Versteeg (2005) which are the institutional centralization around governmental agencies, 
the emergence of new instrumental knowledge, and the diffusion of power effects over 
society as a whole. I found I would need a substantial amount of additional knowledge on 
domestic interactions, particularly the specific policies and economic operations at the 
city or even township levels to construct possibly meaningful analysis, and more ideally 
another country case(s) for comparative studies. It would be a much bigger project than 
the scope of this dissertation and beyond my current capacity, but I would like to carry it 
on for possible future topics of study.  
Limitations and Future Research  
One central problem with the discursive hegemony framework at the theoretical 
level is that actors are not defined a priori as they have to be revealed through tracing 
discourse. Agency is therefore unsure before the research embarks. Empirically, when the 
structure under study is assumed hegemonic, it would be difficult to find out “who’s 
talking” as the dominant discourses are pervasive and there is no significant variation for 
a researcher to detect the discursive “rupture” (Derrida, 1993) in the structure. Simply 
put, the researcher can be buried in overwhelmingly monotonous signaling that usually 
takes the form of repetitive phrases in the texts. This empirical difficulty brings an 
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epistemological problem that how the researcher find and stay in a proper position 
between the research object and the evidence she can perceive. When the evidence 
usually takes the form of written or verbal narratives, the researcher’s understanding may 
be attracted and even absorbed into the empirically hegemonic discursive environment. 
Thus, the researcher needs to create and secure a conceptual space separating the research 
object and evidence available to avoid the pitfall.  
In the specific study of China, the high consistency in policy narratives makes a 
study of “official discourse” easily a study of the Communist Party’s propaganda. I had 
been confronted by similar criticism when presenting a portion of this dissertation before. 
However, despite the derogatory perception for propaganda, what the official discourse in 
China presents is the constant ambition and attempt to construct a discursive hegemony 
thereby perpetrating the government’s rule through a manufactured consent.    
What can a researcher do to avoid the pitfall of absorption? The first strategy I 
think is comparative methods. Internal comparison between the narratives and action of 
identifiable actors, or a comparison of fewer discourses across time is one way. External 
comparison between China and the other nations can be another. 
Another great limitation of the discursive hegemony framework is that it is weak 
in address questions about equity, and perhaps most of the normative questions existing 
in a system. Normative questions are the center of political studies as my personal belief, 
and equity is particular the core of contemporary environmental politics in one basic 
aspect, for example, the distribution of environmental costs (Martinez-Alier, 2002). 
Discursive hegemony has strength in delineating what makes of the dominance and 
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where a possible subversive counter power may lie, but such a formative analysis asks 
about “how” a process came about or may happen, instead of inquire “right” or “wrong.” 
Even though in my research, I tried to point out the problem of the ethic of a neoliberal 
political economic philosophy, I could not push much further as it would become 
irrelevant to the subject matter. However, focusing on particular normative ideas rather 
than a behavior change as this dissertation did, and employing a discursive hegemony 
approach by asking “what conditions make the particular idea honored or dismissed?”, 
“what practices are deemed suitable for the normative idea?”, “what kind of political or 
social mechanisms can facilitate the desired practices?”, may produce fruitful insights. 
A Note on Power   
Power is one, and probably the top one, among the most elemental but contested 
concepts in the study of politics. Robert Dahl’s classic definition where power is 
considered the ability of one actor to make the other do something that it otherwise would 
not do has had great influence among the American political scientists and IR scholars 
(Dahl, 1957, p. 203). This formulation emphasizes intentional control and materialistic 
quality of power. Although IR structuralists brought up the issue of unintended 
consequences, which was one core critique of Dahl’s definition and attempted to move 
beyond an agent-centered worldview (Waltz, 1979), neorealism, as Litfin (1994) argues, 
could not escape from the conventional way of conceptualization, because the neorealist 
notion of power is still by and large materially based (Knorr, 1975) and is measured in 
relative rather than absolute terms (Grieco, 1988).  
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IR neoliberals confront this materialistic quality power, and advocate the 
structural effects of some non-material sources as institutions and ideas in “shaping and 
shoveling” actor’s behavior (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). With “soft power” being 
brought to the horizon (Nye, 1990), notions such as legitimacy, persuasion and even 
cultural attractiveness become understood as different faces of power. The conception of 
power is no longer monopolized by one discourse that power in international politics is 
synonymous to pure coercion and military forces.  
With the “cultural turn” in IR theory in the 1990s, scholars start challenging the 
overall neo-neo rationalist project based on writings of several prominent post-Marxist 
thinkers such as the Frankfurt School, Gramsci, and Foucault.  Their works are often 
labeled post-positivists and are engaged in questioning why and how politics is made in 
certain ways. They also go beyond the materialist tradition of Marxism and tend to pay 
special attention to the “superstructure” of societies with specific historical and politico-
economic contexts, eventually presenting that power is not just about producing effects, 
but also about producing the criteria for certain kinds of effects to be counted. In other 
words, they deconstruct the ways in which power is articulated (Cox, 1986; Campbell, 
1998). This kind of power is deeply intertwined with consent and the operation of 
knowledge, and it is the power I have presented through this study as discursive 
hegemony.  
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Appendix A:  The Construction of Global Climate Change Regime69 
Year Events Significance and Progress 
Agenda Formation Stage 
1972 UN Conference on the 
Human Environment in 
Stockholm 
Necessity and urgency for scientific 
research on climate change was 
promoted and accepted. 
1979 First World Climate 
Conference in Geneva 
Scientific efforts were mobilized to 
mainstream climate research. World 
Climate Programme was established. 
1980-87 Conferences in Villach 
and Bellagio 
Professional communities of scientific 
and policy fields worked closely 
together, marking the transition of the 
climate issue from science to politics.  
1988 Toronto Conference Participants concluded on the “Toronto 
targets” which called upon states to 
reduce their COⁿ emissions 20% below 
1988 levels by 2005. Conference was 
first international effort at the UN-level 
to set concrete target and timetable for 
controlling GHG emissions. Participants 
also agreed to establish the Action Plan 
for the Protection of the Atmosphere and 
a world atmosphere fund. 
1988 Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change 
(IPCC)  
IPCC was formed. 
1989 Noordwijk Ministerial 
Meeting 
The first high-level intergovernmental 
meeting focusing specifically on the 
climate change issue 
1990 Second World Climate 
Conference 
Conflict in positions among Western 
industrialized countries and between the 
Northern and Southern countries became 
evident 
1990 IPCC First Assessment 
Report  
The UN Assembly 
Resolution for 
establishing 
Intergovernmental 
The report provided crucial support for 
the first INC meeting. 
                                                
69 Source: (UNFCCC 2015; C2ES 2015; ENB 2015) 
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Negotiating Committee 
(INC)  
Negotiation Stage 
1991 INC launched first 
official negotiations 
Climate change has been transformed to a 
political problem that involved 
governance of the atmosphere, economic 
and social development of the South, and 
global equity 
1992 UN Conference on 
Environment and 
Development in Rio 
Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (FCCC) was signed by 166 
countries until June 19, 1993 
1994 FCCC enter into force FCCC became effective on March 21, 
1994 
Mar. 1995 First Conference of 
Parties (COP-1) in 
Berlin 
The Berlin Mandate initiated a process of 
negotiating a protocol to the FCCC that 
would contain binding targets and 
timetables beyond 2000. 
1997 COP-3 in Kyoto The Kyoto Protocol (KP) 
2001 COP-7 in Marrakesh  The Marrakesh Accords announced an 
increase in funds to the GEF, and the 
creation of three new funds—the Special 
Climate Change Fund70, the Least-
Developed-Country Fund71, and the 
Adaptation Fund.  
2002 World Summit for 
Sustainable 
Development in 
Johannesburg;  
COP-8 in New Delhi  
Delhi Declaration affirmed sustainable 
development to be a guiding principle for 
coping climate change 
2003 COP-9 in Milan Decisions (among few outcomes) were 
made on sinks projects in the Clean 
Development Mechanism and on 
guidelines for the operation of the SCC 
Fund and the LDC Fund. 
Operationalization/Continued Negotiation Stage 
2005 EU Emissions Trading Russia ratified KP in November 2004, 
                                                
70 The SCCF is designed to finance activities related to adaption, technology transfer, 
development of policies and measures in a number of different sectors, and diversification of 
economies. 
71 The Least-Developed-Country Fund aims to assist these countries in the preparation and 
implementation of national action plans as required under the FCCC 
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launches 
KP enters into force 
bringing KP into force in February 2005. 
2006 CDM opens  
2007 IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report 
COP-13 in Bali  
Bali Road Map charted the course for a 
new negotiation process beyond 2012. A 
twin-track negotiating process for the goal 
was assigned to two subsidiary bodies: 
AWG-LCA focusing on elements of long-
term cooperation including mitigation, 
adaptation, finance and technology 
transfer; and AWG-KP aiming work on 
emission targets for developed countries. 
The results were expected to be delivered 
at COP-15 in 2009. 
2008 Joint Implementation 
Mechanism starts 
 
2009 UN Climate Change 
Summit in New York 
COP-15 in Copenhagen  
The Copenhagen Accord merely 
acknowledged the 2°C limit, and 
committed industrialized countries to 
providing $30 billion as fast-start money 
for adaptation and mitigation activities in 
developing countries by 2012. It did not 
contain quantified emissions reduction 
goals, and only required industrialized 
countries to set their own 2020 emissions 
targets with baseline years of their own 
choices. Mandates for AWG-LCA and 
AWG-KP were extended for the post-
2012 climate regime. 
2010 COP-16 in Cancun The Cancun Agreements established the 
Green Climate Fund (proposed to be $100 
billion per year by 2020), the Technology 
Mechanism of the FCCC, and the Cancun 
Adaptation Framework. No agreement 
was made on how to extend the KP or 
how the funds for GCF would be raised. 
2011 COP-17 in Durban The Durban Platform entailed the process 
(ADP) for a legally binding treaty to be 
defined by 2015 and become effective in 
2020, and it will for the first time include 
developing countries such as China and 
India, as well as the US. The conference 
also led to an agreement on a management 
framework for the GCF.  
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2012 COP-18 in Doha The Doha Climate Gateway contained the 
Doha Amendment, an eight-year 
extension of the Kyoto Protocol until 
2020. Language on loss and damage was 
formalized for the first time in the 
conference documents, while no 
substantive progress could be made on the 
funding. 
2013 COP-19 in Warsaw 
 
The Warsaw Outcomes addressed little 
substantive issues except proposing a for 
addressing loss and damage of impacts 
due to climate change in developing 
countries.  
2014 IPCC Fifth Assessment 
Report  
COP-20 in Lima 
The Lima Call for Climate Action 
committed parties to bring forward their 
“Intended Nationally Determined 
Contributions (INDCs)” to the Paris 
agreement.  
2015 
(forthcoming) 
COP-21 in Paris  
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Appendix B:  China’s Foreign Energy Reliance  
 
Year Oil (Thousand barrels per day) Total Energy (Quadrillion Btu) 
 Import Consumption 
foreign oil 
dependence Import 
Consumpt-
ion 
energy 
dependence 
1990 123.0 2296.4 5.4% -2.384 26.989 -8.8% 
1991 210.8 2498.8 8.4% -1.463 28.159 -5.2% 
1992 375.8 2661.6 14.1% -1.062 29.263 -3.6% 
1993 667.7 2959.5 22.6% -1.943 29.379 -6.6% 
1994 617.5 3160.6 19.5% -0.007 33.278 0.0% 
1995 772.4 3363.2 23.0% -0.288 34.592 -0.8% 
1996 893.7 3610.1 24.8% -0.082 36.696 -0.2% 
1997 1343.3 3916.3 34.3% -0.123 35.966 -0.3% 
1998 1200.4 4105.8 29.2% 0.695 36.476 1.9% 
1999 1376.6 4363.6 31.5% 1.518 37.029 4.1% 
2000 1965.5 4795.7 41.0% 2.052 39.765 5.2% 
2001 1942.5 4917.9 39.5% 0.887 41.201 2.2% 
2002 2093.4 5160.7 40.6% 1.084 43.479 2.5% 
2003 2602.3 5578.1 46.7% 1.721 49.978 3.4% 
2004 3360.1 6437.5 52.2% 3.541 57.913 6.1% 
2005 3470.2 6795.4 51.1% 4.009 64.422 6.2% 
2006 3819.9 7263.3 52.6% 6.098 70.390 8.7% 
2007 4137.1 7479.9 55.3% 5.963 74.853 8.0% 
2008 4519.2 7697.1 58.7% 5.946 78.939 7.5% 
2009 5184.2 8069.8 64.2% 8.710 85.989 10.1% 
2010 5777.3 8938.4 64.6% 10.693 94.922 11.3% 
2011 6123.5 9504.0 64.4% 13.084 103.651 12.6% 
2012 5188.4 10175.1 51.0% 15.406 110.604 13.9% 
Source: (USEIA, 2015) 
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Appendix C:  Oil Market in China 
Year Total production 
Total 
consumption 
Crude 
import 
Crude 
export 
Refined 
product 
import 
Refined 
product 
export 
1992 2851.94 2661.60 230.03 430.19 145.75 136.87 
1993 2903.46 2959.49 312.86 389.66 354.84 79.96 
1994 2957.31 3160.61 251.94 370.83 365.56 98.74 
1995 3059.62 3363.16 349.27 345.93 423.18 112.67 
1996 3211.29 3610.09 459.83 406.58 433.84 111.47 
1997 3284.56 3916.27 717.89 397.66 625.41 159.66 
1998 3301.74 4105.83 579.41 312.86 620.95 144.64 
1999 3317.03 4363.60 744.74 143.74 631.88 147.87 
2000 3377.53 4795.71 1400.54 206.12 565.00 218.71 
2001 3434.63 4917.88 1353.28 151.01 589.22 258.02 
2002 3534.86 5160.71 1394.78 153.26 698.65 292.90 
2003 3572.91 5578.11 1805.80 162.67 796.51 337.09 
2004 3674.75 6437.48 2448.90 109.50 911.20 365.74 
2005 3809.02 6795.44 2598.90 161.34 871.27 454.57 
2006 3884.35 7263.33 2904.70 127.26 915.19 332.45 
2007 3958.34 7479.92 3264.00 77.68 873.14 388.62 
2008 4039.27 7697.13 3577.86 84.76 941.34 421.33 
2009 4074.54 8069.82 4081.89 103.68 1102.29 611.11 
2010 4372.66 8938.36 4753.64 60.60 1023.69 637.52 
2011 4369.98 9504.05 5051.66 177.18 1071.81 614.80 
2012 4459.21 10175.14 4081.89 103.68 1106.50 588.85 
Source: USEIA (2015)               
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Appendix D: Breakdown of COⁿ Emissions from Primary Energy Consumption and 
Intensity Indicators 
Year 
Total 
CO2 
Emissions 
Sources of CO2 Emissions by Energy Type 
Coal  Petroleum Natural Gas  
  
Million 
Metric 
Tons 
Million 
Metric 
Tons 
% of 
Total  
Million 
Metric 
Tons 
% of 
Total 
Million 
Metric 
Tons 
% of 
Total 
1980 1448.47 1161.75 80.2 255.87 17.7 30.84 2.13 
1981 1439.84 1165.45 80.9 246.91 17.1 27.48 1.91 
1982 1506.85 1243.43 82.5 240.15 15.9 23.27 1.54 
1983 1593.46 1315.03 82.5 249.33 15.6 26.32 1.65 
1984 1724.70 1445.79 83.8 252.16 14.6 26.75 1.55 
1985 1857.99 1556.10 83.8 273.98 14.7 27.91 1.50 
1986 1970.77 1646.96 83.6 294.26 14.9 29.56 1.50 
1987 2103.07 1760.27 83.7 312.61 14.9 30.19 1.44 
1988 2240.32 1881.31 84.0 328.27 14.7 30.74 1.37 
1989 2275.55 1897.81 83.4 346.90 15.2 30.84 1.36 
1990 2268.89 1904.14 83.9 334.56 14.7 30.19 1.33 
1991 2369.34 1974.29 83.3 363.82 15.4 31.22 1.32 
1992 2448.88 2042.66 83.4 374.66 15.3 31.56 1.29 
1993 2565.39 2105.98 82.1 426.37 16.6 33.03 1.29 
1994 2754.01 2275.03 82.6 444.17 16.1 34.81 1.26 
1995 2851.78 2340.25 82.1 475.67 16.7 35.85 1.26 
1996 3005.78 2484.40 82.7 481.55 16.0 39.83 1.33 
1997 2918.22 2336.09 80.1 539.13 18.5 42.99 1.47 
1998 2916.26 2335.46 80.1 536.12 18.4 44.68 1.53 
1999 2932.72 2312.43 78.8 572.06 19.5 48.24 1.64 
2000 3165.32 2474.13 78.2 643.11 20.3 48.07 1.52 
2001 3226.52 2514.61 77.9 657.90 20.4 54.02 1.67 
2002 3422.09 2670.56 78.0 692.69 20.2 58.84 1.72 
2003 3959.97 3179.66 80.3 716.91 18.1 63.40 1.60 
2004 4596.97 3671.93 79.9 850.17 18.5 74.87 1.63 
2005 5116.35 4135.69 80.8 888.58 17.4 92.08 1.80 
2006 5575.20 4536.33 81.4 927.92 16.6 110.95 1.99 
2007 5908.43 4810.68 81.4 959.18 16.2 138.57 2.35 
2008 6166.57 5019.67 81.4 995.20 16.1 151.70 2.46 
2009 6816.10 5534.88 81.2 1107.28 16.2 173.94 2.55 
2010 7388.50 6018.33 81.5 1160.42 15.7 209.76 2.84 
2011 8126.69 6612.72 81.4 1256.64 15.5 257.33 3.17 
2012 8106.43 6512.70 80.3 1305.65 16.1 281.32 3.47 
Source: USEIA (2015); World Bank (2015) 
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Year 
  
Intensity Indicators 
Energy Intensity Carbon Intensity Emissions Intensity 
Btu / U.S. Dollars 
2005 Constant 
Metric Tons CO2 / 
Thousand U.S. 
Dollars 2005 
Constant 
Million Metric Tons 
CO2 / Qbtu 
1990 49462.2721 4.1427 83.7545 
1991 47662.2400 3.9992 83.9066 
1992 43426.2488 3.6239 83.4488 
1993 38330.1717 3.3436 87.2320 
1994 38433.4452 3.1729 82.5552 
1995 35471.8490 2.9047 81.8870 
1996 33934.1747 2.7556 81.2041 
1997 33959.6530 2.7771 81.7775 
1998 32546.9173 2.6320 80.8673 
1999 29848.2174 2.3837 79.8597 
2000 28888.4376 2.3089 79.9258 
2001 27746.1389 2.1853 78.7605 
2002 28247.0684 2.2558 79.8590 
2003 28756.4059 2.2999 79.9774 
2004 29330.3453 2.3401 79.7825 
2005 30092.3837 2.4209 80.4488 
2006 29205.1573 2.3339 79.9130 
2007 27326.1955 2.1781 79.7061 
2008 26684.5353 2.0999 78.6928 
2009 27144.2920 2.1784 80.2510 
2010 26273.9237 2.0828 79.2717 
2011 26130.8181 2.0775 79.5050 
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Appendix E:  Temporal View of Use of Words  
Google Ngram Searches in English Corpus  
 
 
Google Ngram Searches in Chinese Corpus 
 
Blue: “sustainable development”  
Green: “climate change” 
Red: “science-based development”  
 200 
Appendix F:  Environmental and Resource Laws of China 
1979 Environmental Protection Law 
1984 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution  
Forest Law  
1985 Grassland Law   
1986 Fisheries Law   
1987 Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 
1988 
Law on Wildlife Protection 
Water Law 
Mineral Resource Law 
1989 (R) Environmental Protection Law 
1991 Law on Soil and Water Conservation 
1992 
Ratification of the Convention on Biodiversity  
Ratification of the Framework Convention on Climate Change 
1993 Agriculture Law 
1995 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution Caused 
by Solid Waste 
Electric Power Law   
1996 
Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Noise Pollution  
Ratification of the Marine Convention 
(R) Law on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 
(R) Mineral Resource Law 
Law on the Coal Industry 
1997 
Law on Energy Conservation   
Flood Prevention Law 
Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters 
1998 (R) Forest Law  
1999 
Meteorology Law 
Marine Environment Protection Law 
2000 
(R) Law on the Prevention and Control of Atmospheric Pollution 
(R) Fisheries Law   
Law on Seeds 
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2001 Law on the Prevention and Control of Desertification 
2002 
Law on the Promotion of Clean Production 
Law on Environment Impact Assessment  
2002 
(R) Water Law 
(R) Grassland Law 
(R) Agriculture Law 
2003 Law on the Prevention and Control of Radioactive Pollution 
2004 
(R) Law on Wildlife Protection 
(R) Law on the Prevention and Control of Environmental Pollution 
Caused by Solid Waste 
Ratification of the border treaty of EEZ and CS between PRC and 
Vietnam 
(R) Law on Seeds 
(R) Fisheries Law   
2005 
Renewable Energy Law 
Law on Animal Husbandry 
Accession to The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other 
Hostile Use of  Environmental Modification Techniques 
2006 
Accession to “Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management 
and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management 
Ratification of The 1996 Protocol of the Convention on the Prevention of 
Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter 
2007 (R) the Energy Conservation Law  
2008 
Circular Economy Promotion Law 
(R) the Law of on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution 
(R) Law on Protecting Against and Mitigating Earthquake Disasters 
Approval of the Revised Convention on the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Materials 
2009 
(R) Renewable Energy Law 
Resolution of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
on Making Active Responses to Climate Change (on 08.27) 
2010 
Law on the Protection of Petroleum and Natural Gas Pipelines  
Law on Water and Soil Conservation  
2011 (R) Law on the Coal Industry 
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2012 
(R) Law on the Promotion of Clean Production  
(R) Law on Agriculture  
(R) Law on the Promotion of Agricultural Technologies  
2013 (R) Law on the Coal Industry 
2014 (R) Environmental Protection Law 
(R) indicates revision 
Sources: Lexis-Nexis; Legislative Affairs Office of the State Council (2015) 
 
